The Existence of Trade Secrets under Texas Law–Fort Worth, Texas Business Law Attorneys

The Existence of Trade Secrets under Texas Law
To determine whether a trade secret exists under Texas law, the Texas Supreme Court has adopted the following nonexclusive, six-factor test, which is largely a set of factors obtained  from §757 of the Restatement of Torts:

(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business;

(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and
others involved in his business;

(3) the extent of the measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the information;

(4) the value of the information to him and to his competitors;

(5) the amount of effort or
money expended by him in developing the information;

(6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others.

In the application of this test, Texas courts have recognized a wide variety of proprietary information as worthy of protection. Some examples include pricing data, design of a product, business procedures, customer lists, computer programs, manufacturing information, marketing strategy,  technical information and data, and vendor lists.

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act–Fort Worth, Texas Employment Lawyers

EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act

ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

INTRODUCTION

This Enforcement Guidance clarifies the rights and responsibilities of employers and individuals with disabilities regarding reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. Title I of the ADA requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities who are employees or applicants for employment, except when such accommodation would cause an undue hardship. This Guidance sets forth an employer’s legal obligations regarding reasonable accommodation; however, employers may provide more than the law requires.

This Guidance examines what “reasonable accommodation” means and who is entitled to receive it. The Guidance addresses what constitutes a request for reasonable accommodation, the form and substance of the request, and an employer’s ability to ask questions and seek documentation after a request has been made.

The Guidance discusses reasonable accommodations applicable to the hiring process and to the benefits and privileges of employment. The Guidance also covers different types of reasonable accommodations related to job performance, including job restructuring, leave, modified or part-time schedules, modified workplace policies, and reassignment. Questions concerning the relationship between the ADA and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) are examined as they affect leave and modified schedules. Reassignment issues addressed include who is entitled to reassignment and the extent to which an employer must search for a vacant position. The Guidance also examines issues concerning the interplay between reasonable accommodations and conduct rules.

The final section of this Guidance discusses undue hardship, including when requests for schedule modifications and leave may be denied.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

Reasonable Accommodation

Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the “ADA”)(1) requires an employer(2) to provide reasonable accommodation to qualified individuals with disabilities who are employees or applicants for employment, unless to do so would cause undue hardship. “In general, an accommodation is any change in the work environment or in the way things are customarily done that enables an individual with a disability to enjoy equal employment opportunities.”(3)There are three categories of “reasonable accommodations”:

“(i) modifications or adjustments to a job application process that enable a qualified applicant with a disability to be considered for the position such qualified applicant desires; or

(ii) modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position; or

(iii) modifications or adjustments that enable a covered entity’s employee with a disability to enjoy equal benefits and privileges of employment as are enjoyed by its other similarly situated employees without disabilities.”(4)

The duty to provide reasonable accommodation is a fundamental statutory requirement because of the nature of discrimination faced by individuals with disabilities. Although many individuals with disabilities can apply for and perform jobs without any reasonable accommodations, there are workplace barriers that keep others from performing jobs which they could do with some form of accommodation. These barriers may be physical obstacles (such as inaccessible facilities or equipment), or they may be procedures or rules (such as rules concerning when work is performed, when breaks are taken, or how essential or marginal functions are performed). Reasonable accommodation removes workplace barriers for individuals with disabilities.

Reasonable accommodation is available to qualified applicants and employees with disabilities.(5) Reasonable accommodations must be provided to qualified employees regardless of whether they work part- time or full-time, or are considered “probationary.” Generally, the individual with a disability must inform the employer that an accommodation is needed.(6)

There are a number of possible reasonable accommodations that an employer may have to provide in connection with modifications to the work environment or adjustments in how and when a job is performed. These include:

  • making existing facilities accessible;
  • job restructuring;
  • part-time or modified work schedules;
  • acquiring or modifying equipment;
  • changing tests, training materials, or policies;
  • providing qualified readers or interpreters; and
  • reassignment to a vacant position.(7)

A modification or adjustment is “reasonable” if it “seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases;”(8) this means it is “reasonable” if it appears to be “feasible” or “plausible.”(9)An accommodation also must be effective in meeting the needs of the individual.(10) In the context of job performance, this means that a reasonable accommodation enables the individual to perform the essential functions of the position. Similarly, a reasonable accommodation enables an applicant with a disability to have an equal opportunity to participate in the application process and to be considered for a job. Finally, a reasonable accommodation allows an employee with a disability an equal opportunity to enjoy the benefits and privileges of employment that employees without disabilities enjoy.

Example A: An employee with a hearing disability must be able to contact the public by telephone. The employee proposes that he use a TTY(11) to call a relay service operator who can then place the telephone call and relay the conversation between the parties. This is “reasonable” because a TTY is a common device used to facilitate communication between hearing and hearing-impaired individuals. Moreover, it would be effective in enabling the employee to perform his job.

Example B: A cashier easily becomes fatigued because of lupus and, as a result, has difficulty making it through her shift. The employee requests a stool because sitting greatly reduces the fatigue. This accommodation is reasonable because it is a common-sense solution to remove a workplace barrier being required to stand when the job can be effectively performed sitting down. This “reasonable” accommodation is effective because it addresses the employee’s fatigue and enables her to perform her job.

Example C: A cleaning company rotates its staff to different floors on a monthly basis. One crew member has a psychiatric disability. While his mental illness does not affect his ability to perform the various cleaning functions, it does make it difficult to adjust to alterations in his daily routine. The employee has had significant difficulty adjusting to the monthly changes in floor assignments. He asks for a reasonable accommodation and proposes three options: staying on one floor permanently, staying on one floor for two months and then rotating, or allowing a transition period to adjust to a change in floor assignments. These accommodations are reasonable because they appear to be feasible solutions to this employee’s problems dealing with changes to his routine. They also appear to be effective because they would enable him to perform his cleaning duties.

There are several modifications or adjustments that are not considered forms of reasonable accommodation.(12) An employer does not have to eliminate an essential function, i.e., a fundamental duty of the position. This is because a person with a disability who is unable to perform the essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation,(13) is not a “qualified” individual with a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Nor is an employer required to lower production standards — whether qualitative or quantitative(14) — that are applied uniformly to employees with and without disabilities. However, an employer may have to provide reasonable accommodation to enable an employee with a disability to meet the production standard. While an employer is not required to eliminate an essential function or lower a production standard, it may do so if it wishes.

An employer does not have to provide as reasonable accommodations personal use items needed in accomplishing daily activities both on and off the job. Thus, an employer is not required to provide an employee with a prosthetic limb, a wheelchair, eyeglasses, hearing aids, or similar devices if they are also needed off the job. Furthermore, an employer is not required to provide personal use amenities, such as a hot pot or refrigerator, if those items are not provided to employees without disabilities. However, items that might otherwise be considered personal may be required as reasonable accommodations where they are specifically designed or required to meet job-related rather than personal needs.(15)

Undue Hardship

The only statutory limitation on an employer’s obligation to provide “reasonable accommodation” is that no such change or modification is required if it would cause “undue hardship” to the employer.(16) “Undue hardship” means significant difficulty or expense and focuses on the resources and circumstances of the particular employer in relationship to the cost or difficulty of providing a specific accommodation. Undue hardship refers not only to financial difficulty, but to reasonable accommodations that are unduly extensive, substantial, or disruptive, or those that would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of the business.(17) An employer must assess on a case-by-case basis whether a particular reasonable accommodation would cause undue hardship. The ADA’s “undue hardship” standard is different from that applied by courts under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for religious accommodation.(18)

REQUESTING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION

    1. How must an individual request a reasonable accommodation?When an individual decides to request accommodation, the individual or his/her representative must let the employer know that s/he needs an adjustment or change at work for a reason related to a medical condition. To request accommodation, an individual may use “plain English” and need not mention the ADA or use the phrase “reasonable accommodation.”(19)

      Example A: An employee tells her supervisor, “I’m having trouble getting to work at my scheduled starting time because of medical treatments I’m undergoing.” This is a request for a reasonable accommodation.

      Example B: An employee tells his supervisor, “I need six weeks off to get treatment for a back problem.” This is a request for a reasonable accommodation.

      Example C: A new employee, who uses a wheelchair, informs the employer that her wheelchair cannot fit under the desk in her office. This is a request for reasonable accommodation.

      Example D: An employee tells his supervisor that he would like a new chair because his present one is uncomfortable. Although this is a request for a change at work, his statement is insufficient to put the employer on notice that he is requesting reasonable accommodation. He does not link his need for the new chair with a medical condition.

      While an individual with a disability may request a change due to a medical condition, this request does not necessarily mean that the employer is required to provide the change. A request for reasonable accommodation is the first step in an informal, interactive process between the individual and the employer. In some instances, before addressing the merits of the accommodation request, the employer needs to determine if the individual’s medical condition meets the ADA definition of “disability,”(20) a prerequisite for the individual to be entitled to a reasonable accommodation.

    2. May someone other than the individual with a disability request a reasonable accommodation on behalf of the individual?Yes, a family member, friend, health professional, or other representative may request a reasonable accommodation on behalf of an individual with a disability.(21) Of course, the individual with a disability may refuse to accept an accommodation that is not needed.

      Example A: An employee’s spouse phones the employee’s supervisor on Monday morning to inform her that the employee had a medical emergency due to multiple sclerosis, needed to be hospitalized, and thus requires time off. This discussion constitutes a request for reasonable accommodation.

      Example B: An employee has been out of work for six months with a workers’ compensation injury. The employee’s doctor sends the employer a letter, stating that the employee is released to return to work, but with certain work restrictions. (Alternatively, the letter may state that the employee is released to return to a light duty position.) The letter constitutes a request for reasonable accommodation.

    3. Do requests for reasonable accommodation need to be in writing?No. Requests for reasonable accommodation do not need to be in writing. Individuals may request accommodations in conversation or may use any other mode of communication.(22)An employer may choose to write a memorandum or letter confirming the individual’s request. Alternatively, an employer may ask the individual to fill out a form or submit the request in written form, but the employer cannot ignore the initial request. An employer also may request reasonable documentation that the individual has an ADA disability and needs a reasonable accommodation. (See Question 6).
    4. When should an individual with a disability request a reasonable accommodation?An individual with a disability may request a reasonable accommodation at any time during the application process or during the period of employment. The ADA does not preclude an employee with a disability from requesting a reasonable accommodation because s/he did not ask for one when applying for a job or after receiving a job offer. Rather, an individual with a disability should request a reasonable accommodation when s/he knows that there is a workplace barrier that is preventing him/her, due to a disability, from effectively competing for a position, performing a job, or gaining equal access to a benefit of employment.(23) As a practical matter, it may be in an employee’s interest to request a reasonable accommodation before performance suffers or conduct problems occur.
    5. What must an employer do after receiving a request for reasonable accommodation?The employer and the individual with a disability should engage in an informal process to clarify what the individual needs and identify the appropriate reasonable accommodation.(24) The employer may ask the individual relevant questions that will enable it to make an informed decision about the request. This includes asking what type of reasonable accommodation is needed.(25)The exact nature of the dialogue will vary. In many instances, both the disability and the type of accommodation required will be obvious, and thus there may be little or no need to engage in any discussion. In other situations, the employer may need to ask questions concerning the nature of the disability and the individual’s functional limitations in order to identify an effective accommodation. While the individual with a disability does not have to be able to specify the precise accommodation, s/he does need to describe the problems posed by the workplace barrier. Additionally, suggestions from the individual with a disability may assist the employer in determining the type of reasonable accommodation to provide. Where the individual or the employer are not familiar with possible accommodations, there are extensive public and private resources to help the employer identify reasonable accommodations once the specific limitations and workplace barriers have been ascertained.(26)
    6. May an employer ask an individual for documentation when the individual requests reasonable accommodation?Yes. When the disability and/or the need for accommodation is not obvious, the employer may ask the individual for reasonable documentation about his/her disability and functional limitations. (27) The employer is entitled to know that the individual has a covered disability for which s/he needs a reasonable accommodation.Reasonable documentation means that the employer may require only the documentation that is needed to establish that a person has an ADA disability, and that the disability necessitates a reasonable accommodation. Thus, an employer, in response to a request for reasonable accommodation, cannot ask for documentation that is unrelated to determining the existence of a disability and the necessity for an accommodation. This means that in most situations an employer cannot request a person’s complete medical records because they are likely to contain information unrelated to the disability at issue and the need for accommodation. If an individual has more than one disability, an employer can request information pertaining only to the disability that requires a reasonable accommodation.An employer may require that the documentation about the disability and the functional limitations come from an appropriate health care or rehabilitation professional. The appropriate professional in any particular situation will depend on the disability and the type of functional limitation it imposes. Appropriate professionals include, but are not limited to, doctors (including psychiatrists), psychologists, nurses, physical therapists, occupational therapists, speech therapists, vocational rehabilitation specialists, and licensed mental health professionals.

      In requesting documentation, employers should specify what types of information they are seeking regarding the disability, its functional limitations, and the need for reasonable accommodation. The individual can be asked to sign a limited release allowing the employer to submit a list of specific questions to the health care or vocational professional.(28)

      As an alternative to requesting documentation, an employer may simply discuss with the person the nature of his/her disability and functional limitations. It would be useful for the employer to make clear to the individual why it is requesting information, i.e., to verify the existence of an ADA disability and the need for a reasonable accommodation.

      Example A: An employee says to an employer, “I’m having trouble reaching tools because of my shoulder injury.” The employer may ask the employee for documentation describing the impairment; the nature, severity, and duration of the impairment; the activity or activities that the impairment limits; and the extent to which the impairment limits the employee’s ability to perform the activity or activities (i.e., the employer is seeking information as to whether the employee has an ADA disability).

      Example B: A marketing employee has a severe learning disability. He attends numerous meetings to plan marketing strategies. In order to remember what is discussed at these meetings he must take detailed notes but, due to his disability, he has great difficulty writing. The employee tells his supervisor about his disability and requests a laptop computer to use in the meetings. Since neither the disability nor the need for accommodation are obvious, the supervisor may ask the employee for reasonable documentation about his impairment; the nature, severity, and duration of the impairment; the activity or activities that the impairment limits; and the extent to which the impairment limits the employee’s ability to perform the activity or activities. The employer also may ask why the disability necessitates use of a laptop computer (or any other type of reasonable accommodation, such as a tape recorder) to help the employee retain the information from the meetings.(29)

      Example C: An employee’s spouse phones the employee’s supervisor on Monday morning to inform her that the employee had a medical emergency due to multiple sclerosis, needed to be hospitalized, and thus requires time off. The supervisor can ask the spouse to send in documentation from the employee’s treating physician that confirms that the hospitalization was related to the multiple sclerosis and provides information on how long an absence may be required from work.(30)

      If an individual’s disability or need for reasonable accommodation is not obvious, and s/he refuses to provide the reasonable documentation requested by the employer, then s/he is not entitled to reasonable accommodation.(31) On the other hand, failure by the employer to initiate or participate in an informal dialogue with the individual after receiving a request for reasonable accommodation could result in liability for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation.(32)

    7. May an employer require an individual to go to a health care professional of the employer’s (rather than the employee’s) choice for purposes of documenting need for accommodation and disability?The ADA does not prevent an employer from requiring an individual to go to an appropriate health professional of the employer’s choice if the individual provides insufficient information from his/her treating physician (or other health care professional) to substantiate that s/he has an ADA disability and needs a reasonable accommodation. However, if an individual provides insufficient documentation in response to the employer’s initial request, the employer should explain why the documentation is insufficient and allow the individual an opportunity to provide the missing information in a timely manner. Documentation is insufficient if it does not specify the existence of an ADA disability and explain the need for reasonable accommodation.(33)Any medical examination conducted by the employer’s health professional must be job-related and consistent with business necessity. This means that the examination must be limited to determining the existence of an ADA disability and the functional limitations that require reasonable accommodation.(34)If an employer requires an employee to go to a health professional of the employer’s choice, the employer must pay all costs associated with the visit(s).
    8. Are there situations in which an employer cannot ask for documentation in response to a request for reasonable accommodation?Yes. An employer cannot ask for documentation when: (1) both the disability and the need for reasonable accommodation are obvious, or (2) the individual has already provided the employer with sufficient information to substantiate that s/he has an ADA disability and needs the reasonable accommodation requested.

      Example A: An employee brings a note from her treating physician explaining that she has diabetes and that, as a result, she must test her blood sugar several times a day to ensure that her insulin level is safe in order to avoid a hyperglycemic reaction. The note explains that a hyperglycemic reaction can include extreme thirst, heavy breathing, drowsiness, and flushed skin, and eventually would result in unconsciousness. Depending on the results of the blood test, the employee might have to take insulin. The note requests that the employee be allowed three or four 10-minute breaks each day to test her blood, and if necessary, to take insulin. The doctor’s note constitutes sufficient documentation that the person has an ADA disability because it describes a substantially limiting impairment and the reasonable accommodation needed as a result. The employer cannot ask for additional documentation.

      Example B: One year ago, an employer learned that an employee had bipolar disorder after he requested a reasonable accommodation. The documentation provided at that time from the employee’s psychiatrist indicated that this was a permanent condition which would always involve periods in which the disability would remit and then intensify. The psychiatrist’s letter explained that during periods when the condition flared up, the person’s manic moods or depressive episodes could be severe enough to create serious problems for the individual in caring for himself or working, and that medication controlled the frequency and severity of these episodes.

      Now, one year later, the employee again requests a reasonable accommodation related to his bipolar disorder. Under these facts, the employer may ask for reasonable documentation on the need for the accommodation (if the need is not obvious), but it cannot ask for documentation that the person has an ADA disability. The medical information provided one year ago established the existence of a long-term impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.

      Example C: An employee gives her employer a letter from her doctor, stating that the employee has asthma and needs the employer to provide her with an air filter. This letter contains insufficient information as to whether the asthma is an ADA disability because it does not provide any information as to its severity (i.e., whether it substantially limits a major life activity). Furthermore, the letter does not identify precisely what problem exists in the workplace that requires an air filter or any other reasonable accommodation. Therefore, the employer can request additional documentation.

    9. Is an employer required to provide the reasonable accommodation that the individual wants?The employer may choose among reasonable accommodations as long as the chosen accommodation is effective.(35) Thus, as part of the interactive process, the employer may offer alternative suggestions for reasonable accommodations and discuss their effectiveness in removing the workplace barrier that is impeding the individual with a disability.If there are two possible reasonable accommodations, and one costs more or is more burdensome than the other, the employer may choose the less expensive or burdensome accommodation as long as it is effective (i.e., it would remove a workplace barrier, thereby providing the individual with an equal opportunity to apply for a position, to perform the essential functions of a position, or to gain equal access to a benefit or privilege of employment). Similarly, when there are two or more effective accommodations, the employer may choose the one that is easier to provide. In either situation, the employer does not have to show that it is an undue hardship to provide the more expensive or more difficult accommodation. If more than one accommodation is effective, “the preference of the individual with a disability should be given primary consideration. However, the employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations.”(36)

      Example A: An employee with a severe learning disability has great difficulty reading. His supervisor sends him many detailed memoranda which he often has trouble understanding. However, he has no difficulty understanding oral communication. The employee requests that the employer install a computer with speech output and that his supervisor send all memoranda through electronic mail which the computer can then read to him. The supervisor asks whether a tape recorded message would accomplish the same objective and the employee agrees that it would. Since both accommodations are effective, the employer may choose to provide the supervisor and employee with a tape recorder so that the supervisor can record her memoranda and the employee can listen to them.

      Example B: An attorney with a severe vision disability requests that her employer provide someone to read printed materials that she needs to review daily. The attorney explains that a reader enables her to review substantial amounts of written materials in an efficient manner. Believing that this reasonable accommodation would be too costly, the employer instead provides the attorney with a device that allows her to magnify print so that she can read it herself. The attorney can read print using this device, but with such great difficulty it significantly slows down her ability to review written materials. The magnifying device is ineffective as a reasonable accommodation because it does not provide the attorney with an equal opportunity to attain the same level of performance as her colleagues. Without an equal opportunity to attain the same level of performance, this attorney is denied an equal opportunity to compete for promotions. In this instance, failure to provide the reader, absent undue hardship, would violate the ADA.

    10. How quickly must an employer respond to a request for reasonable accommodation?An employer should respond expeditiously to a request for reasonable accommodation. If the employer and the individual with a disability need to engage in an interactive process, this too should proceed as quickly as possible.(37) Similarly, the employer should act promptly to provide the reasonable accommodation. Unnecessary delays can result in a violation of the ADA.(38)

      Example A: An employer provides parking for all employees. An employee who uses a wheelchair requests from his supervisor an accessible parking space, explaining that the spaces are so narrow that there is insufficient room for his van to extend the ramp that allows him to get in and out. The supervisor does not act on the request and does not forward it to someone with authority to respond. The employee makes a second request to the supervisor. Yet, two months after the initial request, nothing has been done. Although the supervisor never definitively denies the request, the lack of action under these circumstances amounts to a denial, and thus violates the ADA.

      Example B: An employee who is blind requests adaptive equipment for her computer as a reasonable accommodation. The employer must order this equipment and is informed that it will take three months to receive delivery. No other company sells the adaptive equipment the employee needs. The employer notifies the employee of the results of its investigation and that it has ordered the equipment. Although it will take three months to receive the equipment, the employer has moved as quickly as it can to obtain it and thus there is no ADA violation resulting from the delay. The employer and employee should determine what can be done so that the employee can perform his/her job as effectively as possible while waiting for the equipment.

    11. May an employer require an individual with a disability to accept a reasonable accommodation that s/he does not want?No. An employer may not require a qualified individual with a disability to accept an accommodation. If, however, an employee needs a reasonable accommodation to perform an essential function or to eliminate a direct threat, and refuses to accept an effective accommodation, s/he may not be qualified to remain in the job.(39)

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND JOB APPLICANTS

    1. May an employer ask whether a reasonable accommodation is needed when an applicant has not asked for one?An employer may tell applicants what the hiring process involves (e.g., an interview, timed written test, or job demonstration), and may ask applicants whether they will need a reasonable accommodation for this process.During the hiring process and before a conditional offer is made, an employer generally may not ask an applicant whether s/he needs a reasonable accommodation for the job, except when the employer knows that an applicant has a disability — either because it is obvious or the applicant has voluntarily disclosed the information — and could reasonably believe that the applicant will need a reasonable accommodation to perform specific job functions. If the applicant replies that s/he needs a reasonable accommodation, the employer may inquire as to what type. (40)After a conditional offer of employment is extended, an employer may inquire whether applicants will need reasonable accommodations related to anything connected with the job (i.e., job performance or access to benefits/privileges of the job) as long as all entering employees in the same job category are asked this question. Alternatively, an employer may ask a specific applicant if s/he needs a reasonable accommodation if the employer knows that this applicant has a disability — either because it is obvious or the applicant has voluntarily disclosed the information — and could reasonably believe that the applicant will need a reasonable accommodation. If the applicant replies that s/he needs a reasonable accommodation, the employer may inquire as to what type.(41)
    2. Does an employer have to provide a reasonable accommodation to an applicant with a disability even if it believes that it will be unable to provide this individual with a reasonable accommodation on the job?Yes. An employer must provide a reasonable accommodation to a qualified applicant with a disability that will enable the individual to have an equal opportunity to participate in the application process and to be considered for a job (unless it can show undue hardship). Thus, individuals with disabilities who meet initial requirements to be considered for a job should not be excluded from the application process because the employer speculates, based on a request for reasonable accommodation for the application process, that it will be unable to provide the individual with reasonable accommodation to perform the job. In many instances, employers will be unable to determine whether an individual needs reasonable accommodation to perform a job based solely on a request for accommodation during the application process. And even if an individual will need reasonable accommodation to perform the job, it may not be the same type or degree of accommodation that is needed for the application process. Thus, an employer should assess the need for accommodations for the application process separately from those that may be needed to perform the job. (42)

      Example A: An employer is impressed with an applicant’s resume and contacts the individual to come in for an interview. The applicant, who is deaf, requests a sign language interpreter for the interview. The employer cancels the interview and refuses to consider further this applicant because it believes it would have to hire a full-time interpreter. The employer has violated the ADA. The employer should have proceeded with the interview, using a sign language interpreter (absent undue hardship), and at the interview inquired to what extent the individual would need a sign language interpreter to perform any essential functions requiring communication with other people.

      Example B: An individual who has paraplegia applies for a secretarial position. Because the office has two steps at the entrance, the employer arranges for the applicant to take a typing test, a requirement of the application process, at a different location. The applicant fails the test. The employer does not have to provide any further reasonable accommodations for this individual because she is no longer qualified to continue with the application process.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION RELATED TO THE BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES OF EMPLOYMENT (43)

The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations so that employees with disabilities can enjoy the “benefits and privileges of employment” equal to those enjoyed by similarly-situated employees without disabilities. Benefits and privileges of employment include, but are not limited to, employer-sponsored: (1) training, (2) services (e.g., employee assistance programs (EAP’s), credit unions, cafeterias, lounges, gymnasiums, auditoriums, transportation), and (3) parties or other social functions (e.g., parties to celebrate retirements and birthdays, and company outings).(44)If an employee with a disability needs a reasonable accommodation in order to gain access to, and have an equal opportunity to participate in, these benefits and privileges, then the employer must provide the accommodation unless it can show undue hardship.

    1. Does an employer have to provide reasonable accommodation to enable an employee with a disability to have equal access to information communicated in the workplace to non-disabled employees?Yes. Employers provide information to employees through different means, including computers, bulletin boards, mailboxes, posters, and public address systems. Employers must ensure that employees with disabilities have access to information that is provided to other similarly-situated employees without disabilities, regardless of whether they need it to perform their jobs.

      Example A: An employee who is blind has adaptive equipment for his computer that integrates him into the network with other employees, thus allowing communication via electronic mail and access to the computer bulletin board. When the employer installs upgraded computer equipment, it must provide new adaptive equipment in order for the employee to be integrated into the new networks, absent undue hardship. Alternative methods of communication (e.g., sending written or telephone messages to the employee instead of electronic mail) are likely to be ineffective substitutes since electronic mail is used by every employee and there is no effective way to ensure that each one will always use alternative measures to ensure that the blind employee receives the same information that is being transmitted via computer.

      Example B: An employer authorizes the Human Resources Director to use a public address system to remind employees about special meetings and to make certain announcements. In order to make this information accessible to a deaf employee, the Human Resources Director arranges to send in advance an electronic mail message to the deaf employee conveying the information that will be broadcast. The Human Resources Director is the only person who uses the public address system; therefore, the employer can ensure that all public address messages are sent, via electronic mail, to the deaf employee. Thus, the employer is providing this employee with equal access to office communications.

    2. Must an employer provide reasonable accommodation so that an employee may attend training programs?Yes. Employers must provide reasonable accommodation (e.g., sign language interpreters; written materials produced in alternative formats, such as braille, large print, or on audio- cassette) that will provide employees with disabilities with an equal opportunity to participate in employer-sponsored training, absent undue hardship. This obligation extends to in-house training, as well as to training provided by an outside entity. Similarly, the employer has an obligation to provide reasonable accommodation whether the training occurs on the employer’s premises or elsewhere.

      Example A: XYZ Corp. has signed a contract with Super Trainers, Inc., to provide mediation training at its facility to all of XYZ’s Human Resources staff. One staff member is blind and requests that materials be provided in braille. Super Trainers refuses to provide the materials in braille. XYZ maintains that it is the responsibility of Super Trainers and sees no reason why it should have to arrange and pay for the braille copy.

      Both XYZ (as an employer covered under Title I of the ADA) and Super Trainers (as a public accommodation covered under Title III of the ADA)(45) have obligations to provide materials in alternative formats. This fact, however, does not excuse either one from their respective obligations. If Super Trainers refuses to provide the braille version, despite its Title III obligations, XYZ still retains its obligation to provide it as a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship.

      Employers arranging with an outside entity to provide training may wish to avoid such problems by specifying in the contract who has the responsibility to provide appropriate reasonable accommodations. Similarly, employers should ensure that any offsite training will be held in an accessible facility if they have an employee who, because of a disability, requires such an accommodation.

      Example B: XYZ Corp. arranges for one of its employees to provide CPR training. This three-hour program is optional. A deaf employee wishes to take the training and requests a sign language interpreter. XYZ must provide the interpreter because the CPR training is a benefit that XYZ offers all employees, even though it is optional.

TYPES OF REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS RELATED TO JOB PERFORMANCE(46)

Below are discussed certain types of reasonable accommodations related to job performance.

Job Restructuring

Job restructuring includes modifications such as:

      • reallocating or redistributing marginal job functions that an employee is unable to perform because of a disability; and
      • altering when and/or how a function, essential or marginal, is performed.(47)

An employer never has to reallocate essential functions as a reasonable accommodation, but can do so if it wishes.

    1. If, as a reasonable accommodation, an employer restructures an employee’s job to eliminate some marginal functions, may the employer require the employee to take on other marginal functions that s/he can perform?Yes. An employer may switch the marginal functions of two (or more) employees in order to restructure a job as a reasonable accommodation.

      Example: A cleaning crew works in an office building. One member of the crew wears a prosthetic leg which enables him to walk very well, but climbing steps is painful and difficult. Although he can perform his essential functions without problems, he cannot perform the marginal function of sweeping the steps located throughout the building. The marginal functions of a second crew member include cleaning the small kitchen in the employee’s lounge, which is something the first crew member can perform. The employer can switch the marginal functions performed by these two employees.

      Leave

      Permitting the use of accrued paid leave, or unpaid leave, is a form of reasonable accommodation when necessitated by an employee’s disability.(48) An employer does not have to provide paid leave beyond that which is provided to similarly-situated employees. Employers should allow an employee with a disability to exhaust accrued paid leave first and then provide unpaid leave.(49) For example, if employees get 10 days of paid leave, and an employee with a disability needs 15 days of leave, the employer should allow the individual to use 10 days of paid leave and 5 days of unpaid leave.

      An employee with a disability may need leave for a number of reasons related to the disability, including, but not limited to:

      • obtaining medical treatment (e.g., surgery, psychotherapy, substance abuse treatment, or dialysis); rehabilitation services; or physical or occupational therapy;
      • recuperating from an illness or an episodic manifestation of the disability;
      • obtaining repairs on a wheelchair, accessible van, or prosthetic device;
      • avoiding temporary adverse conditions in the work environment (for example, an air-conditioning breakdown causing unusually warm temperatures that could seriously harm an employee with multiple sclerosis);
      • training a service animal (e.g., a guide dog); or
      • receiving training in the use of braille or to learn sign language.
    2. May an employer apply a “no-fault” leave policy, under which employees are automatically terminated after they have been on leave for a certain period of time, to an employee with a disability who needs leave beyond the set period?No. If an employee with a disability needs additional unpaid leave as a reasonable accommodation, the employer must modify its “no-fault” leave policy to provide the employee with the additional leave, unless it can show that: (1) there is another effective accommodation that would enable the person to perform the essential functions of his/her position, or (2) granting additional leave would cause an undue hardship. Modifying workplace policies, including leave policies, is a form of reasonable accommodation.(50)
    3. Does an employer have to hold open an employee’s job as a reasonable accommodation?Yes. An employee with a disability who is granted leave as a reasonable accommodation is entitled to return to his/her same position unless the employer demonstrates that holding open the position would impose an undue hardship.(51)If an employer cannot hold a position open during the entire leave period without incurring undue hardship, the employer must consider whether it has a vacant, equivalent position for which the employee is qualified and to which the employee can be reassigned to continue his/her leave for a specific period of time and then, at the conclusion of the leave, can be returned to this new position.(52)

      Example: An employee needs eight months of leave for treatment and recuperation related to a disability. The employer grants the request, but after four months the employer determines that it can no longer hold open the position for the remaining four months without incurring undue hardship. The employer must consider whether it has a vacant, equivalent position to which the employee can be reassigned for the remaining four months of leave, at the end of which time the employee would return to work in that new position. If an equivalent position is not available, the employer must look for a vacant position at a lower level. Continued leave is not required as a reasonable accommodation if a vacant position at a lower level is also unavailable.

    4. Can an employer penalize an employee for work missed during leave taken as a reasonable accommodation?No. To do so would be retaliation for the employee’s use of a reasonable accommodation to which s/he is entitled under the law.(53) Moreover, such punishment would make the leave an ineffective accommodation, thus making an employer liable for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.(54)

      Example A: A salesperson took five months of leave as a reasonable accommodation. The company compares the sales records of all salespeople over a one-year period, and any employee whose sales fall more than 25% below the median sales performance of all employees is automatically terminated. The employer terminates the salesperson because she had fallen below the required performance standard. The company did not consider that the reason for her lower sales performance was her five-month leave of absence; nor did it assess her productivity during the period she did work (i.e., prorate her productivity).

      Penalizing the salesperson in this manner constitutes retaliation and a denial of reasonable accommodation.

      Example B: Company X is having a reduction-in-force. The company decides that any employee who has missed more than four weeks in the past year will be terminated. An employee took five weeks of leave for treatment of his disability. The company cannot count those five weeks in determining whether to terminate this employee.(55)

    5. When an employee requests leave as a reasonable accommodation, may an employer provide an accommodation that requires him/her to remain on the job instead?Yes, if the employer’s reasonable accommodation would be effective and eliminate the need for leave.(56) An employer need not provide an employee’s preferred accommodation as long as the employer provides an effective accommodation.(57) Accordingly, in lieu of providing leave, an employer may provide a reasonable accommodation that requires an employee to remain on the job (e.g., reallocation of marginal functions or temporary transfer) as long as it does not interfere with the employee’s ability to address his/her medical needs. The employer is obligated, however, to restore the employee’s full duties or to return the employee to his/her original position once s/he no longer needs the reasonable accommodation.

      Example A: An employee with emphysema requests ten weeks of leave for surgery and recuperation related to his disability. In discussing this request with the employer, the employee states that he could return to work after seven weeks if, during his first three weeks back, he could work part-time and eliminate two marginal functions that require lots of walking. If the employer provides these accommodations, then it can require the employee to return to work after seven weeks.

      Example B: An employee’s disability is getting more severe and her doctor recommends surgery to counteract some of the effects. After receiving the employee’s request for leave for the surgery, the employer proposes that it provide certain equipment which it believes will mitigate the effects of the disability and delay the need for leave to get surgery. The employer’s proposed accommodation is not effective because it interferes with the employee’s ability to get medical treatment.

    6. How should an employer handle leave for an employee covered by both the ADA and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)?(58)An employer should determine an employee’s rights under each statute separately, and then consider whether the two statutes overlap regarding the appropriate actions to take.(59)Under the ADA, an employee who needs leave related to his/her disability is entitled to such leave if there is no other effective accommodation and the leave will not cause undue hardship. An employer must allow the individual to use any accrued paid leave first, but, if that is insufficient to cover the entire period, then the employer should grant unpaid leave. An employer must continue an employee’s health insurance benefits during his/her leave period only if it does so for other employees in a similar leave status. As for the employee’s position, the ADA requires that the employer hold it open while the employee is on leave unless it can show that doing so causes undue hardship. When the employee is ready to return to work, the employer must allow the individual to return to the same position (assuming that there was no undue hardship in holding it open) if the employee is still qualified (i.e., the employee can perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation).If it is an undue hardship under the ADA to hold open an employee’s position during a period of leave, or an employee is no longer qualified to return to his/her original position, then the employer must reassign the employee (absent undue hardship) to a vacant position for which s/he is qualified.

      Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to a maximum of 12 weeks of leave per 12 month period. The FMLA guarantees the right of the employee to return to the same position or to an equivalent one.(60) An employer must allow the individual to use any accrued paid leave first, but if that is insufficient to cover the entire period, then the employer should grant unpaid leave. The FMLA requires an employer to continue the employee’s health insurance coverage during the leave period, provided the employee pays his/her share of the premiums.

      Example A: An employee with an ADA disability needs 13 weeks of leave for treatment related to the disability. The employee is eligible under the FMLA for 12 weeks of leave (the maximum available), so this period of leave constitutes both FMLA leave and a reasonable accommodation. Under the FMLA, the employer could deny the employee the thirteenth week of leave. But, because the employee is also covered under the ADA, the employer cannot deny the request for the thirteenth week of leave unless it can show undue hardship. The employer may consider the impact on its operations caused by the initial 12-week absence, along with other undue hardship factors.(61)

      Example B: An employee with an ADA disability has taken 10 weeks of FMLA leave and is preparing to return to work. The employer wants to put her in an equivalent position rather than her original one. Although this is permissible under the FMLA, the ADA requires that the employer return the employee to her original position. Unless the employer can show that this would cause an undue hardship, or that the employee is no longer qualified for her original position (with or without reasonable accommodation), the employer must reinstate the employee to her original position.

      Example C: An employee with an ADA disability has taken 12 weeks of FMLA leave. He notifies his employer that he is ready to return to work, but he no longer is able to perform the essential functions of his position or an equivalent position. Under the FMLA, the employer could terminate his employment,(62) but under the ADA the employer must consider whether the employee could perform the essential functions with reasonable accommodation (e.g., additional leave, part-time schedule, job restructuring, or use of specialized equipment). If not, the ADA requires the employer to reassign the employee if there is a vacant position available for which he is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, and there is no undue hardship.

Modified or Part-Time Schedule

    1. Must an employer allow an employee with a disability to work a modified or part-time schedule as a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship?Yes.(63) A modified schedule may involve adjusting arrival or departure times, providing periodic breaks, altering when certain functions are performed, allowing an employee to use accrued paid leave, or providing additional unpaid leave. An employer must provide a modified or part-time schedule when required as a reasonable accommodation, absent undue hardship, even if it does not provide such schedules for other employees.(64)

      Example A: An employee with HIV infection must take medication on a strict schedule. The medication causes extreme nausea about one hour after ingestion, and generally lasts about 45 minutes. The employee asks that he be allowed to take a daily 45-minute break when the nausea occurs. The employer must grant this request absent undue hardship.

      For certain positions, the time during which an essential function is performed may be critical. This could affect whether an employer can grant a request to modify an employee’s schedule.(65) Employers should carefully assess whether modifying the hours could significantly disrupt their operations — that is, cause undue hardship — or whether the essential functions may be performed at different times with little or no impact on the operations or the ability of other employees to perform their jobs.

      If modifying an employee’s schedule poses an undue hardship, an employer must consider reassignment to a vacant position that would enable the employee to work during the hours requested. (66)

      Example B: A day care worker requests that she be allowed to change her hours from 7:00 a.m. – 3:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m. because of her disability. The day care center is open from 7:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m. and it will still have sufficient coverage at the beginning of the morning if it grants the change in hours. In this situation, the employer must provide the reasonable accommodation.

      Example C: An employee works for a morning newspaper, operating the printing presses which run between 10 p.m. and 3 a.m. Due to her disability, she needs to work in the daytime. The essential function of her position, operating the printing presses, requires that she work at night because the newspaper cannot be printed during the daytime hours. Since the employer cannot modify her hours, it must consider whether it can reassign her to a different position.

    2. How should an employer handle requests for modified or part-time schedules for an employee covered by both the ADA and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)?(67)An employer should determine an employee’s rights under each statute separately, and then consider whether the two statutes overlap regarding the appropriate actions to take.Under the ADA, an employee who needs a modified or part-time schedule because of his/her disability is entitled to such a schedule if there is no other effective accommodation and it will not cause undue hardship. If there is undue hardship, the employer must reassign the employee if there is a vacant position for which s/he is qualified and which would allow the employer to grant the modified or part-time schedule (absent undue hardship).(68)An employee receiving a part-time schedule as a reasonable accommodation is entitled only to the benefits, including health insurance, that other part-time employees receive. Thus, if non- disabled part-time workers are not provided with health insurance, then the employer does not have to provide such coverage to an employee with a disability who is given a part-time schedule as a reasonable accommodation.Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is entitled to take leave intermittently or on a part-time basis, when medically necessary, until s/he has used up the equivalent of 12 workweeks in a 12- month period. When such leave is foreseeable based on planned medical treatment, an employer may require the employee to temporarily transfer (for the duration of the leave) to an available alternative position, with equivalent pay and benefits, for which the employee is qualified and which better suits his/her reduced hours.(69) An employer always must maintain the employee’s existing level of coverage under a group health plan during the period of FMLA leave, provided the employee pays his/her share of the premium.(70)

      Example: An employee with an ADA disability requests that she be excused from work one day a week for the next six months because of her disability. If this employee is eligible for a modified schedule under the FMLA, the employer must provide the requested leave under that statute if it is medically necessary, even if the leave would be an undue hardship under the ADA.

Modified Workplace Policies

    1. Is it a reasonable accommodation to modify a workplace policy?Yes. It is a reasonable accommodation to modify a workplace policy when necessitated by an individual’s disability-related limitations,(71) absent undue hardship. But, reasonable accommodation only requires that the employer modify the policy for an employee who requires such action because of a disability; therefore, the employer may continue to apply the policy to all other employees.

      Example: An employer has a policy prohibiting employees from eating or drinking at their workstations. An employee with insulin-dependent diabetes explains to her employer that she may occasionally take too much insulin and, in order to avoid going into insulin shock, she must immediately eat a candy bar or drink fruit juice. The employee requests permission to keep such food at her workstation and to eat or drink when her insulin level necessitates. The employer must modify its policy to grant this request, absent undue hardship. Similarly, an employer might have to modify a policy to allow an employee with a disability to bring in a small refrigerator, or to use the employer’s refrigerator, to store medication that must be taken during working hours.

      Granting an employee time off from work or an adjusted work schedule as a reasonable accommodation may involve modifying leave or attendance procedures or policies. For example, it would be a reasonable accommodation to modify a policy requiring employees to schedule vacation time in advance if an otherwise qualified individual with a disability needed to use accrued vacation time on an unscheduled basis because of disability- related medical problems, barring undue hardship.(72)Furthermore, an employer may be required to provide additional leave to an employee with a disability as a reasonable accommodation in spite of a “no-fault” leave policy, unless the provision of such leave would impose an undue hardship.(73)

      In some instances, an employer’s refusal to modify a workplace policy, such as a leave or attendance policy, could constitute disparate treatment as well as a failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. For example, an employer may have a policy requiring employees to notify supervisors before 9:00 a.m. if they are unable to report to work. If an employer would excuse an employee from complying with this policy because of emergency hospitalization due to a car accident, then the employer must do the same thing when the emergency hospitalization is due to a disability.(74)

Reassignment (75)

The ADA specifically lists “reassignment to a vacant position” as a form of reasonable accommodation.(76) This type of reasonable accommodation must be provided to an employee who, because of a disability, can no longer perform the essential functions of his/her current position, with or without reasonable accommodation, unless the employer can show that it would be an undue hardship.(77)

An employee must be “qualified” for the new position. An employee is “qualified” for a position if s/he: (1) satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements of the position, and (2) can perform the essential functions of the new position, with or without reasonable accommodation.(78) The employee does not need to be the best qualified individual for the position in order to obtain it as a reassignment.

There is no obligation for the employer to assist the individual to become qualified. Thus, the employer does not have to provide training so that the employee acquires necessary skills to take a job.(79) The employer, however, would have to provide an employee with a disability who is being reassigned with any training that is normally provided to anyone hired for or transferred to the position.

Example A: An employer is considering reassigning an employee with a disability to a position which requires the ability to speak Spanish in order to perform an essential function. The employee never learned Spanish and wants the employer to send him to a course to learn Spanish. The employer is not required to provide this training as part of the obligation to make a reassignment. Therefore, the employee is not qualified for this position.

Example B: An employer is considering reassigning an employee with a disability to a position in which she will contract for goods and services. The employee is qualified for the position. The employer has its own specialized rules regarding contracting that necessitate training all individuals hired for these positions. In this situation, the employer must provide the employee with this specialized training.

Before considering reassignment as a reasonable accommodation, employers should first consider those accommodations that would enable an employee to remain in his/her current position. Reassignment is the reasonable accommodation of last resort and is required only after it has been determined that: (1) there are no effective accommodations that will enable the employee to perform the essential functions of his/her current position, or (2) all other reasonable accommodations would impose an undue hardship.(80) However, if both the employer and the employee voluntarily agree that transfer is preferable to remaining in the current position with some form of reasonable accommodation, then the employer may transfer the employee.

“Vacant” means that the position is available when the employee asks for reasonable accommodation, or that the employer knows that it will become available within a reasonable amount of time. A “reasonable amount of time” should be determined on a case-by-case basis considering relevant facts, such as whether the employer, based on experience, can anticipate that an appropriate position will become vacant within a short period of time.(81) A position is considered vacant even if an employer has posted a notice or announcement seeking applications for that position. The employer does not have to bump an employee from a job in order to create a vacancy; nor does it have to create a new position.(82)

Example C: An employer is seeking a reassignment for an employee with a disability. There are no vacant positions today, but the employer has just learned that another employee resigned and that that position will become vacant in four weeks. The impending vacancy is equivalent to the position currently held by the employee with a disability. If the employee is qualified for that position, the employer must offer it to him.

Example D: An employer is seeking a reassignment for an employee with a disability. There are no vacant positions today, but the employer has just learned that an employee in an equivalent position plans to retire in six months. Although the employer knows that the employee with a disability is qualified for this position, the employer does not have to offer this position to her because six months is beyond a “reasonable amount of time.” (If, six months from now, the employer decides to advertise the position, it must allow the individual to apply for that position and give the application the consideration it deserves.)

The employer must reassign the individual to a vacant position that is equivalent in terms of pay, status, or other relevant factors (e.g., benefits, geographical location) if the employee is qualified for the position. If there is no vacant equivalent position, the employer must reassign the employee to a vacant lower level position for which the individual is qualified. Assuming there is more than one vacancy for which the employee is qualified, the employer must place the individual in the position that comes closest to the employee’s current position in terms of pay, status, etc.(83)If it is unclear which position comes closest, the employer should consult with the employee about his/her preference before determining the position to which the employee will be reassigned. Reassignment does not include giving an employee a promotion. Thus, an employee must compete for any vacant position that would constitute a promotion.

    1. Is a probationary employee entitled to reassignment?Employers cannot deny a reassignment to an employee solely because s/he is designated as “probationary.” An employee with a disability is eligible for reassignment to a new position, regardless of whether s/he is considered “probationary,” as long as the employee adequately performed the essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable accommodation, before the need for a reassignment arose.The longer the period of time in which an employee has adequately performed the essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, the more likely it is that reassignment is appropriate if the employee becomes unable to continue performing the essential functions of the current position due to a disability. If, however, the probationary employee has never adequately performed the essential functions, with or without reasonable accommodation, then s/he is not entitled to reassignment because s/he was never “qualified” for the original position. In this situation, the employee is similar to an applicant who applies for a job for which s/he is not qualified, and then requests reassignment. Applicants are not entitled to reassignment.

      Example A: An employer designates all new employees as “probationary” for one year. An employee has been working successfully for nine months when she becomes disabled in a car accident. The employee, due to her disability, is unable to continue performing the essential functions of her current position, with or without reasonable accommodation, and seeks a reassignment. She is entitled to a reassignment if there is a vacant position for which she is qualified and it would not pose an undue hardship.

      Example B: A probationary employee has been working two weeks, but has been unable to perform the essential functions of the job because of his disability. There are no reasonable accommodations that would permit the individual to perform the essential functions of the position, so the individual requests a reassignment. The employer does not have to provide a reassignment (even if there is a vacant position) because, as it turns out, the individual was never qualified — i.e., the individual was never able to perform the essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable accommodation, for which he was hired.

    2. Must an employer offer reassignment as a reasonable accommodation if it does not allow any of its employees to transfer from one position to another?Yes. The ADA requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to individuals with disabilities, including reassignment, even though they are not available to others. Therefore, an employer who does not normally transfer employees would still have to reassign an employee with a disability, unless it could show that the reassignment caused an undue hardship. And, if an employer has a policy prohibiting transfers, it would have to modify that policy in order to reassign an employee with a disability, unless it could show undue hardship.(84)
    3. Is an employer’s obligation to offer reassignment to a vacant position limited to those vacancies within an employee’s office, branch, agency, department, facility, personnel system (if the employer has more than a single personnel system), or geographical area?No. This is true even if the employer has a policy prohibiting transfers from one office, branch, agency, department, facility, personnel system, or geographical area to another. The ADA contains no language limiting the obligation to reassign only to positions within an office, branch, agency, etc.(85) Rather, the extent to which an employer must search for a vacant position will be an issue of undue hardship.(86)If an employee is being reassigned to a different geographical area, the employee must pay for any relocation expenses unless the employer routinely pays such expenses when granting voluntary transfers to other employees.
    4. Does an employer have to notify an employee with a disability about vacant positions, or is it the employee’s responsibility to learn what jobs are vacant?The employer is in the best position to know which jobs are vacant or will become vacant within a reasonable period of time.(87) In order to narrow the search for potential vacancies, the employer, as part of the interactive process, should ask the employee about his/her qualifications and interests. Based on this information, the employer is obligated to inform an employee about vacant positions for which s/he may be eligible as a reassignment. However, an employee should assist the employer in identifying appropriate vacancies to the extent that the employee has access to information about them. If the employer does not know whether the employee is qualified for a specific position, the employer can discuss with the employee his/her qualifications.(88)An employer should proceed as expeditiously as possible in determining whether there are appropriate vacancies. The length of this process will vary depending on how quickly an employer can search for and identify whether an appropriate vacant position exists. For a very small employer, this process may take one day; for other employers this process may take several weeks.(89)When an employer has completed its search, identified whether there are any vacancies (including any positions that will become vacant in a reasonable amount of time), notified the employee of the results, and either offered an appropriate vacancy to the employee or informed him/her that no appropriate vacancies are available, the employer will have fulfilled its obligation.
    5. Does reassignment mean that the employee is permitted to compete for a vacant position?No. Reassignment means that the employee gets the vacant position if s/he is qualified for it. Otherwise, reassignment would be of little value and would not be implemented as Congress intended.(90)
    6. If an employee is reassigned to a lower level position, must an employer maintain his/her salary from the higher level position?No, unless the employer transfers employees without disabilities to lower level positions and maintains their original salaries.(91)
    7. Must an employer provide a reassignment if it would violate a seniority system?Generally, it will be “unreasonable” to reassign an employee with a disability if doing so would violate the rules of a seniority system.(92) This is true both for collectively bargained seniority systems and those unilaterally imposed by management. Seniority systems governing job placement give employees expectations of consistent, uniform treatment expectations that would be undermined if employers had to make the type of individualized, case-by-case assessment required by the reasonable accommodation process.(93)However, if there are “special circumstances” that “undermine the employees’ expectations of consistent, uniform treatment,” it may be a “reasonable accommodation,” absent undue hardship, to reassign an employee despite the existence of a seniority system. For example, “special circumstances” may exist where an employer retains the right to alter the seniority system unilaterally, and has exercised that right fairly frequently, thereby lowering employee expectations in the seniority system.(94)In this circumstance, one more exception (i.e., providing the reassignment to an employee with a disability) may not make a difference.(95)Alternatively, a seniority system may contain exceptions, such that one more exception is unlikely to matter.(96) Another possibility is that a seniority system might contain procedures for making exceptions, thus suggesting to employees that seniority does not automatically guarantee access to a specific job.

OTHER REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION ISSUES (97)

    1. If an employer has provided one reasonable accommodation, does it have to provide additional reasonable accommodations requested by an individual with a disability?The duty to provide reasonable accommodation is an ongoing one.(98) Certain individuals require only one reasonable accommodation, while others may need more than one. Still others may need one reasonable accommodation for a period of time, and then at a later date, require another type of reasonable accommodation. If an individual requests multiple reasonable accommodations, s/he is entitled only to those accommodations that are necessitated by a disability and that will provide an equal employment opportunity.An employer must consider each request for reasonable accommodation and determine: (1) whether the accommodation is needed, (2) if needed, whether the accommodation would be effective, and (3) if effective, whether providing the reasonable accommodation would impose an undue hardship. If a reasonable accommodation turns out to be ineffective and the employee with a disability remains unable to perform an essential function, the employer must consider whether there would be an alternative reasonable accommodation that would not pose an undue hardship. If there is no alternative accommodation, then the employer must attempt to reassign the employee to a vacant position for which s/he is qualified, unless to do so would cause an undue hardship.
    2. Does an employer have to change a person’s supervisor as a form of reasonable accommodation?No. An employer does not have to provide an employee with a new supervisor as a reasonable accommodation. Nothing in the ADA, however, prohibits an employer from doing so. Furthermore, although an employer is not required to change supervisors, the ADA may require that supervisory methods be altered as a form of reasonable accommodation.(99)Also, an employee with a disability is protected from disability-based discrimination by a supervisor, including disability-based harassment.

      Example: A supervisor frequently schedules team meetings on a day’s notice often notifying staff in the afternoon that a meeting will be held on the following morning. An employee with a disability has missed several meetings because they have conflicted with previously-scheduled physical therapy sessions. The employee asks that the supervisor give her two to three days’ notice of team meetings so that, if necessary, she can reschedule the physical therapy sessions. Assuming no undue hardship would result, the supervisor must make this reasonable accommodation.

    3. Does an employer have to allow an employee with a disability to work at home as a reasonable accommodation?An employer must modify its policy concerning where work is performed if such a change is needed as a reasonable accommodation, but only if this accommodation would be effective and would not cause an undue hardship.(100)Whether this accommodation is effective will depend on whether the essential functions of the position can be performed at home. There are certain jobs in which the essential functions can only be performed at the work site — e.g., food server, cashier in a store. For such jobs, allowing an employee to work at home is not effective because it does not enable an employee to perform his/her essential functions. Certain considerations may be critical in determining whether a job can be effectively performed at home, including (but not limited to) the employer’s ability to adequately supervise the employee and the employee’s need to work with certain equipment or tools that cannot be replicated at home. In contrast, employees may be able to perform the essential functions of certain types of jobs at home (e.g., telemarketer, proofreader).(101) For these types of jobs, an employer may deny a request to work at home if it can show that another accommodation would be effective or if working at home will cause undue hardship.
    4. Must an employer withhold discipline or termination of an employee who, because of a disability, violated a conduct rule that is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity?No. An employer never has to excuse a violation of a uniformly applied conduct rule that is job-related and consistent with business necessity. This means, for example, that an employer never has to tolerate or excuse violence, threats of violence, stealing, or destruction of property. An employer may discipline an employee with a disability for engaging in such misconduct if it would impose the same discipline on an employee without a disability.
    5. Must an employer provide a reasonable accommodation for an employee with a disability who violated a conduct rule that is job- related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity?An employer must make reasonable accommodation to enable an otherwise qualified employee with a disability to meet such a conduct standard in the future, barring undue hardship, except where the punishment for the violation is termination.(102)Since reasonable accommodation is always prospective, an employer is not required to excuse past misconduct even if it is the result of the individual’s disability.(103) Possible reasonable accommodations could include adjustments to starting times, specified breaks, and leave if these accommodations will enable an employee to comply with conduct rules.(104)

      Example: An employee with major depression is often late for work because of medication side-effects that make him extremely groggy in the morning. His scheduled hours are 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., but he arrives at 9:00, 9:30, 10:00, or even 10:30 on any given day. His job responsibilities involve telephone contact with the company’s traveling sales representatives, who depend on him to answer urgent marketing questions and expedite special orders. The employer disciplines him for tardiness, stating that continued failure to arrive promptly during the next month will result in termination of his employment. The individual then explains that he was late because of a disability and needs to work on a later schedule. In this situation, the employer may discipline the employee because he violated a conduct standard addressing tardiness that is job-related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity. The employer, however, must consider reasonable accommodation, barring undue hardship, to enable this individual to meet this standard in the future. For example, if this individual can serve the company’s sales representatives by regularly working a schedule of 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., a reasonable accommodation would be to modify his schedule so that he is not required to report for work until 10:00 a.m.

    6. Is it a reasonable accommodation to make sure that an employee takes medication as prescribed?No. Medication monitoring is not a reasonable accommodation. Employers have no obligation to monitor medication because doing so does not remove a workplace barrier. Similarly, an employer has no responsibility to monitor an employee’s medical treatment or ensure that s/he is receiving appropriate treatment because such treatment does not involve modifying workplace barriers.(105)It may be a form of reasonable accommodation, however, to give an employee a break in order that s/he may take medication, or to grant leave so that an employee may obtain treatment.
    7. Is an employer relieved of its obligation to provide reasonable accommodation for an employee with a disability who fails to take medication, to obtain medical treatment, or to use an assistive device (such as a hearing aid)?No. The ADA requires an employer to provide reasonable accommodation to remove workplace barriers, regardless of what effect medication, other medical treatment, or assistive devices may have on an employee’s ability to perform the job.(106)However, if an employee with a disability, with or without reasonable accommodation, cannot perform the essential functions of the position or poses a direct threat in the absence of medication, treatment, or an assistive device, then s/he is unqualified.
    8. Must an employer provide a reasonable accommodation that is needed because of the side effects of medication or treatment related to the disability, or because of symptoms or other medical conditions resulting from the underlying disability?Yes. The side effects caused by the medication that an employee must take because of the disability are limitations resulting from the disability. Reasonable accommodation extends to all limitations resulting from a disability.

      Example A: An employee with cancer undergoes chemotherapy twice a week, which causes her to be quite ill afterwards. The employee requests a modified schedule — leave for the two days a week of chemotherapy. The treatment will last six weeks. Unless it can show undue hardship, the employer must grant this request.

      Similarly, any symptoms or related medical conditions resulting from the disability that cause limitations may also require reasonable accommodation.(107)

      Example B: An employee, as a result of insulin-dependent diabetes, has developed background retinopathy (a vision impairment). The employee, who already has provided documentation showing his diabetes is a disability, requests a device to enlarge the text on his computer screen. The employer can request documentation that the retinopathy is related to the diabetes but the employee does not have to show that the retinopathy is an independent disability under the ADA. Since the retinopathy is a consequence of the diabetes (an ADA disability), the request must be granted unless undue hardship can be shown.

    9. Must an employer ask whether a reasonable accommodation is needed when an employee has not asked for one?Generally, no. As a general rule, the individual with a disability — who has the most knowledge about the need for reasonable accommodation — must inform the employer that an accommodation is needed.(108)However, an employer should initiate the reasonable accommodation interactive process(109) without being asked if the employer: (1) knows that the employee has a disability, (2) knows, or has reason to know, that the employee is experiencing workplace problems because of the disability, and (3) knows, or has reason to know, that the disability prevents the employee from requesting a reasonable accommodation. If the individual with a disability states that s/he does not need a reasonable accommodation, the employer will have fulfilled its obligation.

      Example: An employee with mental retardation delivers messages at a law firm. He frequently mixes up messages for “R. Miller” and “T. Miller.” The employer knows about the disability, suspects that the performance problem is a result of the disability, and knows that this employee is unable to ask for a reasonable accommodation because of his mental retardation. The employer asks the employee about mixing up the two names and asks if it would be helpful to spell the first name of each person. When the employee says that would be better, the employer, as a reasonable accommodation, instructs the receptionist to write the full first name when messages are left for one of the Messrs. Miller.

    10. May an employer ask whether a reasonable accommodation is needed when an employee with a disability has not asked for one?An employer may ask an employee with a known disability whether s/he needs a reasonable accommodation when it reasonably believes that the employee may need an accommodation. For example, an employer could ask a deaf employee who is being sent on a business trip if s/he needs reasonable accommodation. Or, if an employer is scheduling a luncheon at a restaurant and is uncertain about what questions it should ask to ensure that the restaurant is accessible for an employee who uses a wheelchair, the employer may first ask the employee. An employer also may ask an employee with a disability who is having performance or conduct problems if s/he needs reasonable accommodation.(110)
    11. May an employer tell other employees that an individual is receiving a reasonable accommodation when employees ask questions about a coworker with a disability?No. An employer may not disclose that an employee is receiving a reasonable accommodation because this usually amounts to a disclosure that the individual has a disability. The ADA specifically prohibits the disclosure of medical information except in certain limited situations, which do not include disclosure to coworkers.(111)An employer may certainly respond to a question from an employee about why a coworker is receiving what is perceived as “different” or “special” treatment by emphasizing its policy of assisting any employee who encounters difficulties in the workplace. The employer also may find it helpful to point out that many of the workplace issues encountered by employees are personal, and that, in these circumstances, it is the employer’s policy to respect employee privacy. An employer may be able to make this point effectively by reassuring the employee asking the question that his/her privacy would similarly be respected if s/he found it necessary to ask the employer for some kind of workplace change for personal reasons.Since responding to specific coworker questions may be difficult, employers might find it helpful before such questions are raised to provide all employees with information about various laws that require employers to meet certain employee needs (e.g., the ADA and the Family and Medical Leave Act), while also requiring them to protect the privacy of employees. In providing general ADA information to employees, an employer may wish to highlight the obligation to provide reasonable accommodation, including the interactive process and different types of reasonable accommodations, and the statute’s confidentiality protections. Such information could be delivered in orientation materials, employee handbooks, notices accompanying paystubs, and posted flyers. Employers may wish to explore these and other alternatives with unions because they too are bound by the ADA’s confidentiality provisions. Union meetings and bulletin boards may be further avenues for such educational efforts.

      As long as there is no coercion by an employer, an employee with a disability may voluntarily choose to disclose to coworkers his/her disability and/or the fact that s/he is receiving a reasonable accommodation.

UNDUE HARDSHIP ISSUES (112)

An employer does not have to provide a reasonable accommodation that would cause an “undue hardship” to the employer. Generalized conclusions will not suffice to support a claim of undue hardship. Instead, undue hardship must be based on an individualized assessment of current circumstances that show that a specific reasonable accommodation would cause significant difficulty or expense.(113) A determination of undue hardship should be based on several factors, including:

      • the nature and cost of the accommodation needed;
      • the overall financial resources of the facility making the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at this facility; the effect on expenses and resources of the facility;
      • the overall financial resources, size, number of employees, and type and location of facilities of the employer (if the facility involved in the reasonable accommodation is part of a larger entity);
      • the type of operation of the employer, including the structure and functions of the workforce, the geographic separateness, and the administrative or fiscal relationship of the facility involved in making the accommodation to the employer;
      • the impact of the accommodation on the operation of the facility.(114)

The ADA’s legislative history indicates that Congress wanted employers to consider all possible sources of outside funding when assessing whether a particular accommodation would be too costly.(115) Undue hardship is determined based on the net cost to the employer. Thus, an employer should determine whether funding is available from an outside source, such as a state rehabilitation agency, to pay for all or part of the accommodation.(116) In addition, the employer should determine whether it is eligible for certain tax credits or deductions to offset the cost of the accommodation. Also, to the extent that a portion of the cost of an accommodation causes undue hardship, the employer should ask the individual with a disability if s/he will pay the difference.

If an employer determines that one particular reasonable accommodation will cause undue hardship, but a second type of reasonable accommodation will be effective and will not cause an undue hardship, then the employer must provide the second accommodation.

An employer cannot claim undue hardship based on employees’ (or customers’) fears or prejudices toward the individual’s disability.(117) Nor can undue hardship be based on the fact that provision of a reasonable accommodation might have a negative impact on the morale of other employees. Employers, however, may be able to show undue hardship where provision of a reasonable accommodation would be unduly disruptive to other employees’s ability to work.

Example A: An employee with breast cancer is undergoing chemotherapy. As a consequence of the treatment, the employee is subject to fatigue and finds it difficult to keep up with her regular workload. So that she may focus her reduced energy on performing her essential functions, the employer transfers three of her marginal functions to another employee for the duration of the chemotherapy treatments. The second employee is unhappy at being given extra assignments, but the employer determines that the employee can absorb the new assignments with little effect on his ability to perform his own assignments in a timely manner. Since the employer cannot show significant disruption to its operation, there is no undue hardship.(118)

Example B: A convenience store clerk with multiple sclerosis requests that he be allowed to go from working full-time to part- time as a reasonable accommodation because of his disability. The store assigns two clerks per shift, and if the first clerk’s hours are reduced, the second clerk’s workload will increase significantly beyond his ability to handle his responsibilities. The store determines that such an arrangement will result in inadequate coverage to serve customers in a timely manner, keep the shelves stocked, and maintain store security. Thus, the employer can show undue hardship based on the significant disruption to its operations and, therefore, can refuse to reduce the employee’s hours. The employer, however, should explore whether any other reasonable accommodation will assist the store clerk without causing undue hardship.

  1. Must an employer modify the work hours of an employee with a disability if doing so would prevent other employees from performing their jobs?No. If the result of modifying one employee’s work hours (or granting leave) is to prevent other employees from doing their jobs, then the significant disruption to the operations of the employer constitutes an undue hardship.

    Example A: A crane operator, due to his disability, requests an adjustment in his work schedule so that he starts work at 8:00 a.m. rather than 7:00 a.m., and finishes one hour later in the evening. The crane operator works with three other employees who cannot perform their jobs without the crane operator. As a result, if the employer grants this requested accommodation, it would have to require the other three workers to adjust their hours, find other work for them to do from 7:00 to 8:00, or have the workers do nothing. The ADA does not require the employer to take any of these actions because they all significantly disrupt the operations of the business. Thus, the employer can deny the requested accommodation, but should discuss with the employee if there are other possible accommodations that would not result in undue hardship.

    Example B: A computer programmer works with a group of people to develop new software. There are certain tasks that the entire group must perform together, but each person also has individual assignments. It is through habit, not necessity, that they have often worked together first thing in the morning.

    The programmer, due to her disability, requests an adjustment in her work schedule so that she works from 10:00 a.m. – 7:00 p.m. rather than 9:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m. In this situation, the employer could grant the adjustment in hours because it would not significantly disrupt the operations of the business. The effect of the reasonable accommodation would be to alter when the group worked together and when they performed their individual assignments.

  2. Can an employer deny a request for leave when an employee cannot provide a fixed date of return?Providing leave to an employee who is unable to provide a fixed date of return is a form of reasonable accommodation. However, if an employer is able to show that the lack of a fixed return date causes an undue hardship, then it can deny the leave. In certain circumstances, undue hardship will derive from the disruption to the operations of the entity that occurs because the employer can neither plan for the employee’s return nor permanently fill the position. If an employee cannot provide a fixed date of return, and an employer determines that it can grant such leave at that time without causing undue hardship, the employer has the right to require, as part of the interactive process, that the employee provide periodic updates on his/her condition and possible date of return. After receiving these updates, employers may reevaluate whether continued leave constitutes an undue hardship.In certain situations, an employee may be able to provide only an approximate date of return.(119) Treatment and recuperation do not always permit exact timetables. Thus, an employer cannot claim undue hardship solely because an employee can provide only an approximate date of return. In such situations, or in situations in which a return date must be postponed because of unforeseen medical developments, employees should stay in regular communication with their employers to inform them of their progress and discuss, if necessary, the need for continued leave beyond what might have been granted originally.(120)

    Example A: An experienced chef at a top restaurant requests leave for treatment of her disability but cannot provide a fixed date of return. The restaurant can show that this request constitutes undue hardship because of the difficulty of replacing, even temporarily, a chef of this caliber. Moreover, it leaves the employer unable to determine how long it must hold open the position or to plan for the chef’s absence. Therefore, the restaurant can deny the request for leave as a reasonable accommodation.

    Example B: An employee requests eight weeks of leave for surgery for his disability. The employer grants the request. During surgery, serious complications arise that require a lengthier period of recuperation than originally anticipated, as well as additional surgery. The employee contacts the employer after three weeks of leave to ask for an additional ten to fourteen weeks of leave (i.e., a total of 18 to 22 weeks of leave). The employer must assess whether granting additional leave causes an undue hardship.

  3. Does a cost-benefit analysis determine whether a reasonable accommodation will cause undue hardship?No. A cost-benefit analysis assesses the cost of a reasonable accommodation in relation to the perceived benefit to the employer and the employee. Neither the statute nor the legislative history supports a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether a specific accommodation causes an undue hardship.(121) Whether the cost of a reasonable accommodation imposes an undue hardship depends on the employer’s resources, not on the individual’s salary, position, or status (e.g., full-time versus part-time, salary versus hourly wage, permanent versus temporary).
  4. Can an employer claim undue hardship solely because a reasonable accommodation would require it to make changes to property owned by someone else?No, an employer cannot claim undue hardship solely because a reasonable accommodation would require it to make changes to property owned by someone else. In some situations, an employer will have the right under a lease or other contractual relationship with the property owner to make the type of changes that are needed. If this is the case, the employer should make the changes, assuming no other factors exist that would make the changes too difficult or costly. If the contractual relationship between the employer and property owner requires the owner’s consent to the kinds of changes that are required, or prohibits them from being made, then the employer must make good faith efforts either to obtain the owner’s permission or to negotiate an exception to the terms of the contract. If the owner refuses to allow the employer to make the modifications, the employer may claim undue hardship. Even in this situation, however, the employer must still provide another reasonable accommodation, if one exists, that would not cause undue hardship.

    Example A: X Corp., a travel agency, leases space in a building owned by Z Co. One of X Corp.’s employees becomes disabled and needs to use a wheelchair. The employee requests as a reasonable accommodation that several room dividers be moved to make his work space easily accessible. X Corp.’s lease specifically allows it to make these kinds of physical changes, and they are otherwise easy and inexpensive to make. The fact that X Corp. does not own the property does not create an undue hardship and therefore it must make the requested accommodation.

    Example B: Same as Example A, except that X Corp.’s lease requires it to seek Z Co.’s permission before making any physical changes that would involve reconfiguring office space. X Corp. requests that Z Co. allow it to make the changes, but Z Co. denies the request. X Corp. can claim that making the physical changes would constitute an undue hardship. However, it must provide any other type of reasonable accommodation that would not involve making physical changes to the facility, such as finding a different location within the office that would be accessible to the employee.

    An employer should remember its obligation to make reasonable accommodation when it is negotiating contracts with property owners.(122) Similarly, a property owner should carefully assess a request from an employer to make physical changes that are needed as a reasonable accommodation because failure to permit the modification might constitute “interference” with the rights of an employee with a disability.(123) In addition, other ADA provisions may require the property owner to make the modifications.(124)

BURDENS OF PROOF

In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S., 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002), the Supreme Court laid out the burdens of proof for an individual with a disability (plaintiff) and an employer (defendant) in an ADA lawsuit alleging failure to provide reasonable accommodation. The “plaintiff/employee (to defeat a defendant/employer’s motion for summary judgment) need only show that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.”(125) Once the plaintiff has shown that the accommodation s/he needs is “reasonable,” the burden shifts to the defendant/employer to provide case-specific evidence proving that reasonable accommodation would cause an undue hardship in the particular circumstances.(126)

The Supreme Court’s burden-shifting framework does not affect the interactive process triggered by an individual’s request for accommodation.(127) An employer should still engage in this informal dialogue to obtain relevant information needed to make an informed decision.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR INVESTIGATORS

When assessing whether a Respondent has violated the ADA by denying a reasonable accommodation to a Charging Party, investigators should consider the following:

\

  • Is the Charging Party “otherwise qualified” (i.e., is the Charging Party qualified for the job except that, because of disability, s/he needs a reasonable accommodation to perform the position’s essential functions)?
  • Did the Charging Party, or a representative, request a reasonable accommodation (i.e., did the Charging Party let the employer know that s/he needed an adjustment or change at work for a reason related to a medical condition)? [see Questions 1-4]
    • Did the Respondent request documentation of the Charging Party’s disability and/or functional limitations? If yes, was the documentation provided? Did the Respondent have a legitimate reason for requesting documentation? [see Questions 6-8]
    • What specific type of reasonable accommodation, if any, did the Charging Party request?
    • Was there a nexus between the reasonable accommodation requested and the functional limitations resulting from the Charging Party’s disability? [see Question 6]
    • Was the need for reasonable accommodation related to the use of medication, side effects from treatment, or symptoms related to a disability? [see Questions 36-38]
  • For what purpose did the Charging Party request a reasonable accommodation:
    • for the application process? [see Questions 12-13]
    • in connection with aspects of job performance? [see Questions 16-24, 32-33]
    • in order to enjoy the benefits and privileges of employment? [see Questions 14-15]
  • Should the Respondent have initiated the interactive process, or provided a reasonable accommodation, even if the Charging Party did not ask for an accommodation? [see Questions 11, 39]
  • What did the Respondent do in response to the Charging Party’s request for reasonable accommodation (i.e., did the Respondent engage in an interactive process with the Charging Party and if so, describe both the Respondent’s and the Charging Party’s actions/statements during this process)? [see Questions 5-11]
  • If the Charging Party asked the Respondent for a particular reasonable accommodation, and the Respondent provided a different accommodation, why did the Respondent provide a different reasonable accommodation than the one requested by the Charging Party? Why does the Respondent believe that the reasonable accommodation it provided was effective in eliminating the workplace barrier at issue, thus providing the Charging Party with an equal employment opportunity? Why does the Charging Party believe that the reasonable accommodation provided by the Respondent was ineffective? [see Question 9]
  • What type of accommodation could the Respondent have provided that would have been “reasonable” and effective in eliminating the workplace barrier at issue, thus providing the Charging Party with an equal employment opportunity?
  • Does the charge involve allegations concerning reasonable accommodation and violations of any conduct rules? [see Questions 34-35]
  • If the Charging Party alleges that the Respondent failed to provide a reassignment as a reasonable accommodation [see generally Questions 25-30 and accompanying text]:
    • did the Respondent and the Charging Party first discuss other forms of reasonable accommodation that would enable the Charging Party to remain in his/her current position before discussing reassignment?
    • did the Respondent have any vacant positions? [see Question 27]
    • did the Respondent notify the Charging Party about possible vacant positions? [see Question 28]
    • was the Charging Party qualified for a vacant position?
    • if there was more than one vacant position, did the Respondent place the Charging Party in the one that was most closely equivalent to the Charging Party’s original position?
    • if the reassignment would conflict with a seniority system, are there “special circumstances” that would make it “reasonable” to reassign the Charging Party? [see Question 31]
  • If the Respondent is claiming undue hardship [see generally Questions 42-46 and accompanying text]:
    • what evidence has the Respondent produced showing that providing a specific reasonable accommodation would entail significant difficulty or expense?
    • if a modified schedule or leave is the reasonable accommodation, is undue hardship based on the impact on the ability of other employees to do their jobs? [see Question 42]
    • if leave is the reasonable accommodation, is undue hardship based on the amount of leave requested? [see Question 43]
    • if there are “special circumstances” that would make it “reasonable” to reassign the Charging Party, despite the apparent conflict with a seniority system, would it nonetheless be an undue hardship to make the reassignment? [see Question 31]
    • is undue hardship based on the fact that providing the reasonable accommodation requires changes to property owned by an entity other than the Respondent? [see Question 46]
    • if the Respondent claims that a particular reasonable accommodation would result in undue hardship, is there another reasonable accommodation that Respondent could have provided that would not have resulted in undue hardship?
  • Based on the evidence obtained in answers to the questions above, is the Charging Party a qualified individual with a disability (i.e., can the Charging Party perform the essential functions of the position with or without reasonable accommodation)?

APPENDIX
RESOURCES FOR LOCATING REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
1-800-669-3362 (Voice)
1-800-800-3302 (TT)

The EEOC’s Publication Center has many free documents on the Title I employment provisions of the ADA, including both the statute, 42 U.S.C. . 12101 et seq. (1994), and the regulations, 29 C.F.R. . 1630 (1997). In addition, the EEOC has published a great deal of basic information about reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. The two main sources of interpretive information are: (1) the Interpretive Guidance accompanying the Title I regulations (also known as the “Appendix” to the regulations), 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. .. 1630.2(o), (p), 1630.9 (1997) , and (2) A Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions (Title I) of the Americans with Disabilities Act III, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:6981, 6998-7018 (1992). The Manual includes a 200-page Resource Directory, including federal and state agencies, and disability organizations that can provide assistance in identifying and locating reasonable accommodations.

The EEOC also has discussed issues involving reasonable accommodation in the following guidances and documents: (1) Enforcement Guidance: Preemployment Disability-Related Questions and Medical Examinations at 5, 6-8, 20, 21-22, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7191, 7192-94, 7201 (1995); (2) Enforcement Guidance: Workers’ Compensation and the ADA at 15-20, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7391, 7398-7401 (1996); (3) Enforcement Guidance: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities at 19-28, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7461, 7470-76 (1997); and (4) Fact Sheet on the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 6-9, 8 FEP Manual (BNA) 405:7371, 7374-76 (1996).

Finally, the EEOC has a poster that employers and labor unions may use to fulfill the ADA’s posting requirement.

All of the above-listed documents, with the exception of the ADA Technical Assistance Manual and Resource Directory and the poster, are also available through the Internet at http://www.eeoc.gov.

U.S. Department of Labor
(To obtain information on the Family and Medical Leave Act)
To request written materials:
1-800-959-3652 (Voice)
1-800-326-2577 (TT)
To ask questions: (202) 219-8412 (Voice)

Internal Revenue Service
(For information on tax credits and deductions for providing certain reasonable accommodations)

(202) 622-6060 (Voice)

Job Accommodation Network (JAN)
1-800-232-9675 (Voice/TT)
http://janweb.icdi.wvu.edu/.

A service of the President’s Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities. JAN can provide information, free-of-charge, about many types of reasonable accommodations.

ADA Disability and Business Technical Assistance Centers (DBTACs) 1-800-949-4232 (Voice/TT)

The DBTACs consist of 10 federally funded regional centers that provide information, training, and technical assistance on the ADA. Each center works with local business, disability, governmental, rehabilitation, and other professional networks to provide current ADA information and assistance, and places special emphasis on meeting the needs of small businesses. The DBTACs can make referrals to local sources of expertise in reasonable accommodations.

Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf
(301) 608-0050 (Voice/TT)

The Registry offers information on locating and using interpreters and transliteration services.

RESNA Technical Assistance Project
(703) 524-6686 (Voice)
(703) 524-6639 (TT)
http://www.resna.org/hometa1.htm

RESNA, the Rehabilitation Engineering and Assistive Technology Society of North America, can refer individuals to projects in all 50 states and the six territories offering technical assistance on technology-related services for individuals with disabilities. Services may include:

  • information and referral centers to help determine what devices may assist a person with a disability (including access to large data bases containing information on thousands of commercially available assistive technology products),
  • centers where individuals can try out devices and equipment,
  • assistance in obtaining funding for and repairing devices, and
  • equipment exchange and recycling programs.

 

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

Texas Non-Subscriber Compliance Package-Texas Department of Insurance—-Fort Worth, Texas Non Subscriber Defense Lawyers

NonSubscriber – Compliance Package
This is a copy of Texas Department of Insurance change notice
dated September 24, 2012.
We have enclosed the forms that are so vital in maintaining your status as a
Non-Subscriber in the state of Texas. They include:
1. The DWC Form-005 (Rev. 01/13) that you must complete
annually between February 1st and April 30th.
Complete and send in to the state by Certified Mail, return
receipt requested. You can now file your DWC Form 5 on-line:
https://txcomp.tdi.state.tx.us/TXCOMPWeb/nonsubscriber/DW
C5NonSecure.do?startWizard=Y&isBackAllowed=N . Texas
Department of Insurance is now requiring effective dates be
listed in Section I; Question 1. Effective date must be May 1st
of current year and expiration date April 30th of next year.
2. The DWC Form-7 that you need to complete to report any
claims. Send in monthly, only if there were injuries that
resulted in lost time in excess of the date of the injury.
3. The “Notice to Employees” that you must have all current
employees sign. All employees must sign this form when they
are hired and then placed in their personnel file.
4. The posters that are required to be posted “in an area frequented
by the employees”. The “Notice to Employees concerning
Workers’ Compensation in Texas” must be posted in both
English and Spanish and any other appropriate language.
DWC005
DWC005 Rev. 01/13 Page 1 of 3
Texas Department of Insurance
Division of Workers’ Compensation
7551 Metro Center Drive, Suite 100 • MS-96
Austin, TX 78744-1645
(800) 372-7713 phone • (512) 804-4146 fax
Employer Notice of No Coverage or Termination of Coverage
Online submission available through Employer Online Filings at:
https://txcomp.tdi.state.tx.us/TXCOMPWeb/common/home.jsp
I. REQUIRED STATEMENTS
1. Statement of No Coverage
The employer named below DOES NOT HAVE workers’ compensation insurance coverage, pursuant to the
Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Texas Labor Code, Section 406.004.
The employer named below HAS TERMINATED workers’ compensation insurance coverage, pursuant to the
Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, Texas Labor Code, Section 406.007.
Policy terminated effective (mm/dd/yyyy):
Policy number:
Insurance company name:
Insurer informed of termination on (mm/dd/yyyy):
Employees were (will be) notified on (mm/dd/yyyy):
The election selected above is effective from (mm/dd/yyyy) to (mm/dd/yyyy). The effective
dates cannot exceed a one-year period.
2. Statement of Reportable Injuries or Diseases
Did you have any death, injury that resulted in the injured employee’s absence from work for more than one day,
or knowledge of an occupational disease since your last Employer Notice of No Coverage or Termination of
Coverage?
Yes No If your response is “Yes”, you may be required to file a DWC Form-007, Employer’s Report of
Non-covered Employee’s Occupational Injury or Disease. (See the Frequently Asked Questions section of this form.)
II. PRIMARY EMPLOYER INFORMATION
3. Employer Business Name
4. Federal Employer ID Number
5. Employer Business Mailing Address (Street or PO Box, City, County, State, Zip Code)
6. Employer Business Type
7. Six-Digit NAICS Codes
NOTE: You must provide name, Federal Employer ID number and address of each Texas business location, subsidiary, or
separate entity of the primary employer covered by this report. To identify additional locations, submit a DWC Form-205,
Locations of Employer’s Business(es).
III. PERSON PROVIDING INFORMATION
8. Printed Name
9. Phone Number
10. Title
11. E-mail Address
12. Signature 13. Date of Signature (mm/dd/yyyy)
For TDI-DWC Use Only
DWC005
DWC005 Rev. 01/13 Page 2 of 3
Frequently Asked Questions
Employer Notice of No Coverage or Termination of Coverage
Who must file the DWC Form-005?
An employer who does not have workers’ compensation insurance (non-subscriber) must file the DWC
Form-005, unless the employer’s only employees are exempt from coverage under the Texas Workers’
Compensation Act (for example, certain domestic workers, certain farm and ranch workers).
An employer who terminates workers’ compensation insurance coverage must file the DWC Form-005.
Failure to file the form when required may subject the employer to administrative penalties.
When do I file the DWC Form-005?
An employer who uses the DWC Form-005 to file a notice of no coverage must file:
• annually between February 1st and April 30th of each calendar year;
• within 30 days of the employer hiring its first employee, unless this due date falls between
February 1st and April 30th and the employer submits the notice within this time period; and
• within 10 days of receipt of a TDI-DWC request for filing a notice of no coverage.
An employer who uses the DWC Form-005 to file a notice of termination of coverage must file:
• within 10 days after notifying the insurance carrier of the termination of coverage unless
the employer purchases a new policy or becomes a certified self-insurer; and
• thereafter, the employer must file the DWC Form-005 as a non-subscriber as long as the
employer remains in operation and does not have workers’ compensation insurance
coverage.
How do I file the DWC Form-005?
Employers can submit the DWC Form-005 to the TDI-DWC by:
• filing electronically on the TDI website at:
https://txcomp.tdi.state.tx.us/TXCOMPWeb/common/home.jsp;
• faxing the form to (512) 804-4146; or
• mailing the form to the address listed at the top of the form (if the filing is for termination of
coverage, the submission must be by certified mail).
How/when must a non-subscriber notify employees that workers’ compensation coverage is not
provided?
An employer must post the Notice to Employees Concerning Workers’ Compensation in Texas in the
workplace in English, Spanish and any other language common to the employer’s employee population
in the print type specified by TDI-DWC rules whenever the employer:
• elects to not have workers’ compensation insurance;
• cancels or terminates workers’ compensation insurance;
• withdraws from certified self-insurance; or
• has its workers’ compensation coverage cancelled by the insurance company.
DWC005 Rev. 01/13 Page 3 of 3
The employer must also provide this notice to each employee:
• at the time of hire;
• when the employer elects to not have workers’ compensation insurance;
• within 15 days of notification to the insurance carrier that the employer is terminating coverage
unless the employer maintains continuous coverage under a new policy or becomes a certified
self-insurer; or
• within 15 days of cancellation by the insurance company.
The required notice may be found on the TDI website at:
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/forms/dwc/notice5.pdf (English) and
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/forms/dwc/notice5s.pdf (Spanish).
Are non-subscribers required to file other forms with the TDI-DWC?
Employers with five or more employees are required to report work-related injuries and diseases to the
TDI-DWC. Non-subscribers and covered employers whose employee(s) have waived workers’
compensation insurance coverage must report these work-related injuries and diseases using the DWC
Form-007, Employer’s Report of Non-covered Employee’s Occupational Injury or Diseases. The form
must be filed not later than the 7th day of the month following the month in which:
• a work-related death occurred,
• an employee was absent from work for more than one day* as a result of an on-the-job injury, or
• the employer acquired knowledge of an occupational disease.
*Do not count the day of the injury or the day the injured employee returned to work when calculating
the number of days absent from work.
The DWC Form-007 can be obtained from the TDI website at:
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/forms/dwc/dwc7.pdf.
Are any fields on the DWC Form-005 optional?
No, all applicable fields must be completed each time the DWC Form-005 is filed.
Additional information can be obtained from the TDI website at:
http://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/employer/index.html or by calling 1-800-372-7713.
NOTE: With few exceptions, upon your request, you are entitled to be informed about information TDI-DWC
collects about you; receive and review the information (Government Code, §§552.021 and 552.023); and have
TDI-DWC correct information that is incorrect (Government Code, §559.004).
Texas Department of lnsurance
Division of Workers’ Compensation
7551 Metro Center Drive. Suite 100. MS-96
Austin,T X 78744-1645
(8001 372-7713 phons . (5’12) 8044146 tax
Locations of Employer’s Business(es)
Addendum to DWG Form-005 or DWC Form-020
Type or print each item on this form in black ink
Gheck the appropriate box:
|-f AddendumtoDWGForm-005 EmployerNoticeof NoCoverageorTerminationof Coverage
I Addendum to DWC Form-020 lnsurance Carrier Notice of Coverage or Cancellation/Non-renewal
I. PRIMARY EMPLOYER INFORMATION
DWC205
ForT DI-DWCU seO nly
of Coverage
PrimaryE mployer’Bs usinessN ame FederaEl mployelrD Number
II.A DDITIONALB USINESSL OCATIONS
Use this section to add or delete coverage for locations, subsidiaries, and/or separate entities of the primary employer.
Check One: LIADD I_IDELETE Effective Date
Name Federal Employer lD Number
Address (Street or PO Box, City State Zip)
Check One: IIADD IIDELETE Effective Date
Name Federal Employer lD Number
Address (Street or PO Box, City State Zip)
Check One: IJADD IJDELETE Effective Date
Name Federal Employer lD Number
Address (Street or PO Box, City State Zip)
CheckOne: IIADD IfDELETE Effective Date
Name Federal Employer lD Number
Address (Street or PO Box, City State zip)
Check One: LJADD IJDELETE Effective Date
Name Federal Employer lD Number
Address (Street or PO Box, City State Zip)
Check One: IIADD LIDELETE Effective Date
Name Federal Employer lD Number
Address (Street or PO Box, City State Zip)
Gheck One: EADD EDELETE Effective Date
Name Federal Employer lD Number
Address (Street or PO Box, City State Zip)
NOTE: With few exceptions, upon your request, you are entitled to be informed about information TDI-DWC collects about you; receive and review
the information( GovemmentG ode,9 9552.021a nd 552.023)a; nd haveT DI-DWCc orrect informationt hat is incoriect (GovernmenCt ode,5 559.004).
DWC20R5 ev1. 1l10
DWC007
DWC007 Rev. 01/13 Page 1 of 5
Texas Department of Insurance
Division of Workers’ Compensation
7551 Metro Center Drive, Suite 100 • MS-96
Austin, TX 78744-1645
(800) 372-7713 phone • (512) 804-4146 fax
Employer’s Report of Non-covered Employee’s Occupational Injury or Disease
Type or print in black ink
Non-subscribing Employer
Subscribing Employer – Employee Waived Workers’ Compensation Insurance Coverage
I. EMPLOYER INFORMATION
1. Employer Business Name
2. Reporting Period (mm/yyyy) 3. Number of Injured Employees Included on This Report
4. Employer Business Mailing Address
(Street or PO Box, City, County, State, Zip Code)
5. Provide the following:
NAICS
Codes
NAICS
Employment
6. Employer Physical Address (Street, City, State, Zip Code)
7. Employer Phone Number
8. Federal Employer ID Number
9. Name of Person Completing Form
10. Phone Number of Person Completing Form
11. Title of Person Completing Form
12. Signature of Person Completing Form 13. Date of Signature (mm/dd/yyyy)
II. INJURED EMPLOYEE INFORMATION / INJURY DATA
14. Employee Name (First, Middle, Last) 15. Employee’s SSN
16. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy) 17. Date of Hire (mm/dd/yyyy) 18. Sex
Male Female
19. Occupation 20. Hourly Wage 21. Employee NAICS Code
22. Race/Ethnic Identification
White Black Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander American Indian or Alaskan Native
Other (specify)
For TDI-DWC Use Only
DWC007
DWC007 Rev. 01/13 Page 2 of 5
23. Address Where Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (Street, City, State, Zip Code)
24. Type of Location Where Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred
Primary Business Location On-site Job Location Traveling between Job Locations
25. Date of Injury/Occupational Disease (mm/dd/yyyy) 26. Date Reported By Employee (mm/dd/yyyy)
27. Return to Work Date or Expected Date (mm/dd/yyyy)
28. Reported Cause of Injury
29. Nature of Injury/Occupational Disease
30. Equipment Involved in the Injury (if any)
31. Body Part(s) Affected
32. First Day of Absence from Work (mm/dd/yyyy) 33. Number of Days Absent from Work
1 Day or Less >1 Day – 7 Days 8 Days or More
34. Occupational Disease
Yes No
35. Fatality Yes No
If Yes, provide date (mm/dd/yyyy)
36. Description of Incident
NOTE1: Title 28 Texas Administrative Code, Chapter 160 requires employers to report work-related deaths, on-the-job
injuries and occupational diseases in the form and manner required by TDI-DWC. The social security number may be used
to identify the injured employee.
NOTE2: With few exceptions, upon your request, you are entitled to be informed about information TDI-DWC collects about
you; receive and review the information (Government Code, §§552.021 and 552.023); and have TDI-DWC correct information
that is incorrect (Government Code, §559.004)
Employer’s Name:
Employer’s FEIN:
For TDI-DWC Use Only
DWC007
DWC007 Rev. 01/13 Page 3 of 5
Injury Data for Additional Injured Employee(s)
(reproduce this page, if necessary)
Employer Business Name
Employer FEIN Reporting Period (mm/yyyy)
II. INJURED EMPLOYEE INFORMATION / INJURY DATA
14. Employee Name (First, Middle, Last) 15. Employee’s SSN
16. Date of Birth (mm/dd/yyyy) 17. Date of Hire (mm/dd/yyyy) 18. Sex
Male Female
19. Occupation 20. Hourly Wage 21. Employee NAICS Code
22. Race/Ethnic Identification
White Black Hispanic Asian or Pacific Islander American Indian or Alaskan Native
Other (specify)
23. Address Where Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred (Street, City, State, Zip Code)
24. Type of Location Where Injury/Occupational Disease Occurred
Primary Business Location On-site Job Location Traveling between Job Locations
25. Date of Injury/Occupational Disease (mm/dd/yyyy) 26. Date Reported By Employee (mm/dd/yyyy)
27. Return to Work Date or Expected Date (mm/dd/yyyy)
28. Reported Cause of Injury
29. Nature of Injury/Occupational Disease
30. Equipment Involved in the Injury (if any)
31. Body Part(s) Affected
32. First Day of Absence from Work (mm/dd/yyyy) 33. Number of Days Absent from Work
1 Day or Less >1 Day – 7 Days 8 Days or More
34. Occupational Disease
Yes No
35. Fatality Yes No
If Yes, provide date (mm/dd/yyyy)
36. Description of Incident
For TDI-DWC Use Only
DWC007
DWC007 Rev. 01/13 Page 4 of 5
Frequently Asked Questions
Employer’s Report of Non-covered Employee’s Occupational Injury or Disease (DWC Form-007)
Which employers are required to report on-the-job injuries, occupational diseases, and workrelated
deaths on the DWC Form-007?
The following employers are required to file the DWC Form-007:
• An employer that does not have workers’ compensation insurance coverage (non-subscriber)
and employs five or more employees who are not exempt from workers’ compensation
insurance coverage must file the DWC Form-007 to report all on-the-job injuries and occupational
diseases. Examples of exempt employees include certain domestic workers, and certain farm and
ranch workers.
• An employer that has workers’ compensation insurance coverage must file the DWC Form-007 to
report an on-the-job injury or occupational disease for an employee who has waived workers’
compensation insurance coverage in accordance with Texas Labor Code §406.034.
Failure to file the form may subject the employer to administrative penalties.
What do I do if I need to report more than two injured employees?
Copy page three of the form as many times as necessary for reporting additional injured employees.
When do I file the DWC Form-007?
The form must be filed not later than the 7th day of the month following the month in which:
• a work-related death occurred,
• an employee was absent from work for more than one day* as a result of an on-the-job injury; or
• the employer acquired knowledge of an occupational disease.
*Do not count the day of the injury or the day the injured employee returned to work when calculating the
number of days absent from work.
NOTE: If no such deaths, injuries, or diseases occurred during a calendar month, no report is required
for that month.
Are any fields on the DWC Form-007 optional?
No, all applicable fields must be completed each time the DWC Form-007 is filed.
How do I file the DWC Form-007?
Submit the DWC Form-007 to the Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation
(TDI-DWC) by:
• faxing the form to (512) 804-4146; or
• mailing the form to the address listed at the top of the form.
DWC007
DWC007 Rev. 01/13 Page 5 of 5
Instructions for Completing Specific Items
Box 5: Employer NAICS Codes*/Employment
List all six-digit NAICS Codes which the employer uses with the FEIN specified in Box 8. Provide the
highest employment figure for each NAICS Code for the month of the report. Employment means all
employees on your payroll whether full-time, part-time, temporary, or permanent. Attach additional
pages, if necessary.
Box 21: Employee NAICS Code*
List the six-digit NAICS Code of the activity that the employee was engaged in at the time of the injury or
disease. The code listed must be one of the six-digit NAICS Code numbers reported in Box 5.
Box 22: Race/Ethnic Identification
Check appropriate box and provide requested information, if applicable. Information as to the
race/ethnicity of the employee will be maintained for non-discriminatory statistical use.
NOTE: Hispanic, while not a race identification, is included as a separate race/ethnic category. Do not
include Hispanic under “white” or “black”.
Box 28: Reported Cause of Injury
Enter the most probable cause of the injury or disease. Examples: overexertion due to lifting or pushing,
caught between, slip, trip, fall.
Box 29: Nature of Injury/Occupational Disease
Enter the type of injury or occupational disease. Examples: cut, burn, bruise, fracture, sprain, strain,
chemical burn, dermatitis, asbestosis, silicosis. For multiple injuries, use most serious.
Box 33: Number of Days Absent from Work
• Occupational disease: Must be reported regardless of the number of days the employee is absent
from work. Check the appropriate box, including 1 Day or Less.
• On-the-job injury: Must be reported only if the employee is absent from work for more than one
day. Do not check 1 Day or Less.
Box 36: Description of Incident
Provide a short narrative of how the incident occurred. Example: While painting house, fell off ladder and
fractured arm.
*Information on NAICS Codes can be found on the United States Census Bureau website at
www.census.gov/eos/www/naics. NAICS Codes can also be obtained from the North American Industry
Classification System published by the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road,
Springfield, Virginia 22161; e-mail: info@ntis.fedworld.gov.

Notice to New Employees Rev. 01/13 DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
Texas Department of Insurance
Division of Workers’ Compensation
7551 Metro Center Drive, Suite 100 • Austin, Texas 78744-1645
512-804-4000 telephone • 512-804-4001 fax • www.tdi.texas.gov
YOU MAY USE YOUR OWN LETTERHEAD WITH
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
Reference Rule 110.101
(a) In addition to the posted notice required by subsection (e) of this section, employers, as
defined by Labor Code Section 406.001, shall notify their employees of workers’
compensation insurance coverage status, in writing. This additional notice:
(1) shall be provided at the time an employee is hired, meaning when the employee is
required by federal law to complete both a W-4 form and an I-9 form or when a
break in service has occurred and the employee is required by federal law to
complete a W-4 form on the first day the employee reports back to duty;
(2) shall be provided to each employee, by an employer whose workers’
compensation insurance coverage is terminated or cancelled, not later than the 15th
day after the date on which the termination or cancellation of coverage takes
effect;
(3) shall be provided to each employee, by an employer who obtains workers’
compensation insurance coverage, not later than the 15th day after the date on
which coverage takes effect, as necessary to allow the employee to elect to retain
common law rights under Labor Code Chapter 406;
(4) shall include the text required in the posted notice (see rule 110.101 (e)(1), (e)(2),
(e)(3), (e)(4) for appropriate language); and
(5) if the employer is covered by workers’ compensation insurance (subscriber) or
becomes covered, whether by commercial insurance or through self-insurance as
provided by the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), shall include the
following statement:
NOTICE TO NEW EMPLOYEES
“You may elect to retain your common law right of action if, no later than five days
after you begin employment or within five days after receiving written notice from
the employer that the employer has obtained workers’ compensation insurance
coverage, you notify your employer in writing that you wish to retain your common
law right to recover damages for personal injury. If you elect to retain your
common law right of action, you cannot obtain workers’ compensation income or
medical benefits if you are injured.”
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES CONCERNING
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN TEXAS
COVERAGE: [Name of employer] does not
have workers’ compensation insurance coverage. As an employee of a non-covered employer, you
are not eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits under the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act. However, a non-covered (non-subscribing) employer can and may provide other benefits to
injured employees. You should contact your employer regarding the availability of other benefits for
a work-related injury or occupational disease. In addition, you may have rights under the common
law of Texas should you have an on the job injury or occupational disease. Your employer is required
to provide you with coverage information, in writing, when you are hired or whenever the employer
becomes, or ceases to be, covered by workers’ compensation insurance.
SAFETY VIOLATIONS HOTLINE: The Division has a 24 hour toll-free telephone number
for reporting unsafe conditions in the workplace that may violate occupational health and safety
laws. Employers are prohibited by law from suspending, terminating, or discriminating against any
employee because he or she in good faith reports an alleged occupational health or safety violation.
Contact the Division at 1-800-452-9595.
Notice 5 (01/13) TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION Rule 110.101(e)(4)
Non-Covered Employer
Texas Workers’ Compensation Rule 110.101(e)(4) requires employers who are not covered by
workers’ compensation, either by election, cancelation or termination of coverage to advise their
employees that they do not have workers’ compensation insurance coverage.
Notices in English, Spanish and any other language common to the employer’s employee population
must be posted and:
1. Prominently displayed in the employer’s personnel office, if any;
2. Located about the workplace in such a way that each employee is likely to see the notice on a
regular basis;
3. Printed with a title in at least 26 point bold type, subject in at least 18 point bold type, and text in
at least 16 point normal type; and
4. Contain the exact words as prescribed in Rule 110.101(e)(4).
The notice on the reverse side meets the above requirements. Failure to post or to provide notice
as required in the rule is a violation of the Act and Division rules. The violator may be subject to
administrative penalties.
Do Not Post This Side
COBERTURA: [Name of employer]
no cuenta con una cobertura de seguro
de compensación para trabajadores. Como empleado de un empleador que
no cuenta con una cobertura, usted no es elegible para recibir beneficios
de compensación para trabajadores bajo la Ley de Compensación para
Trabajadores de Texas. Sin embargo, un empleador no cubierto (no
suscriptor) puede y debe proporcionar otros beneficios a los empleados
lesionados. Usted debe comunicarse con su empleador para obtener
información sobre la disponibilidad de otros beneficios por una lesión o
enfermedad ocupacional relacionada con el trabajo. Además, usted podría
tener derechos bajo la ley de “Derecho Común de Texas” (Common Law of
Texas, por su nombre en inglés), en caso de que usted llegara a sufrir una
lesión o enfermedad ocupacional relacionada con el trabajo. Su empleador
tiene la obligación de proporcionarle a usted información por escrito sobre
la cobertura cuando usted es contratado o cuando su empleador adquiere o
deja de tener una cobertura de seguro de compensación para trabajadores.
LÍNEA DIRECTA PARA REPORTAR VIOLACIONES DE
SEGURIDAD: La División cuenta con una línea gratuita telefónica que
está en servicio las 24 horas del día para reportar condiciones inseguras
en el área de trabajo que podrían violar las leyes ocupacionales de salud
y seguridad. La ley prohíbe que los empleadores suspendan, despidan o
discriminen en contra de cualquier empleado porque él o ella de buena
fe reporta una alegada violación ocupacional de salud o seguridad.
Comuníquese con la División al teléfono 1-800-452-9595.
AVISO A LOS EMPLEADOS SOBRE
LA COMPENSACIÓN PARA
TRABAJADORES EN TEXAS
Notice 5 (01/13) TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, DIVISION OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION Rule 110.101(e)(4)
EMPLEADORES SIN COBERTURA
El Reglamento 110.101 (e)(4) de Compensación para Trabajadores de
Texas requiere que los empleadores que no cuentan con una cobertura
de compensación para trabajadores, ya sea por elección, cancelación o
anulación de la cobertura notifiquen a sus empleados que no cuentan con
una cobertura de seguro de compensación para trabajadores.
Avisos en inglés, español y cualquier otro idioma común para la población
de los trabajadores del empleador deben ser puestos a la vista y:
1. Mostrarse en un lugar prominente de la oficina de personal del
empleador, si es que la hay;
2. Ubicar este aviso en el área de trabajo de tal manera que los
empleados lo vean regularmente;
3. El título debe ser impreso en tamaño 26, en letra negrita de punto, el
tema debe ser impreso en tamaño 18, en letra negrita de punto, y el
texto, por lo menos en tamaño 16 en letra negrita de punto normal; y
4. Contener las palabras exactas según lo señalado en el Reglamento
110.101 (e)(4).
El aviso que se muestra al reverso de esta página cumple con los
requisitos que se han señalado en la parte de arriba. El negarse a mostrar
o proporcionar esta información, según lo requerido en el reglamento es
una falta a la ley y a los reglamentos de la División. El infractor podría estar
sujeto a sanciones administrativas.
NO MOSTRAR ESTE LADO

 

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

Medicare Set Aside Directive–Fort Worth, Texas Workers’ Compensation Defense Lawyers

JUL 23 2001
To: All Associate Regional Administrators
Attention: Division of Medicare
From: Deputy Director
Purchasing Policy Group
Center for Medicare Management
SUBJECT: Workers’ Compensation: Commutation of Future Benefits
Medicare’s regulations (42 CFR 411.46) and manuals (MIM” 3407.7&3407.8 and MCM
”2370.7 & 2370.8) make a distinction between lump sum settlements that are commutations of
future benefits and those that are due to a compromise between the Workers’ Compensation
(WC) carrier and the injured individual. This Regional Office letter clarifies the Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) policy regarding a number of questions raised recently by
several Regional Offices (RO) concerning how the RO should evaluate and approve WC lump
sum settlements to help ensure that Medicare’s interests are properly considered.
Regional Office staff may choose to consult with the Regional Offices Office of the General
Counsel (OGC) on WC cases because these cases may entail many legal questions. OGC should
become involved in WC cases if there are legal issues which need to be evaluated or if there is a
request to compromise Medicare’s recovery claim or if the Federal Claims Collection Act
(FCCA) delegations require such consultation. Because most WC carriers typically dispute
liability in WC compromise cases, it is very common that Medicare later finds that it has already
made conditional payments. (A conditional payment means a Medicare payment for which
another payer is responsible.) If Medicare’s conditional payments are more than $100,000 and
the beneficiary also wishes Medicare to compromise its recovery under FCCA (31U.S.C.3711),
the case must be referred to Central Office and then forwarded to the Department of Justice. It is
important to note in all WC compromise cases that all pre-settlement and post-settlement
requests to compromise any Medicare recovery claim amounts must be submitted to the RO for
appropriate action. Regional Offices must comply with general CMS rules regarding collection of
debts (please reference the Administrator’s March 27, 2000 memo re: New instructions detailing
your responsibilities for monies owed to the government).

 

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

ERISA Plan Subrogation and Reimbursement Provisions–Fort Worth, Texas Subrogation Attorneys

U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals

WALKER v WAL-MART STORES INC

                    Revised November 23, 1998                  

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                     

For the Fifth Circuit            __________________________________________

No. 98-60224

Summary Calendar

_________________________________________

SANDRA F. WALKER

Plaintiff – Appellant,

VERSUS                      WAL-MART STORES, INC.

Defendant – Appellees.

__________________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi

__________________________________________

November 18, 1998

Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, JOLLY, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

  1. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January of 1990, Sandra Walker (“Walker”) was employed by Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and was a member of the Wal-Mart Associates Group Health Plan (“the Plan”), which provided Walker with medical and dental benefits. The Plan is governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).

Beginning January 18, 1990, through January 25, 1990, Walker underwent dental treatment by Dr. Van R. Simmons, a dentist in Mississippi. On January 7, 1992, Walker initiated a malpractice action in state court against Dr. Simmons for dental malpractice. She alleged that he propped her mouth open excessively, thus causing her to undergo three inpatient surgeries for repair of her right and left temporomandibular joints.

Walker’s medical expenses totaled $41,598.59 and were paid by the Plan. On June 19, 1996, Walker agreed to release Dr. Simmons of all claims in exchange for a settlement agreement of $12,500.

On December 13, 1996, Walker instituted a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court of Pike County, Mississippi. Walker argued that she was entitled to the whole of the settlement proceeds received in the underlying malpractice action. On January 21, 1997, the Plan removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.

On March 31, 1998, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi granted the Plan’s Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered the entirety of the $12,500 be paid to the Plan as reimbursement for its medical expenses. Walker appealed the lower court’s decision.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch , 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989), the Supreme Court established that courts must apply a de novo standard of review in actions brought by ERISA plan participants who challenge the denial of benefits. However, if the plan vests the plan administrator with discretionary authority to make eligibility determinations or construe the plan’s terms, the appropriate standard of review is for abuse of discretion. Id .

This Court has held Bruch’s principles applicable not only to benefit determinations brought by plan participants, but also to plans’ assertions of purported reimbursement and subrogation rights. Sunbeam-Oster Company, Inc. Group Benefits Plan for Salaried and Non-Bargaining Hourly Employees v. Whitehurst , 102 F.3d 1368, 1373 (5th Cir. 1991). In Whitehurst , we applied a de novo standard of review because the parties agreed that the administrator had not been vested with discretionary authority to interpret the Plan at the time of the plaintiff’s injuries. Id . Had we found that the administrator had possessed discretionary authority at the time of the injury, the appropriate standard of review would have been for abuse of discretion.

Like in Whitehurst , the Plan herein is asserting its reimbursement and subrogation rights over the plaintiff’s monetary recoveries from the tortfeasor. In this case, however, the issue on whether the administrator was vested with discretionary authority has not been settled and we must look at the Plan’s language to determine if any of its provisions vested the administrator with such authority. The relevant provision, for determining this issue, reads as follows:

The PLAN herein expressly gives the ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE discretionary authority to resolve all questions concerning the administration, interpretation or application of the PLAN, including without limitation, discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the PLAN in conducting the review of the appeal. . . .

This provision clearly vested the Administrative Committee with the discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the Plan, therefore, the proper standard of review in this case is for abuse of discretion.

III. DISCUSSION

There are two issues presented in this case. First, whether the Plan’s language unambiguously speaks to this dispute and sufficiently provides for the distribution of settlement proceeds of the type paid in this case. Second, whether the plaintiff’s attorney is entitled to deduct his fees and expenses prior to the Plan being reimbursed under his own reimbursement contract with the plaintiff.

Walker’s argument, for right of possession over the settlement money, is three-fold. First, she argues that the Plan chose not to participate or finance the lawsuit and should therefore be barred from recovering any of the settlement money. Second, Walker maintains that the language of the Plan never contemplated partial recovery by a participant nor did it ever consider the issue of attorneys’ fees. Third, Walker contends that there is no proof that the settlement sum paid was a result of any malpractice by the tortfeasor and therefore the reimbursement provision does not apply.

The Plan argues that it is entitled to the right of subrogation and recovery of all amounts paid. The Plan points out that it expended $41,498.59 for Walker’s medical treatment and that the plain language of the Plan gives it the right to recover benefits that it has previously paid to the extent of any payments resulting from settlement, regardless of how the parties chose to designate those payments.

The Plan asserts that the relevant provisions are unambiguous. Walker, however, claims that they are insufficient for determining the distribution of the settlement proceeds. The provisions read as follows:

The PLAN shall have the right to reduce benefits otherwise payable by the PLAN or recover benefits previously paid by the PLAN to the extent of any and all of the following:

A.   Any payments resulting from a judgement orsettlement, or     other payment or payments,made or to be made by any person or     personsconsidered responsible for the conditiongiving rise to the     medical expense or bytheir insurers, regardless of whether the     payment is designated as payment for suchdamages including, but     no limited [,] to painand/or suffering, loss of income, medical     benefits or any other specified damages; orany other damages made     or to be made by anyperson . . .

Congress expressly intended for ERISA Plans to be “written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan participant,” and need only be “sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under the plan. Title 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a)(1). In light of this statute, we have previously held that ERISA plans should not be held to the same standard that an insurance contract purchased in an open market is held to. Jones v. Georgia Pacific Corp. , 90 F.3d 114, 116 (5th Cir. 1996). Such a contract is purposefully drafted with greater particularity because courts usually construe plan terms strictly in favor of the insured. ERISA, on the other hand, expressly guards against boilerplate language in its plans and we must therefore interpret ERISA plans’ provisions as they are likely to be “understood by the average plan participant,” consistent with ERISA’s statutory drafting requirements.

We hold that the Plan’s language is unambiguous and that the administrators’ interpretation of the Plan did not constitute an abuse of discretion. We agree with the district court in holding that the “any and all” language plainly means the first dollar of recovery (any) and 100% recovery (all) of the funds received by the plaintiff in the settlement, up to full amount of the benefits paid. The Plan’s unambiguous language does not include a provision for reduction of its subrogation lien for payment of attorneys’ fees or costs. Interpreting the provisions to provide for attorneys’ fees and expenses would have been wholly improper by the district court. Furthermore, the fact that the provisions do not specifically mention attorneys’ fees or set out detailed distribution procedures, does not constitute silence or ambiguity on behalf of the Plan. Whitehurst , 102 F.3d at 1375. This Court has firmly held that an ERISA plan should not be penalized for lack of technical precision or verbosity by labeling the Plan “silent” or “ambiguous” when it is simply using the direct language mandated by ERISA. Id .

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that the administrator’s interpretation of the plan was legally correct and that the language of the Plan’s subrogation and reimbursement provisions are clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, in the absence of any expressly selected alternative standard, the Plan Priority norm vested the Plan with unconditional reimbursement for the full amount of the medical benefits paid to Walker. Therefore, her attorneys are not entitled to deduct their fees or expenses.

We find that there was no abuse of discretion by the Administrative Committee and AFFIRM the district court’s decision to grant the Plan’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

 

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Texas Civil Litigation–Fort Worth, Texas Civil Litigation Attorneys

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

NO. 12-0946

IN RE BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS TIRE OPERATIONS, LLC, RELATOR

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Argued November 5, 2014
JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Before us once again is the Texas-resident exception to the forum-non-conveniens statute.
We consider whether the exception—which allows a plaintiff residing in Texas to maintain a lawsuit
here even when the suit would otherwise be subject to dismissal for forum non conveniens—applies
in a case in which two nonresident minors sue by a next friend who is a Texas resident. The minors
themselves reside in Mexico with their grandparents, who are the minors’ legal guardians under
Mexican law. We hold that the Texas-resident exception does not apply and that the trial court
abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case on forum-non-conveniens grounds. Accordingly,
we conditionally grant mandamus relief.
I. Background
This case arises from a June 2009 car accident in Mexico. Armando Alvarado was driving
a 1996 Ford Explorer on a highway near Monterrey in the State of Nuevo Leon. His wife, Maria
Isabel Rodriguez, and their two minor children were passengers. The Explorer’s left rear tire
allegedly failed, causing a rollover that killed Armando and Maria and injured the children. At the
time of the accident, the family resided in Nuevo Leon. The children’s maternal grandparents
became the children’s legal guardians by operation of Mexican law and took custody of the children
in Nuevo Leon.
Gilberto Rodriguez, a Texas resident who is the children’s maternal uncle, filed a wrongfuldeath
lawsuit “as next friend” of the children in Texas against Bridgestone Americas Tire
Operations, LLC (Bridgestone), a Delaware company that manufactured the allegedly defective tire.
Other defendants included Gutierrez Brothers, Inc., doing business as Gutierrez Auto Sales, and that
company’s individual owners, brothers Juan, Jaime, and Manuel Gutierrez.1 Gutierrez Auto Sales,
which is in Hidalgo County, Texas, had purchased the used Explorer from a New Jersey Acura
dealership through a New Jersey auction house on July 12, 2007.2 Approximately two weeks later,
Gutierrez Auto Sales sold the Explorer to wholesaler Librado Leal, a company based in Nuevo Leon,
“For Export Only.” The accident occurred almost two years later. The record does not reflect when
or where the tire at issue was put on the Explorer, and nothing in the record suggests that the tire was
manufactured in Texas.
Bridgestone filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, arguing that the case
belonged in Mexico, not Texas. The trial court denied the motion, and Bridgestone filed a petition
1 The original petition named only Bridgestone and Jaime Gutierrez d/b/a Gutierrez Auto Sales as defendants.
The operative Third Amended Petition names Gutierrez Brothers, Inc., and all three Gutierrez brothers.
2 The Explorer’s first two owners were New Jersey residents.
2
for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. In denying relief, the court of appeals held that the
case may not be dismissed on forum-non-conveniens grounds because the plaintiff, next-friend
Rodriguez, is a Texas resident. 387 S.W.3d 840, 848 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012). Bridgestone
now seeks mandamus relief in this Court, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Bridgestone’s motion to dismiss.
II. Analysis
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, which originated in the common law and is now
codified in Texas, “comes into play when there are sufficient contacts between the defendant and the
forum state to confer personal jurisdiction upon the trial court, but the case itself has no significant
connection to the forum.” In re Pirelli Tire, LLC, 247 S.W.3d 670, 675–76 (Tex. 2007). Texas’s
forum-non-conveniens statute provides:
If a court of this state, on written motion of a party, finds that in the interest of justice
and for the convenience of the parties a claim or action to which this section applies
would be more properly heard in a forum outside this state, the court shall decline to
exercise jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and shall stay or
dismiss the claim or action.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(b).3 Notwithstanding this mandatory language, courts “may
not stay or dismiss a plaintiff’s claim [on forum-non-conveniens grounds] if the plaintiff is a legal
resident of this state.” Id.§ 71.051(e). This so-called Texas-resident exception “ensure[s] access to
Texas courts for Texas plaintiffs.” In re Ford Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. 2014).
3 The statute applies to actions for personal injuries or wrongful death. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 71.051(i).
3
We have held that a trial court’s erroneous denial of a forum-non-conveniens motion cannot
be adequately remedied on appeal and therefore warrants mandamus relief. In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271
S.W.3d 681, 685 (Tex. 2008). We review the trial court’s forum-non-conveniens ruling for an abuse
of discretion. Id.
A. Application of the Texas-Resident Exception
When the Texas-resident exception outlined in subsection 71.051(e) applies, a case may not
be dismissed on forum-non-conveniens grounds no matter how tenuous its connection to Texas. In
this case, as discussed above, Texas-resident Rodriguez brought a wrongful-death suit on behalf of
two nonresident minors to recover damages for their parents’ deaths. Rodriguez may not assert a
personal cause of action under Texas’s wrongful-death statute and has sued solely in his capacity as
next friend of his nephews. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.004(a) (“An action to recover
damages as provided by [the wrongful-death statute] is for the exclusive benefit of the surviving
spouse, children, and parents of the deceased.”). Bridgestone argues that Rodriguez’s Texas
residency does not foreclose dismissal for two reasons: (1) Rodriguez lacked authority to sue as the
children’s next friend because they had a legal guardian, and (2) even if the children could sue by
next friend, a next friend is not a “plaintiff” whose residency may trigger the exception. We address
these contentions in turn.
1. Next-Friend Representation
We first address whether Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 44 allowed the children to sue
through a next friend. When we analyze Texas’s procedural rules, we apply the same rules of
construction that govern the interpretation of statutes. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573,
4
579 (Tex. 2012). That is, we look first to the rule’s language and construe it according to its plain
meaning. In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex. 2007). At the same time,
we bear in mind that the rules are given a liberal construction in order to obtain “a just, fair, equitable
and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law.”
TEX. R. CIV. P. 1.
Rule 44, which is derived from a statute that was originally enacted in 1893,4 governs the
institution of suit by next friend and provides:
Minors . . . who have no legal guardian may sue and be represented by “next
friend” under the following rules:
(1) Such next friend shall have the same rights concerning such suits as
guardians have, but shall give security for costs, or affidavits in lieu thereof, when
required.
(2) Such next friend or his attorney of record may with the approval of the
court compromise suits and agree to judgments, and such judgments, agreements and
compromises, when approved by the court, shall be forever binding and conclusive
upon the party plaintiff in such suit.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 44.5 The only other procedural rule to mention next friends is Rule 173, which
requires the court to appoint a guardian ad litem for a party represented by a next friend or guardian
if “the next friend or guardian appears to the court to have an interest adverse to the party” or if the
parties agree. TEX. R. CIV. P. 173.2(a). Bridgestone argues that Rule 44’s plain language allows suit
4 Act approved Feb. 11, 1893, 23d Leg., R.S., ch. 6, § 1, 1893 Tex. Gen. Laws 433 (former TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. art. 3498u) (repealed) (“[A]ny minor having a sufficient cause of action, and who has no legal guardian, can bring
suit in any of the courts of this State by next friend.”).
5 The federal rule governing next-friend representation uses similar but not identical language: “A minor or
incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative [which includes a general guardian, a committee,
a conservator, and a like fiduciary] may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem.” FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
5
by a next friend only when the minor has “no legal guardian” and that the minor plaintiffs in this case
have legal guardians: their grandparents.
The parties do not dispute that, under the law of the State of Nuevo Leon where the children
reside, the children’s grandparents automatically became the children’s legal guardians upon the
death of their parents.6 However, the court of appeals concluded that, because no Texas court had
accepted the grandparents’ guardianship established in Mexico, “the minors had no legal guardian
in Texas,” and next-friend representation was appropriate under Rule 44. 387 S.W.3d at 846.
Bridgestone contends that this interpretation improperly adds words to the rule and that “no legal
guardian” means just that: “no legal guardian.”
Bridgestone’s argument has appeal, but it leaves out a very important inquiry. The
significance of a minor’s having a legal guardian in the context of Rule 44 is that, when a minor
already has a guardian who may sue on his behalf, the minor does not need next-friend representation
in order to litigate his claims. For Rule 44 to make sense, it must be construed to enable minors to
prosecute their claims—through a next friend—when they otherwise could not through a legal
guardian. It follows that, if a legal guardian has been appointed or recognized in another jurisdiction,
6 At oral argument, Rodriguez’s attorney asserted that the grandparents had executed an affidavit renouncing
their status as guardians for health reasons. That affidavit was executed on December 12, 2011—seven months after the
underlying lawsuit was filed—and is a bit unclear. The grandparents aver that they have custody of the children and
“have provided them with all care required for the welfare of the children,” but also that they “are in total agreement”
that Rodriguez “take charge” of the children. Nothing in the record suggests that the children have ever lived with
Rodriguez or that Rodriguez has petitioned any court for guardianship. Further, Bridgestone’s Mexican-law expert
testified without opposition that the grandparents would be required to petition a competent court to be excused from
their guardianship duties, and the record does not reflect that such action was taken. Finally, we note that Rodriguez
submitted, with a post-submission brief, copies of two federal tax returns purporting to show that he claimed the children
as dependents in 2009 and 2010. We grant Bridgestone’s motion to strike this evidence, which is not in the mandamus
record.
6
but that guardian lacks authority to sue on the minor’s behalf in Texas and has no legal basis for
obtaining such authority, the minor may sue by next friend under Rule 44.7 In this case, then,
whether the children could sue by next friend turns on whether their grandparents could have filed
suit in Texas on the children’s behalf as their guardians. If they could not, Rule 44 steps in.
Bridgestone summarily argues that the grandparents’ guardian status entitled them (and only
them) to bring the underlying suit, but Bridgestone fails to address the potential limitations on a
guardian’s authority outside the jurisdiction in which he was appointed or otherwise designated. The
U.S. Supreme Court recognized long ago that “[t]he authority of a guardian, like that of an executor
or administrator, appointed by a court of one state, is limited to that state, and he cannot sue in a
court . . . held within any other state, except so far as authorized to do so by its laws.” Morgan v.
Potter, 157 U.S. 195, 197 (1895) (noting that “[t]he statutes of Kansas do authorize executors or
administrators appointed in another state to sue and be sued as such in Kansas,” but “they confer no
such general authority upon guardians appointed in another state”); cf. Faulkner v. Reed, 241 S.W.
1002, 1007 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1922, holding approved) (“An administrator, appointed by the
courts of Ohio, could not, by virtue of said appointment sue or be sued in the courts of Texas, or in
any way act as a legal representative of said estate in Texas. An administrator is the agent solely of
the court appointing him, clothed with authority to administer only such assets as are within the
jurisdiction of the court making such appointment.”).
7 Nothing in the rule prevents the foreign guardian and the next friend from being the same person.
7
Our courts of appeals have recognized this principle over the years in addressing challenges
to next-friend representation, starting with Bonner v. Ogilvie, 58 S.W. 1027 (Dallas 1900, no writ).
In that case, a child’s mother appointed as his legal guardian in Louisiana sued on his behalf in her
capacity as guardian. Id. at 1028. The court held that the mother’s appointment as guardian in
Louisiana “would not give her authority to sue as such guardian in Texas, but it would not deprive
her of the power to sue in this state as next friend.” Id.
As Bridgestone points out, Bonner was decided before this Court adopted the Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, Rule 44’s “no legal guardian” language tracks the 1893 statute from
which the rule is derived, and courts have relied on Bonner to interpret Rule 44. In Henderson v.
Shell Oil Co., for example, a guardian appointed by a Missouri court sued in Texas on behalf of his
ward, also a Missouri resident, regarding a tract of land in Texas that the ward owned. 179 S.W.2d
386, 386 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth), rev’d on other grounds and dismissed for want of
jurisdiction, 182 S.W.2d 994 (Tex. 1944). The court noted that “the only capacity in which [the
Missouri guardian] could be recognized as having the right to bring the suit is that of ‘next friend.’”
Id. at 388. This conclusion was reiterated in Herrin v. Falcon, in which the court of appeals held
that a father appointed by a Louisiana court to be his minor son’s guardian properly brought suit in
Texas “as next friend” where no ancillary or original guardianship proceeding had been brought in
Texas. 198 S.W.2d 117, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
8
Evaluating these decisions requires an examination of the Texas Guardianship Code, which
includes provisions governing guardians’ authority to file suit on behalf of their wards.8 In Texas,
the term “guardian” encompasses both a “guardian of the person” and a “guardian of the estate” of
a minor or other incapacitated person. TEX. EST. & G’SHIP CODE § 1002.012(b). “A guardian of the
estate of a ward appointed in this state” has authority to sue for damages on the minor’s behalf. Id.
§ 1151.104(a)(1) (emphasis added). However, like the Kansas statute at issue in Morgan, Texas’s
guardianship statutes confer no such general authority on guardians appointed or recognized in other
jurisdictions. In limited circumstances in which a nonresident ward owns property in Texas, the
Code provides a mechanism by which a guardian appointed in another jurisdiction may “be
appointed and qualified as guardian or coguardian” of the ward’s estate located here. Id.
§§ 1252.051–.053. But a nonresident guardian of a nonresident ward with no connection to Texas
beyond a possible lawsuit simply has no authority to sue on behalf of the ward in Texas in his
capacity as guardian.9
8 The Legislature recently amended and recodified Texas’s guardianship statutes, which were formerly housed
in the Probate Code but, effective January 1, 2014, are now contained in the Estates and Guardianships Code. Act of
June 17, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 823, § 1.02, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 1917. Because the amendments do not affect our
analysis, we will cite the current versions of the statutes in this opinion.
9 We note that we disagree with Bonner and Herrin to the extent they hold that a child’s parent is not a legal
guardian qualified to sue on his child’s behalf in that capacity. Under Texas law, a parent has the right to represent his
child in legal proceedings and the duty to manage the child’s estate unless a guardian of the estate has been appointed.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 151.001(a)(4), (7). A parent thus typically qualifies as a legal guardian for purposes of Rule 44, and
his minor child may not sue by next friend. See In re KC Greenhouse Patio Apartments LP, 445 S.W.3d 168, 172 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, orig. proceeding); see also R.H. v. Smith, 339 S.W.3d 756, 759, 764 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (holding that a father had no right to represent his minor child in a lawsuit when the child’s
grandparents had been appointed the minor’s managing conservators).
9
Accordingly, in this case, although the children’s grandparents are recognized as the
children’s guardians under the law of Nuevo Leon where they reside, they have no authority to sue
in that capacity on the children’s behalf in Texas. To avoid depriving the children of the ability to
pursue their claims before they turn eighteen, Rule 44 allows them to do so by next friend.
Accordingly, we agree with the court of appeals that, for purposes of Rule 44, the children could sue
by next friend. We therefore turn to whether Rodriguez, as a next friend, qualifies as a “plaintiff”
who may take advantage of the forum-non-conveniens statute’s Texas-resident exception.
2. Status of Next Friend
As noted above, a plaintiff’s claim may not be stayed or dismissed on forum-non-conveniens
grounds if the plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(e). In
determining whether Rodriguez is a plaintiff for purposes of this provision, we focus on the specific
statutory definition of “plaintiff,” but we also consider that definition in the context of the entire
forum-non-conveniens statute and chapter 71 as a whole. See CHCA Woman’s Hosp. v. Lidji, 403
S.W.3d 228, 232 (Tex. 2013) (“We analyze statutory language in context, considering the specific
section at issue as well as the statute as a whole.”). We presume the Legislature enacted the statute
“with complete knowledge of the existing law and with reference to it.” Acker v. Tex. Water
Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex. 1990).
The forum-non-conveniens statute defines the term “plaintiff” as follows:
“Plaintiff” means a party seeking recovery of damages for personal injury or
wrongful death. In a cause of action in which a party seeks recovery of damages for
personal injury to or the wrongful death of another person, “plaintiff” includes both
that other person and the party seeking such recovery. The term does not include a
counterclaimant, cross-claimant, or third-party plaintiff or a person who is assigned
10
a cause of action for personal injury, or who accepts an appointment as a personal
representative in a wrongful death action, in bad faith for purposes of affecting in any
way the application of this section.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(h)(2). In the context of this case, we consider whether
Rodriguez, as a next friend, qualifies as “a party seeking recovery of damages for personal injuries
or wrongful death.” We hold that he does not.
The status of a next friend under Texas law is well settled. “In a suit by a ‘next friend,’ the
real party plaintiff is the child and not the next friend.” Gracia v. RC Cola–7-Up Bottling Co., 667
S.W.2d 517, 519 (Tex. 1984); accord Safeway Stores of Tex. v. Rutherford, 111 S.W.2d 688, 689
(Tex. 1938). Indeed, we long ago stated that “the next friend is not a party to the suit instituted by
a minor by his aid.” Martin v. Weyman, 26 Tex. 460, 468 (1863) (citation omitted); see also Gulf,
C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 1 S.W. 161, 163 (Tex. 1886) (“When it appears with certainty . . . that the action
[by next friend] is based on the right of the minor; that the relief sought is such as the minor alone
would be entitled to on the facts pleaded, and that this is sought for the use and benefit of the minor;
then we are of the opinion that the minor is the real plaintiff, whatsoever may be the formula used.”).
The U.S. Supreme Court has similarly stated:
It is the infant, and not the next friend, who is the real and proper party. The next
friend, by whom the suit is brought on behalf of the infant, is neither technically nor
substantially the party, but resembles an attorney, or a guardian ad litem, by whom
a suit is brought or defended in behalf of another.
Morgan, 157 U.S. at 198. This is consistent with our longstanding recognition that a minor’s lack
of capacity to sue, unlike standing, is not a jurisdictional defect and that a challenge to capacity may
be waived. Austin Nursing Ctr. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005).
11
In light of this well-settled law, we cannot conclude that a next friend is “a party seeking
recovery of damages for personal injury or wrongful death.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 71.051(h)(2). That description fits the persons who are authorized to bring a wrongful-death action
under section 71.004, but not the person serving as a conduit when the ones authorized to bring the
action are minors. As such, a next friend’s legal residency in Texas does not trigger the forum-nonconveniens
statute’s Texas-resident exception. So interpreted, the statute’s plain language serves
its purpose of “ensur[ing] access to Texas courts for Texas plaintiffs.” In re Ford Motor Co., 442
S.W.3d at 269. Texas courts have no responsibility to protect the interests of next friends, who
themselves must protect and advance the interests of the minors suing through them. That is, next
friends have no interest in keeping a case in Texas beyond the interests of the minors they represent.
If the minors whose wrongful-death claims are being prosecuted are not Texas residents, their right
to access Texas courts does not trump a defendant’s right to dismissal for forum non conveniens.
The court of appeals interpreted the statute differently, relying principally on the language
excluding personal representatives appointed in bad faith from qualifying as plaintiffs. The specific
language at issue states: “The term [plaintiff] does not include . . . a person . . . who accepts an
appointment as a personal representative in a wrongful death action, in bad faith for purposes of
affecting in any way the application of this section.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(h)(2).
The court concluded, and Rodriguez argues, that this exclusion demonstrates that the Legislature
intended a next friend to qualify as a plaintiff for purposes of the Texas-resident exception unless
the defendant shows the next friend was appointed in bad faith. We disagree.
12
Considering this language in the context of chapter 71 as a whole, as we must, we read this
exclusion to apply to the prosecution of a wrongful-death action by an executor or administrator
under subsection 71.004(c). Section 71.004 provides:
(a) An action to recover damages [for wrongful death] is for the exclusive benefit of
the surviving spouse, children, and parents of the deceased.
(b) The surviving spouse, children, and parents of the deceased may bring the action
or one or more of those individuals may bring the action for the benefit of all.
(c) If none of the individuals entitled to bring an action have begun the action within
three calendar months after the death of the injured individual, his executor or
administrator shall bring and prosecute the action unless requested not to by all those
individuals.
An executor or administrator thus has express statutory authority to bring an action that wrongfuldeath
beneficiaries could have brought but chose not to. When that happens, the executor or
administrator—i.e., the personal representative—is the only possible party plaintiff.10 See In re Ford
Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d at 281 (noting that a personal representative qualifies as a party “seek[ing]
recovery of damages for personal injury to or the wrongful death of another person” (quoting TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(h)(2))). In turn, the bad-faith exclusion precludes such a plaintiff
from taking advantage of the Texas-resident exception when he accepted the appointment “in bad
faith for purposes of affecting in any way the application of this section.” Id. § 71.051(h)(2).
10 Section 71.012 is also instructive. Entitled “Qualification of Foreign Personal Representative,” section 71.012
provides that, when an executor or administrator of a nonresident’s estate “is the plaintiff” in a wrongful-death action,
that “foreign personal representative” need not apply for letters testamentary “to bring and prosecute the action” so long
as he has complied with the statutory requirements for the probate of a foreign will. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 71.012. This lends further support to our interpretation of “personal representative,” as used in the Texas-resident
exception, to apply to executors or administrators exercising their authority to sue under subsection 71.004(c). See also
TEX. EST. & G’SHIP CODE § 22.031(a) (defining “personal representative” to include: an executor and independent
executor; an administrator, independent administrator, and temporary administrator; and their successors).
13
The court of appeals’ overly broad reading of the bad-faith exclusion stretches the definition
of plaintiff beyond the breaking point. If the term “personal representative” as used in section
71.051 were broad enough to include a next friend, we see no principled reason why it would not
also include a guardian ad litem, an attorney ad litem, or an amicus attorney.11 See Morgan, 157 U.S.
at 198 (noting that a next friend resembles a guardian ad litem). Yet it would be absurd to classify
a guardian ad litem as a plaintiff, and, for the reasons discussed above, it makes no more sense to
so classify a next friend. We note that, had the children at issue been adults when suit was filed, the
Texas-resident exception clearly would not have applied. Allowing them to take advantage of the
exception and maintain a suit in Texas merely because they are minors who lack capacity to
represent themselves in litigation defies logic as well as the statute’s plain language and purpose.
In sum, we hold that the Texas-resident exception does not foreclose dismissal of this action
for forum non conveniens. Accordingly, we turn to whether the forum-non-conveniens factors
mandate dismissal.
B. Application of Forum-Non-Conveniens Factors
As noted above, the forum-non-conveniens statute mandates the stay or dismissal of a
personal-injury or wrongful-death action when the court “finds that in the interest of justice and for
the convenience of the parties [the action] would be more properly heard in a forum outside this
state.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(b). In short, the statute requires dismissal of a case
11 Next friends generally are not appointed. They simply act on behalf of the minor unless and until the court
steps in to protect the minor in the event of a conflict of interest. TEX. R. CIV. P. 44, 173; see also Saldarriaga v.
Saldarriaga, 121 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.) (noting that Rule 44 “does not provide for any
kind of procedure for the appointment of a next friend,” but “merely gives minors and incapacitated persons the ability
to sue and appear by a representative”).
14
that “has no significant connection to the forum.” In re Pirelli Tire, LLC, 247 S.W.3d 670, 675–76
(Tex. 2007).
The statute lists six factors for consideration in evaluating a forum-non-conveniens motion.
Specifically, the court must consider whether:
(1) an alternate forum exists in which the claim or action may be tried;
(2) the alternate forum provides an adequate remedy;
(3) maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state would work
a substantial injustice to the moving party;
(4) the alternate forum, as a result of the submission of the parties or
otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants properly joined to the
plaintiff’s claim;
(5) the balance of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of
the state predominate in favor of the claim or action being brought in an alternate
forum, which shall include consideration of the extent to which an injury or death
resulted from acts or omissions that occurred in this state; and
(6) the stay or dismissal would not result in unreasonable duplication or
proliferation of litigation.
Id. § 71.051(b)(1)–(6). Our decision in Pirelli Tire guides the application of these factors to this
case.
The facts of the two cases are strikingly similar. Pirelli Tire involved an alleged tire failure
leading to a rollover accident in Mexico that caused the death of a Mexican resident who was in the
truck at the time of the accident. 247 S.W.3d at 673. Two years before the accident, a Texas
dealership had purchased the truck at an auction in another state and sold it eleven days later to a
Mexican citizen who imported it into Mexico the same day, where it was used and serviced until the
15
accident. Id. The tire was not manufactured in Texas, and the tire’s manufacturer, Pirelli Tire, was
not formed in Texas, nor did it maintain its principal place of business here. Id. The decedent’s
family sued Pirelli Tire for negligence and strict liability in designing and manufacturing the tire.
Id. Pirelli Tire filed a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, which the trial court denied. Id.
Applying the factors listed above, we granted Pirelli Tire’s petition for writ of mandamus.
We held that Pirelli Tire had demonstrated the availability of an adequate forum by stipulating that
it would submit to personal jurisdiction in Mexico and would not assert a statute-of-limitations
defense, and that Mexico was not rendered an inadequate forum merely because its laws may have
been “less favorable” to the plaintiffs. Id. at 677–78. We also held that private-interest factors
favored a Mexican forum, noting that “key evidence and witnesses concerning damages [were] in
Mexico,” including a witness to the accident, the accident investigators and medical personnel,
witnesses most likely to be familiar with the condition and maintenance of the truck and the tire, the
truck’s owner, and the accident scene itself. Id. at 678–79. We also noted that evidence concerning
the tire’s design and manufacture was in Georgia or Iowa, not Texas. Id. at 679. Finally, we held
that the public interests involved “strongly favor[ed] Mexico,” as Mexico has a “paramount” interest
in seeing that its citizens are compensated for their injuries as well as interests in the safety of
Mexican highways and products within its borders. Id. We concluded that “it is unfair to impose
upon the citizens of [the Texas forum county] the cost and administrative burden of a complex
products-liability suit with no significant connection to Texas.” Id.
Like Pirelli Tire, this case involves: Mexican citizens and residents involved in a car accident
in Mexico; an alleged failure of a tire manufactured in the United States, but not in Texas; and brief
16
ownership of the subject vehicle by a Texas dealership approximately two years before the accident,
followed by ownership and maintenance of the vehicle in Mexico. Also like Pirelli Tire, key
evidence and witnesses relating to the accident, the vehicle, the tire, and damages are in Mexico, and
the evidence concerning the tire’s design and manufacture may be in the United States, but it is not
in Texas. These similarities would seem to render Pirelli Tire dispositive of the forum-nonconveniens
analysis.12 However, Rodriguez argues that this case is distinguishable from Pirelli Tire
because of the presence of Texas defendants in the suit. As noted above, in addition to Bridgestone,
the plaintiffs sued the Texas dealership—and its individual owners—that had owned the Explorer
for two weeks in 2007 before selling it to a wholesaler for export to Mexico.13 The petition alleged
that the dealership was liable for selling the vehicle with a recalled tire.
Rodriguez asserts that Mexico’s courts lack personal jurisdiction over these defendants—one
of whom has affirmatively stated that he will not submit to such jurisdiction—rendering Mexico an
inadequate alternate forum. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(b)(4) (requiring
consideration of whether “the alternate forum, as a result of the submission of the parties or
otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants properly joined to the plaintiff’s claim”).
We need not address whether a showing that the Mexico courts lack jurisdiction over the Gutierrez
12 We found that the trial court had abused its discretion in Pirelli Tire even though the applicable version of
the forum-non-conveniens statute permitted, but did not require, the trial court to dismiss for forum non conveniens when
it found no significant connection to Texas under the enumerated factors. See Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch.
424, § 1, sec. 71.051, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1680, 1680, amended by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204,
§ 3.04, sec. 71.051, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 854. As amended in 2003, the current version of the statute requires
dismissal upon such a finding. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(b).
13 The plaintiffs in Pirelli Tire initially sued both Pirelli and the Texas dealership that had briefly owned the
vehicle. 247 S.W.3d at 673 n.1. However, the plaintiffs nonsuited the dealer in exchange for Pirelli Tire’s agreement
not to remove the case to federal court. Id. The dealer thus played no role in our forum-non-conveniens analysis.
17
defendants would be dispositive of the forum-non-conveniens analysis because the only record
evidence on the subject is that such jurisdiction exists.14 Bridgestone’s Mexican-law expert testified
that the Mexico courts would have jurisdiction over all defendants, both because Bridgestone had
agreed to submit to Mexico’s jurisdiction and because the “denial of justice” doctrine allows a
Mexico court to “seize jurisdiction” if a foreign court has rejected a case on forum-non-conveniens
grounds. Rodriguez did not designate an expert to counter these conclusions and thus presented no
evidence to support his interpretation of Mexican law. Accordingly, the presence of the Texas
defendants does not meaningfully distinguish this case from Pirelli Tire for purposes of evaluating
the adequacy of the alternate forum as part of the forum-non-conveniens analysis.15
As they did in Pirelli Tire, the forum-non-conveniens factors “clearly and overwhelmingly
favor a Mexican forum for resolution of this dispute.” 247 S.W.3d at 679. Accordingly, we hold
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Bridgestone’s motion to dismiss.
14 Factually, Rodriguez’s inclusion of claims against the dealership does not provide much of a distinction from
Pirelli Tire. Notably, neither the New Jersey dealer that sold the Explorer to the Texas dealership nor the wholesaler
that imported the car to Mexico were sued, even though it is unclear when the tire at issue was put on the Explorer. The
principal claims in the case involve the allegedly defective design and manufacture of the failed tire. As in Pirelli Tire,
“[t]he happenstance that the truck was in Texas for [less than a month] before it was sold and imported to Mexico is
simply insufficient to provide Texas with any interest in this case.” Id. at 679.
15 To the extent Rodriguez claims Mexico is an inadequate forum because the defendants have not waived any
limitations defenses, we agree with Bridgestone that the record does not support this assertion. Leaving aside that
Rodriguez did not make this argument in the trial court, nothing in the record suggests that Mexican law differs from
Texas law on the running of limitations on a minor’s claim. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.001(a)(1), (b) (stating
that the statute of limitations on a minor’s claims does not begin to run until the minor turns eighteen). While we do not
necessarily presume that the laws of Mexico and Texas are identical, at best the absence of evidence in the record renders
us unable to evaluate Rodriguez’s implied assertion that statute-of-limitations issues affect the forum-non-conveniens
analysis.
18
III. Conclusion
We hold that Texas law allows minors to sue by next friend when they have a legal guardian
who is not authorized to sue in Texas in that capacity. We also hold that a next friend is not a
plaintiff for purposes of the forum-non-conveniens statute’s Texas-resident exception. Finally, we
hold that application of the forum-non-conveniens factors mandates dismissal of this case as a matter
of law. Accordingly, we conditionally grant Bridgestone’s petition for writ of mandamus and order
the trial court to vacate its order denying Bridgestone’s motion to dismiss. We further order the trial
court to “set terms and conditions for . . . dismissing [this] action . . . as the interests of justice may
require, giving due regard to the rights of the parties to the claim or action,” in a manner that is
consistent with this opinion. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051(c). The writ will issue only
if the trial court fails to comply.
_________________________________
Debra H. Lehrmann
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: April 24, 2015

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

Umbrella Insurance Policies and Texas Non Subscriber Coverage Issues–Fort Worth, Texas Non Subscriber Defense Attorneys

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-11052
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY LINES INSURANCE CO.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
RENTECH STEEL LLC; PRESTON TEEL; LESA CROSSWHITE;
JENNINGS TEEL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas (Abilene Division)
Before KING, BARKSDALE, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.
JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:
This case addresses whether an insurance policy that excludes coverage
for an “obligation” incurred under “any workers’ compensation law” bars
coverage for a judgment that an employee recovers in a negligence action against
a Texas employer that does not subscribe to the Texas workers’ compensation
system. Because the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (“TWCA”) imposes no
obligation on a nonsubscriber to compensate an employee for injuries sustained
due to the employer’s own negligence, we find that the exclusion is not
applicable. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of defendants-appellees.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
September 21, 2010
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
I.
Plaintiff-Appellant American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co.
(“AISLIC”) appeals from the district court’s summary judgment in favor of
defendants, holding that AISLIC’s umbrella insurance policy (“the AISLIC
policy”), issued to Rentech Boiler Systems, Inc., covered the negligence claims
that Preston Teel, Lesa Crosswhite, and Jennings Teel (“the Teels”) asserted
against Rentech Steel, L.L.C. in the underlying litigation and the resulting
judgment. Rentech Steel, Rentech Boiler Systems, Inc., and Renz Family
Partnership, Ltd. are entities under the control of or owned by a common
owner/entity. Rentech Steel, a nonsubscriber to the Texas workers’
compensation insurance system, maintained both a primary indemnity policy,
which is not implicated in this case, and the AISLIC Policy. Rentech Steel
shared the AISLIC Policy with Rentech Boiler Systems, a subscriber to the
workers’ compensation system, but they maintained separate primary policies
due to their differing statuses in relation to the workers’ compensation system.
The underlying litigation commenced when sixteen-year-old Preston Teel
sustained severe injuries while working at Rentech Steel’s manufacturing
facility in Abilene, Texas. Following the incident, the Teels sued Rentech Steel
in state court for gross negligence, negligence, and negligence per se. Lexington
Insurance Company, Rentech Steel’s primary insurer, initially defended Rentech
Steel in the litigation. But after Lexington Insurance denied further coverage,
AISLIC assumed Rentech Steel’s defense as the umbrella insurer. A few weeks
before trial was to begin, AISLIC sought a declaratory judgment that it had no
obligation to defend or indemnify Rentech Steel in the lawsuit. On the first day
of trial, Rentech Steel entered Chapter 7 bankruptcy. According to Rentech
2
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 2 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
Steel, the bankruptcy was necessary because AISLIC would not pay for the suit.
The bankruptcy court, however, lifted the stay and permitted the case to proceed
to trial on the condition that any recovery would be limited to the proceeds of the
AISLIC insurance policy.
The jury found for the Teels on their negligence and negligence per se
claims, but it did not find gross negligence on the part of Rentech Steel. The
court then entered a judgment against Rentech Steel for $12,470,000 in actual
damages, which was reduced to $10,570,000 after applying a settlement credit.
Rentech Steel has appealed the judgment, and AISLIC has continued to defend
Rentech Steel under a reservation of rights during the appeal. As a consequence
of the state-court judgment, the Teels became proper claimants to Rentech
Steel’s insurance policy.
Shortly after the state court entered its judgment, AISLIC filed a
declaratory judgment action in federal court seeking to establish that it had no
duty to either defend Rentech Steel in the underlying state-court lawsuit or to
indemnify Rentech Steel for the judgment because the AISLIC policy’s “Various
Laws” exclusion excluded coverage for any “obligation of the Insured under . . .
any workers’ compensation, disability benefits, or unemployment compensation
law, or any similar law.” AISLIC moved for summary judgment, arguing that
a negligence claim filed against a nonsubscribing employer is an obligation
arising under the TWCA, not state common law, so the Teels’ judgment against
Rentech Steel was necessarily an “obligation” under Texas’s workers’
compensation law—an obligation explicitly excluded from coverage under the
“Various Laws” exclusion. The Teels and Rentech Steel opposed AISLIC’s
motion.
3
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 3 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
The district court denied AISLIC’s summary-judgment motion, holding
that the judgment against Rentech Steel did not fall within the Policy’s “Various
Laws” exclusion. The order explained that, although the TWCA deprives
appellees of the right to assert a common-law negligence or negligence per se
claim against a subscribing employer, the Act imposed no “obligation” on a
nonsubscribing employer to compensate an employee for injuries resulting from
the employer’s negligence, but merely limited an employer’s defenses against an
employee’s common-law claims. Alternatively, the court held that, because the
“Various Laws” exclusion was ambiguous, Texas law required that the exclusion
be interpreted against AISLIC and in favor of coverage where appellees’
interpretation of the exclusion was reasonable.
Following the district court’s denial of AISLIC’s motion for summary
judgment, appellees filed for summary judgment on the ground that the AISLIC
policy’s “Various Laws” exclusion did not bar coverage of the judgment against
Rentech Steel, which the district court granted. This appeal followed.
II.
We review a district court’s summary judgment de novo, applying the same
legal standards that the district court applied, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v.
Canal Indem. Co., 352 F.3d 254, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2003). We affirm “only if
there is no genuine issue of material fact and one party is entitled to prevail as
a matter of law.” Cedyco Corp. v. PetroQuest Energy, LLC, 497 F.3d 485, 488
(5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Where, as here, parties have filed crossmotions
for summary judgment, each motion must be considered separately
because each movant bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of
4
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 4 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Shaw Constructors v. ICF Kaiser Engr’s, Inc., 395 F.3d 533, 538–39 (5th Cir.
2004).
III.
At issue in this case is whether an employee’s negligence action against an
employer that does not subscribe to the Texas workers’ compensation system is
an “obligation” under the TWCA, such that it is excluded under the AISLIC
Policy’s “Various Laws” exclusion. The AISLIC Policy’s “Various Laws”
exclusion provides:
This insurance does not apply to any obligation of the Insured
under any of the following:
1. the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(including amendments relating to the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985), or any
amendment or revision thereto, or any similar law; or
2. any workers’ compensation, disability benefits or
unemployment compensation law, or any similar law.
Because Texas law governs this claim, we employ the principles of Texas
contract construction in interpreting the “Various Laws” exclusion. Texas law
provides that insurance policies are construed according to common principles
governing the construction of contracts, and the interpretation of an insurance
policy is a question of law for a court to determine. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir. 1996). Limiting our inquiry to the
four corners of the underlying complaint and the four corners of the insurance
policy, we interpret the contract to discern the intention of the parties from the
language expressed in the policy. See Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins.
5
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 5 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
Co., 611 F.3d 299, 309 (5th Cir. 2010). “No single provision taken alone will be
given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with
reference to the whole instrument.” See Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393
(Tex. 1983) (citations omitted). Where, as here, the disputed provision is an
exclusion, the insurer bears the burden of establishing that the exclusion
applies. Guaranty Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Vic Mfg. Co., 143 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir.
1998).
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Kelley-Coppedge,
Inc. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 980 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. 1998). An ambiguity does
not arise simply because the parties present conflicting interpretations; it “exists
only if the contractual language is susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex.
2003) (citation omitted). “If policy language is worded so that it can be given a
definite or certain legal meaning, it is not ambiguous,” and the court construes
it as a matter of law without admitting evidence for the purpose of creating an
ambiguity. Id.; see Univ. C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Daniel, 243 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.
1951). But if the policy language is ambiguous, we construe it “strictly against
the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured,” Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
723 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1987), and an “even more stringent construction is
required” where the ambiguity pertains to an “exception or limitation on [the
insured’s] liability under the policy,” Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v.
Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 1993).
Consequently, we must adopt the “construction of an exclusionary clause urged
by the insured as long as that construction is not itself unreasonable, even if the
construction urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more
6
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.” Glover v. Nat’l Ins. Underwriters, 545
S.W.2d 755, 761 (Tex. 1977).
Employing these principles, we find no ambiguity in the language of the
“Various Laws” exclusion. The exclusion plainly excludes from coverage only
those legal obligations imposed by “any workers’ compensation . . . law.” This
provision is straightforward. If Texas’s workers’ compensation law imposes a
duty upon Rentech Steel to compensate the Teels for the injuries Preston Teel
incurred due to Rentech Steel’s negligence, the exclusion applies and bars
coverage. Hence, the only question before the court concerns the proper
interpretation of Texas law: does the TWCA obligate a nonsubscribing employer
to compensate an employee for injuries sustained as a result of the employer’s
own negligence, or is such compensation a duty under Texas common law? 1
IV.
AISLIC and appellees disagree on two fundamental aspects of Texas law:
(1) whether an employee’s negligence claim against a nonsubscribing employer
arises under the TWCA or common law, and (2) if it arises under the TWCA,
whether the TWCA imposes an “obligation” upon a nonsubscriber to compensate
an employee for injuries caused by its own negligence. AISLIC contends that the
provision of the TWCA addressing negligence actions against nonsubscribers,
codified at section 406.033 of the Texas Labor Code, wholly supplanted the Texas
common-law claim with a statutory claim. According to AISLIC, because the
TWCA creates the cause of action under which the Teels sued Rentech Steel for
Although AISLIC challenges both its duties to indemnify and defend Rentech Steel, 1
which are separate duties creating separate causes of action under Texas law, see Amerisure,
611 F.3d at 309–10, the parties agree that the applicability of the “Various Laws” exclusion
is determinative of whether AISLIC owes both duties.
7
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 7 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
negligence, the TWCA necessarily imposes an obligation on Rentech Steel to pay
the Teels’ judgment. AISLIC premises its theory on the fact that section 406.033
deprives nonsubscribing employers of certain defenses available at common law
and sets out an employee’s burden of proof in negligence cases. Tex. Labor Code
§ 406.033 (b), (c).
Appellees contend that AISLIC can prove neither that the TWCA creates
the cause of action for negligence against a nonsubscriber, nor that section
406.033 imposes any “obligation” on a nonsubscriber to pay a judgment to an
employee for injuries caused by negligence. According to appellees, rather than
displacing the common law, section 406.033 “simply leaves the common law
intact with one modification: as a carrot-and-stick incentive to participate in the
compensation program, the TWCA deprives nonsubscribers of some traditional
common-law defenses.” But regardless of what law creates the cause of action,
appellees argue that section 406.033 is devoid of any language creating an
“obligation” for nonsubscribing employers to compensate employees for accidents
resulting from negligence, so the exclusion does not apply.
Where, as here, the proper resolution of the case turns on the
interpretation of Texas law, we “are bound to apply [Texas] law as interpreted
by the state’s highest court.” Barfield v. Madison Cnty., Miss., 212 F.3d 269,
271–72 (5th Cir. 2000). Because the Texas Supreme Court has never ruled on
whether the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act “obligates” a nonsubscribing
employer to compensate an employee for injuries sustained due to employer
negligence, we must make an “Erie guess” as to how the Texas Supreme Court
would rule upon the issue based on
(1) decisions of the [Texas] Supreme Court in analogous cases, (2)
the rationales and analyses underlying [Texas] Supreme Court
8
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
decisions on related issues, (3) dicta by the [Texas] Supreme Court,
(4) lower state court decisions, (5) the general rule on the question,
(6) the rulings of courts of other states to which [Texas] courts look
when formulating substantive law and (7) other available sources,
such as treatises and legal commentaries.
Hodges v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 474 F.3d 188, 199 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting
Centennial Ins. Co. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 149 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir.
1998)).
Turning first to the text of section 406.033, nothing in the text indicates
that the Texas Legislature intended to impose a legal “obligation” on a
nonsubscriber to compensate an injured employee. The statute simply specifies
that, “[i]n an action against an employer who does not have workers’
compensation insurance coverage to recover damages for personal injuries or
death sustained by an employee in the course and scope of employment,” the
defendant employer is deprived of certain defenses available at common law,
though other defenses remain available. § 406.033(a), (b). It also clarifies that
the common-law negligence standard continues to apply: “the plaintiff must
prove negligence of the employer or of an agent or servant of the employer acting
within the general scope of an agent’s or servant’s employment.” § 406.033(c).
Although we believe that this statute, on its face, does no more than
modify the defenses available at common law, and does not create a cause of
action that usurps the common-law cause of action, we “are emphatically not
permitted to do merely what we think best; we must do that which we think the
[Texas] Supreme Court would deem best.” Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc). Thus, we consider the
9
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
relevant authorities to determine how the Texas Supreme Court would interpret
section 406.033.
A. Texas Cases
In making our Erie guess, we look first to those Texas Supreme Court
cases that, while not deciding the issue, provide guidance as to how the Texas
Supreme Court would decide the question before us. Our preeminent Erie-guess
authorities, language and decisions from the Texas Supreme Court, suggest that
the court would find that a negligence claim against a nonsubscriber is a
common-law claim, and that section 406.033 imposes no “obligation” upon
Rentech Steel to pay the Teels’ judgment. The Texas Supreme Court in Kroger
Company v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Tex. 2009), indicated in dicta that a
negligence claim against a non-subscriber is modified by the TWCA, but remains
a claim at common law. In that case, the court addressed whether Chapter 33
of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code required the district court to
submit a comparative-responsibility question to the jury in a negligence action
against a nonsubscriber, or alternatively, whether section 406.033 prevented the
jury from considering comparative responsibility. The Texas Supreme Court
explained in dicta that the TWCA
allow[s] injured workers, whose employers subscribed to workers’
compensation insurance, to recover without establishing the
employer’s fault and without regard to the employee’s negligence.
In exchange, the employees received a lower, but more certain,
recovery than would have been possible under the common law.
Employers were, however, allowed to opt out of the system, resulting
in their employees retaining their common-law rights. 2
The Texas Supreme Court went on to explain that the purpose of enacting section 2
406.033 was to discourage employers from choosing to opt out by depriving them of certain
traditional common-law defenses to an employee’s negligence action. Kroger, 23 S.W.3d at
10
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
Id. at 349–50 (emphasis added). This suggests that the right to bring a claim
against a nonsubscriber for negligence remains what it has always been—a right
arising under common law.
AISLIC, however, argues that this case supports exactly the opposite
conclusion: that such a claim is an obligation arising under the TWCA because
the TWCA “governs” the negligence cause of action. AISLIC reads Kroger as
“unequivocally stat[ing] that the [TWCA] governs an employee’s personal-injury
claim against a nonsubscribing employer,” as the Texas Supreme Court there
explained that
Labor Code § 406.033, which is part of the Workers’ Compensation
Act, governs an employee’s personal-injury action against his or her
employer, when the employer is a nonsubscriber under the Act.
. . . .
In enacting section 406.033 and its predecessors, the
Legislature intended to delineate explicitly the structure of an
employee’s personal-injury action against his or her nonsubscribing
employer. Section 406.033(a) prescribes the defenses that are
unavailable to a nonsubscriber; section 406.033(c) dictates the
defenses that implicate the employee’s conduct and on which an
employer may rely; and section 406.033(d) provides the employee’s
burden of proof . . . .
23 S.W.3d 347, 349–51 (Tex. 2000). Thus, according to AISLIC, because the
TWCA governs an employee’s negligence claim against a nonsubscriber, it also
provides an obligation for the nonsubscriber to compensate the injured employee.
Not so. We agree that this language in Kroger indicates that a negligence
claim against a nonsubscriber must proceed within the parameters delineated
in section 406.033. But it does not follow that simply by virtue of governing the
350.
11
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 11 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
claim, the TWCA also “obligates” Rentech Steel to pay the Teels’ judgment.
Many common-law claims are “governed” by statutes of limitations, but those
statutes neither give rise to the cause of action they govern, nor do they obligate
any party to pay a judgment arising from a governed claim. See Texas Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code § 16.003(a), (b) (providing a two-year statute of limitations for such
common-law claims as trespass, injury to the estate or property of another,
conversion of personal property, taking or detaining the personal property of
another, personal injury, and forcible entry and detainer); Porterfield v. Ethicon,
Inc., 183 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing section 16.003(a) for the premise
that “a two-year statute of limitations governs personal injury actions.”
(emphasis added)). Because it is clear that AISLIC’s chain of logical
assumptions is missing a key link, we must conclude that Kroger provides no
support for AISLIC’s theory.
Moreover, in Kroger, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly declined to adopt
the appellate court’s reasoning, favorable to AISLIC, that a suit against a
nonsubscriber is “‘an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits under the
workers compensation laws of this state.’” See Kroger, 23 S.W.3d at 352 (quoting
Texas Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.002(c)(1)). The court reserved that question
for another day, and instead affirmed the appellate court’s decision that no
comparative-responsibility jury instruction was required on the ground that no
such jury instruction was possible because section 406.033 precludes a finding
of comparative responsibility. Id. Thus, we do not read Kroger to suggest that
the TWCA imposes an obligation on Rentech Steel to compensate the Teels for
Preston’s injuries.
12
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 12 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
Further, the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Fairfield Insurance Co. v.
Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., demonstrates that, even where the TWCA sets
certain parameters on an employee’s claim against a nonsubscriber, it does not
necessarily transform the claim into an obligation under the TWCA. 246 S.W.3d
653, 659 (Tex. 2008). In Fairfield, the Texas Supreme Court held that the
standard-form employers’ liability policy—the same policy AISLIC issued to
Rentech Steel, containing the very same “Various Laws” exclusion—did not
exclude coverage for claims of gross negligence against nonsubscribers. See id.
This holding is significant because Texas Labor Code section 408.001(b), the
provision of the TWCA governing gross-negligence claims against
nonsubscribers, specifies the employee’s burden of proof in that action: the
employee must prove that the employee’s “death was caused by an intentional
act or omission of the employer or by the employer’s gross negligence.” Tex. 3
Lab. Code § 408.001(b). Fairfield thus belies AISLIC’s contention that section
406.033 subsumed the common law because it “specif[ies] the employee’s burden
of proof and the defenses available to the employer.” Where the TWCA provides
the employee’s burden of proof for both gross-negligence and negligence claims,
and the former are unquestionably covered by the insurance policy, the statute’s
provision of the employee’s burden of proof cannot provide the basis for a
contrary result here.
Though the decisions and dicta of the Texas Supreme Court weigh more
heavily in our Erie analysis, we also consider those decisions of Texas appellate
courts in determining how the Texas Supreme Court would rule on this issue.
Further, section 408.001 goes on to define “gross negligence” as “the meaning assigned 3
by Section 41.001, Civil Practices and Remedies Code.” Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(c).
13
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 13 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
AISLIC invites us to follow Robertson v. Home State County Mutual Insurance
Company, —S.W.3d—, 2010 WL 2813488 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth, 2010, no pet.),
which held that the employee’s judgment for damages against his
nonsubscribing employer was an “obligation” under workers’ compensation law,
excluded from coverage by the “Various Laws” exclusion in his employer’s
liability policy. We decline this invitation, as Robertson is inconsistent with 4
both the relevant Texas Supreme Court caselaw and the plain reading of section
406.033. See Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 558 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that,
where authorities were split, the Texas Supreme Court would adopt the view
that was most consistent with the “plain reading” of the statute).
We consider Robertson to be unpersuasive because it conflates “governs”
with “obligates,” and because it fails to account for the Texas Supreme Court’s
decision in Fairfield. See Robertson, 2010 WL 2813488, at *5. The Robertson
court grounded its holding that no coverage existed on the statute’s provision of
the plaintiff’s burden of proof, id. at *7. This conflicts, however, with Fairfield’s
holding that the standard employers’ liability policy covered claims for gross
negligence, though the TWCA sets the standard of proof for those claims as well,
See Fairfield, 246 S.W.3d at 657. We are convinced by the plain language of
section 406.033 and by Fairfield that the Texas Supreme Court would not follow
Robertson, so we do not defer to it. Mem’l Hermann Healthcare Sys., Inc., v.
Eurocopter Deutschland, GMBH, 524 F.3d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining
that we need not defer to an intermediate state appellate court decision where
we are “convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state
But see In re Autotainment Partners, 183 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 4
Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (holding that a negligence claim against a nonsubscriber for workers’
compensation benefits does not arise under the TWCA).
14
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 14 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
would decide otherwise.”); see also Warfield, 436 F.3d at 558 (holding that the
Texas Supreme Court would follow those decisions that were most consistent
with the “plain reading” of the statute).
B. Decisions From Other Courts
Although Texas cases provide greater guidance for our Erie analysis, we
may likewise “consider, among other sources, treatises, decisions from other
jurisdictions, and the ‘majority rule.’” SMI Owen Steel Co. v. Marsh USA, Inc.,
520 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see also Amerisure Ins. Co.
v. Navigators Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299, 311 (5th Cir. 2010). Here, we have the
benefit of a number of federal cases interpreting the TWCA, and we consider 5
these cases in determining whether the Texas Supreme Court would conclude
that section 406.033 imposes an obligation on Rentech Steel to pay the Teels’
judgment.
We generally consider decisions from other states to the extent they are relevant, but 5
the decisions AISLIC submits are largely inapposite because, unlike most other states, Texas
grants employers the right to choose whether to participate in the workers’ compensation
system. In AISLIC’s cases, the courts considered how nonsubscribers were acting illegally
under state law, but Rentech Steel is not similarly situated. See Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 998 So. 2d 677, 678–79 (Fla. Ct. App. 2009); Weger v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 796
P.2d 72, 74 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 539 N.E.2d 537, 538 (Mass.
1989); Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Revoredo, 698 So. 2d 890, 892–93 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997);
Tri-State Constr., Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 692 P.2d 899, 903 (Wash. App. 1984); cf. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 731 P.2d 167, 168–70 (Haw. 1987) (addressing a different
issue).
In states where employers are compelled to participate in the workers’ compensation
system, there is a stronger argument that employers who fail to participate in the mandatory
system are nevertheless “obligat[ed]” by law to compensate injured employees. See 21 Eric
Mills Holmes & Mark S. Rhodes, Holmes’ Appleman on Insurance 2d, § 132.5 (Lexis Nexis ed.
2002) (“The [policy] exclusion excludes ‘any obligation’ of the insured under a workers’
compensation, disability benefits, or unemployment compensation, or any similar law.
Including the word ‘obligation’ means that no coverage applies when (1) an insured has
statutory coverage and it applies to a loss or (2) an insured should have obtained the statutory
protection that applies to a loss.”).
15
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 15 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
We begin this analysis by considering Middleton v. Texas P&L Co., a
Supreme Court decision examining the TWCA only a few years following its
1913 enactment. 249 U.S. 152 (1919). The TWCA withstood constitutional
challenge in the Texas Supreme Court in 1916, but with United States Supreme 6
Court review imminent, the Texas Legislature amended the Act while the appeal
was pending to allow workers to forego workers’ compensation remedies and
thereby retain their common-law rights of action. See Ferguson v. Hosp. Corp.
Int’l, 769 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1985). In 1919, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Texas Supreme Court and held that the statute was constitutional.
Middleton, 249 U.S. at 155. In describing the Act, the Court explained that the
TWCA shielded employers from common-law suits, but “[e]mployers who do not
become subscribers are subject as before to suits for damages based on
negligence.” Id. (emphasis added). Negligence suits preceding the enactment of
the TWCA were unquestionably suits under common law. Therefore, the
Supreme Court’s statement leaves little doubt that it interpreted the TWCA as
not fundamentally changing the characterization of common-law negligence
claims against nonsubscribers.
We are also guided by those federal decisions that have considered the
question whether an action against a nonsubscriber arises under common law
or the TWCA. Rentech Steel argues that we should follow Pyle v. Beverly
Enters.-Tex., 826 F. Supp. 206, 209 (N.D. Tex. 1993), holding that negligence
Middleton v. Texas P. & L. Co., 185 S.W. 556, 561-62 (1916) (rejecting an employee’s 6
challenge that the statute’s requirement that he accept compensation under his employer’s
compensation policy in lieu of common-law damages constituted a deprivation of property
without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
16
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 16 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
claims against nonsubscribers exist independently of the TWCA. In that well- 7
reasoned opinion, Judge Fitzwater considered whether the plaintiff’s negligence
suit against her nonsubscribing employer arose under the TWCA, such that it
was not preempted by ERISA. The court held that they were not so preempted
because the plaintiff’s
state court petition does not seek recovery pursuant to the TWCA.
It clearly alleges common law claims of negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and breach of duty of good faith and
fair dealing. These are not causes of action that are created by the
TWCA; they exist independently. Moreover, the fact that the TWCA
deprives employers of certain defenses to negligence claims does not
mean that claims by employees against nonsubscribing employers
are brought pursuant to the TWCA. See Eurine v. Wyatt Cafeterias,
Inc., 1991 WL 207468 at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 21, 1991) (Sanders, C.J.)
(“A cause of action does not arise under workers’ compensation laws
merely because the workers’ compensation statute deprives the
defendant of certain defenses to the cause of action.”).
Id.
This approach, we believe, is consistent with the Texas Supreme Court’s
approach in Kroger v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347 (Tex. 2000), and with the history of
the TWCA, see Nunez, 771 F. Supp. at 167–68 (“When the Texas Legislature put
a workers’ compensation law into effect in 1917 it, for all practical purposes,
abolished the right of an employee to bring a common-law action against an
employer having workers’ compensation insurance coverage. However, the
Legislature preserved the common law right of action for the employees of an
See also Nunez v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc., 771 F. Supp.165, 167–68 (N.D. Tex. 1991) 7
(holding that by bringing a cause of action against his nonsubscribing employer, the plaintiff
had “but exercised his common law rights, as those rights have been enhanced by the workers’
compensation laws of Texas”).
17
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 17 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
employer who elected not to carry workers’ compensation insurance, and
enhanced those rights by a statutory provision that prevented an employer in
such an action from asserting defenses that theretofore had been available to
employers.”).
AISLIC, however, contends that we must consider those district-court
decisions holding that claims against nonsubscribers are not removable to
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c), the federal statute addressing
“nonremovable actions,” because such claims “arise” under the TWCA. See
Figueroa v. Healthmark Partners, 125 F. Supp. 2d 209, 210 (S.D. Tex. 2000); see
also Smith v. Tubal-Cain Indus., Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 421, 423 (E.D. Tex. 2001);
Dean v. Tex. Steel Co., 837 F. Supp. 212, 214 (N.D. Tex. 1993). But see Eurine
v. Wyatt Cafeterias, Inc., No. 3-91-0408-H, 1991 WL 207468, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 21, 1991) (unpublished) (holding that, for the purposes of section 1445(c),
a negligence action against a nonsubscriber is a common-law claim that does not
arise out of the TWCA). We find these cases to be of limited value because
section 1445(c) does not require the court to determine whether the TWCA
imposes an “obligation” on a nonsubscriber to pay a judgment to an employee
injured as a result of the employer’s negligence. It provides only that “a civil
action in any State court arising under the workmen’s compensation laws of such
state may not be removed to any district court of the United States.”
Further, even if we assume arguendo that a claim that “arises under” the
TWCA becomes an “obligation” under that law, the section 1445(c) cases
nevertheless remain an imperfect litmus test for how the Texas Supreme Court
would resolve the case before us. This is because of the deference courts afford
to the congressional intent behind the removal statute, which is not applicable
18
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 18 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
here. As the district court explained in Figueroa, “Section 1445(c) denotes an
effort by Congress to restrict the district courts’ diversity jurisdiction in order to
relieve the collectively overburdened docket of the federal courts. Courts have
therefore construed section 1445(c) broadly in order to further this purpose.”
Figueroa, 125 F. Supp 2d. at 211 (internal citations omitted). This broad
construction was also apparent in Smith, where the court found that a
negligence claim “aro[se] under” the TWCA simply because “[n]egligence actions
against nonsubscribing employers are expressly contemplated by Texas workers’
compensation law; indeed, several common-law defenses have been eliminated
by statute.” Smith, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 423 (citation omitted). We do not
comment on whether the TWCA’s mere “contemplat[ion]” of a cause of action
provides sufficient justification to deny removal under section 1445(c), but it is
no proof at all that the TWCA actually “obligate[s]” a nonsubscriber to
compensate an employee for negligence-induced injury.
Likewise, Illinois National Insurance Co. v. Hagendorf Construction Co.,
337 F. Supp. 2d 902 (W.D. Tex. 2004), is similarly unpersuasive. In that case,
the court held that a policy exclusion, similar to the one considered here,
excluded coverage for an employee’s negligence claim against a nonsubscriber
because the claim arose under the TWCA. See id. at 905. We are disinclined to 8
follow this decision for four reasons. First, though the Texas appellate court in
Kroger followed the reasoning that the federal district court would later apply
in Hagendorf, the Texas Supreme Court expressly declined to adopt that
reasoning, and decided the case on other grounds. Kroger v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d
The exclusion in Hagendorf excluded “[a]ny obligation for which the insured or the 8
insured’s insurer may be held liable under any workers compensation, disability benefits or
unemployment compensation law or any similar law.” Hagendorf, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
19
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 19 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
347 (Tex. 2000). This inspires little confidence that the court would opt to follow
that decision in this instance. Second, Hagendorf’s holding is grounded on
Figueroa, Smith, and Dean—decisions that were decided using a broad
construction of the term “arising under,” a construction that we do not apply
here. Illinois Nat’l, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 905 (citing Figueroa,125 F. Supp. 2d 209;
Smith, 196 F. Supp. 2d 421; Dean, 837 F. Supp. 212). Third, just as in the
removal cases, Hagendorf held that the exclusion applied because the negligence
claims were “commenced pursuant” to the TWCA, but this reasoning does not
hold water. The text of the exclusion does not purport to exclude claims
“commenced pursuant” to any workers’ compensation law. The language
required the court to determine whether the TWCA actually imposed an
obligation on the nonsubscriber to compensate an employer for injuries caused
by negligence. The court did not do so.9
Finally, we find Hagendorf unreliable because the three decisions upon
which the court premised its holding—Figueroa, Smith, and Dean—derive their
respective holdings, at least in part, from a misreading of Foust v. City Insurance
Co, 704 F. Supp. 752 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (Gee, J., sitting by designation). These
courts interpreted Foust’s language—that employers “depart the general
common-law tort system” upon hiring workers regardless of whether they choose
to subscribe to the workers’ compensation system—as implying that the
common-law claims had been extinguished. Id. at 753; see also Figueroa, 125 F.
Supp. 2d at 211 (quoting Foust, 704 F. Supp. at 753); Smith, 196 F. Supp. 2d at
423 (same); Dean, 837 F. Supp. at 214 (same). This interpretation conflicts with
For these same reasons, we 9 are not persuaded by Markel Insurance Company, Inc. v.
Spirit of Texas Cheer & Gymnastics, No. 4:08-CV-758-Y, 2010 WL 3283051 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 19,
2010), which followed Hagendorf. See id. at *6.
20
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 20 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
Foust’s language just sentences later: depending on whether an employer
subscribed to the workers’ compensation system, the TWCA either “admitted
[the employer] to the worker’s compensation system or removed its defenses and
relegated it to Texas common law, shorn of [its] defenses.” Foust, 704 F. Supp.
at 753 (emphasis added). Accordingly, we hold that a negligence claim against
a nonsubscriber is not an “obligation” imposed by the TWCA.
V.
Alternatively, assuming arguendo that the “Various Laws” exclusion is
ambiguous, summary judgment for appellees would still be proper if their
interpretation of the exclusion is reasonable. See Amerisure 10 Ins. Co. v.
Navigators Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299, 309 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that we must
adopt the “interpretation of the exclusionary clause urged by the insured if it is
‘not itself unreasonable,’ even if the insurer’s interpretation seems ‘more
reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.’” (citation
omitted)). The district court stated in its alternative holding that the phrase
“any obligation . . . under any workers’ compensation . . . law” could be
We reject AISLIC’s argument that the district court was prohibited from finding 10
ambiguity sua sponte, as we have previously held that “[t]he interpretation of the contract and
determination of ambiguity, however, is a matter of law, and the court ‘may conclude that a
contract is ambiguous even in the absence of such a pleading by either party.’” In re Newell
Indus., Inc., 336 F.3d 446, 449 n.5 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sage St. Assocs. v. Northdale
Constr. Co., 863 S.W.2d 438, 445 (Tex. 1993)). As this court has observed, this scenario rarely
presents itself. Brooks, Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d
1358, 1365 (5th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (“An allegation of ambiguity. . . is of pivotal
importance. Moreover, ‘[a]s necessity is the mother of invention, so is ambiguity the father of
multiple reasonable constructions, and where lawyers are involved, one never lacks an eager
parent of either gender.’ . . . It is interesting, therefore, that the allegation of ambiguity in this
case came, not from the parties, but from the district court.”).
21
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 21 Date Filed: 09/21/2010
No. 08-11052
interpreted to incorporate only workers’ compensation benefits, not a judgment
in a negligence suit. It explained that
the “Various Laws”exclusion could be interpreted as only excluding
claims already covered by workers’ compensation benefits rather
than excluding all claims of employees, whether filed to collect
workers’ compensation benefits or damages by common-law. In such
a case, there is more than one plausible interpretation of the
“Various Laws” exclusion. Thus, applying the provisions of the
“Various Laws” exclusion to the dispute before the Court produces
an uncertain or ambiguous result, and the exclusion will be
interpreted against AISLIC and in favor of coverage.
We agree with the district court that an “obligation” under “workers’
compensation law” could be interpreted to refer only to benefits paid by the
workers’ compensation system, as the meaning of the term obligation has “many,
wide, and varied meanings” that depends on the context in which the word is
used. See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009). Where negligence claims
against nonsubscribers, at least traditionally, have been recognized as arising
under common law, we conclude that it is reasonable to interpret the “Various
Laws” exclusion to exclude only mandatory benefit payments.
CONCLUSION
In summary, AISLIC has failed to meet its burden of proving that the
“Various Laws” exclusion bars coverage of the Teels’ claims and the judgment
against Rentech Steel. AISLIC has not shown that the Texas Supreme Court
would conclude either that a negligence claim against a nonsubscriber arises
under the TWCA rather than common law, or that Texas Labor Code section
406.033 imposes any obligation upon Rentech Steel to pay the Teels’ judgment.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
22
Case: 08-11052 Document: 00511239102 Page: 22 Date Filed: 09/21/2010

 

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

Texas Pay Day Law Appeals–Texas Employment Attorneys

Texas Payday Law Appeals — Texas Workforce Commission

Overview

An appeal is your written notice that you disagree with a TWC decision and want your case decided through the appeal process. State law gives TWC sole authority in disputed wage claims; no other state agency or official can affect the outcome of an appeal. To participate in an appeal you must meet submission deadlines.

The appeal process is structured so that you do not need an attorney. You may choose to have an attorney or other person represent you at your own expense.

There are three levels of appeal. You start with the first level, and if you disagree with that decision, you may proceed through the other levels.

  1. Appeal to the Appeal Tribunal
  2. Appeal to the Commission
  3. Motion for Rehearing or Appeal to a Civil Court

Appeal to the Appeal Tribunal

The first step in the appeals process is an appeal to the Appeal Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal is the name the Texas Payday Law gives to hearing officers who hold wage claim hearings. Each appeal case has only one hearing officer.

The first appeal is a telephone hearing, except that when a sign-language interpreter is required the hearing may be in-person instead.

The claimant and employer may present testimony, witnesses, and documents relevant to its case. During the Appeal Tribunal hearing, the hearing officer will determine what is relevant and make sure that the record is complete. After the hearing, the hearing officer will mail a decision to the interested parties.

How to Appeal a Determination

These instructions are for the first step in the appeals process, which is an appeal to the Appeal Tribunal. The first step is to appeal in writing to TWC.

You must appeal in writing within 21 calendar days from the date that we mail you the Preliminary Wage Determination Order, which is shown at the top of that form. If the twenty-first day falls on a federal or state holiday, you have until the next business day to submit your appeal.

You can submit your written appeal online, in person at your Workforce Solutions office, or by mailing or faxing your appeal letter to the Special Hearings Department at the address or fax number on your Preliminary Wage Determination Order. You cannot submit an appeal by e-mail or over the telephone. If you choose to fax the information, keep the paperwork that indicates successful transmission of your appeal.

Your letter or appeal form must include:

  • Your name
  • Wage claim number
  • Your Social Security Number or TWC Tax ID number
  • Your current address
  • The date TWC mailed you the Preliminary Wage Determination Order
  • A copy of the Preliminary Wage Determination Order, if possible
  • Any dates on which you will not be able to participate in a hearing

Keep a copy of your appeal for your records.

Accommodations for Your Hearing

Inform us in writing as early as possible if you need accommodations for the appeal hearing:

  • If you or your witnesses need interpreters – include needed languages
  • If you or your witnesses have a hearing impairment
  • If you need access to a telephone or fax machine

Appeal Hearing Notification Details

It may take six to eight weeks to receive a hearing information packet with information about your appeal. TWC will mail you the packet ten to twenty days before your hearing.

The hearing information packet includes:

  • The Notice of Telephone Hearing, which includes the date and time of hearing, the telephone number to call for the hearing, and the name and contact information of the hearing officer assigned to the hearing
  • Instructions on how to participate in the hearing
  • Instructions on how to submit documents for the telephone hearing to the hearing officer and to the other side
  • The claim issues up for discussion

Change Your Address

It is important that you keep your mailing address up to date because we will mail the hearing information packet and appeal decision to the address in our records. Change your address with us as needed in writing by mail or fax to the Special Hearings address or fax number listed under Contact Information.

Preparing for Your Hearing

Allow enough time for your hearing. How long the hearing takes depends on many things, including the number of witnesses, documents, and issues in the case. Usually, hearings take from one hour to four hours to complete.

It is important to prepare all of the documentation, witnesses and evidence that you need to support your side of the issues. It is your responsibility to make sure that both the hearing officer and the other side receive copies of all the documents you wish to refer to before the hearing date. This will increase your credibility and allow the hearing officer to make a just determination of the facts.

Document Evidence You Want to Present at Your Hearing

Case documentation could include:

  • Letters and memos
  • Timecards
  • Pay stubs or payroll records
  • Employee handbooks
  • Written authorizations for deductions from wages
  • Employment agreements
  • Commission agreements and invoices

All documents must relate directly to the issues on the hearing notice. Be ready to tell who prepared the evidence and how it helps your case.

Any documents you want to present during the hearing must be provided to the hearing officer and to the other party in your appeal (the employee or the employer) if applicable.

  • For a telephone hearing, mail or fax a copy of all of the documents you want to present to the hearing officer and to the other party. Send them as far in advance as possible. Documents cannot be used if they are not provided in enough time before the hearing begins.
  • The hearing officer’s address and fax number is on the first page of the hearing information packet. If there is another party in your case, that person’s mailing address is also on the first page.
  • For an in-person hearing, you can bring the documents with you or send them in advance.

Calling Witnesses & Notifying the Hearing Officer

If you wish to call witnesses, they should have personal (first-hand) knowledge about the background, policies, incidents, or events regarding the issues on the hearing notice. For example, they either saw the incident, heard a supervisor say something directly, or saw the paperwork connected to the event.

Contact your witnesses before the hearing and have them arrange their schedules so they can participate in the hearing.

During the hearing, you must give the hearing officer your list of witnesses and the contact phone numbers. Have your witnesses remain available for the call until the hearing officer or you release them from the hearing.

If your hearing is in person, simply have your witnesses appear at the hearing location at the time and date for the hearing, or they may participate by phone as stated above.

If You Need to Subpoena Witnesses

A subpoena is a written legal order that requires a person to appear at a hearing to testify or produce documents for a hearing.

Subpoenas may be issued at the discretion of the hearing officer. A request for a subpoena will be granted only after the hearing officer determines that the records or witnesses requested to be subpoenaed are relevant to the issues on appeal.

TWC pays the applicable fees for issuing a subpoena.

Withdrawing Your Appeal

If you no longer want to proceed with the hearing, you have the option to withdraw your appeal. Only the individual who filed the appeal can withdraw or cancel the appeal.

The withdrawal of your appeal must be done in writing or recorded by contacting the hearing officer and also must contain the specific words that you wish to “withdraw your appeal.”

The appeal can be withdrawn either before or during the hearing.

Participating in Your Appeal Hearing

Before the Hearing

For telephone hearings, you must provide a phone number where we can reach you for the hearing. Provide your contact information on the day of your hearing, at least 10 minutes before your hearing is scheduled to begin. You can give us your phone number in one of two ways:

  • Register online at C2T Online Registration, https://tx.c2tinc.com/register, and follow the instructions on that web site. You will need your Case Number.
  • Call TWC at our toll-free number shown on your Notice of Hearing and speak with the receptionist.

If you do not call in on time, you may not be allowed to participate in the hearing.

Beginning the Hearing

When it is time for the hearing, the hearing officer will call you and connect all parties and witnesses to a conference call. The hearing will begin when everyone is connected.

All of the hearings are scheduled for the Central Time zone. If you have any questions about when you should call, please call the toll-free number listed on the Notice of Hearing.

Why You Should Participate

It is very important that you provide your phone number for your hearing before the scheduled hearing time and that you take part in your appeal hearing. The hearing officer makes their decision based entirely on the evidence given at the appeal hearing.

If you find you cannot participate in the hearing for any reason, mail or fax a written postponement request as soon as you can. TWC rules allow hearing officers to delay or reschedule hearings only in specific, limited cases.

What Happens in the Appeal Tribunal Hearing

All hearings are recorded. The law requires the hearing officer to give a very specific opening statement at the beginning of each hearing. This opening statement includes:

  • Information identifying the case for the record
  • What determination and issues are on appeal
  • Who is taking part in the hearing
  • Each party’s rights
  • The procedures used for the hearing

The hearing officer will put everyone who will speak under oath, and then answer questions about the opening statement before hearing any testimony.

If you have more than one person present, you must designate one primary representative, which may be you or your chosen representative. That primary representative will be able to:

  • Question the witnesses
  • Give their own testimony
  • Look at and object to documents

Order of Testimony in a Hearing

The hearing officer will hear statements from each side in turn, one witness at a time. The hearing officer will question the witnesses, and then allow them to add relevant information.

The witness’s primary representative will be able to question the witness. The other side can then question the witness. The hearing will follow this procedure until everyone has spoken.

The hearing officer will discuss any documents that were sent in by either party or that are part of the case file. Documents will be admitted into evidence after ruling on any objections by either side.

The hearing officer will then let both sides add any new testimony before ending the hearing.

What to Do If You Did Not Participate in the Appeal Hearing

If you did not participate in the Appeal hearing and disagree with the decision, you can submit a request to reopen your case at the Appeal Tribunal level within 14 calendar days after the mailing date of the decision. However, you must show that you had a good reason for missing the prior hearing.

After the Hearing

After the hearing is complete, the hearing officer will mail you a written decision, usually within five to ten working days.

Request an Audio Recording of Your Hearing

You can request a copy of the CD recording of your hearing. Your written request must include identifying information: your name, appeal number, the last four digits of your Social Security number, and your telephone number and mailing address.

Mail or fax your request in writing to the TWC Special Hearings Department:

  • Special Hearings
    Texas Workforce Commission
    Attn: CD Duplication
    101 E 15th St, Rm 406
    Austin, TX, 78778
  • Fax: 512-463-9318, Attention: CD Duplication

It usually takes one to two weeks for you to receive your copy. The first copy is free; there is a small charge for any additional copies. Only parties to the appeal can request a copy of the recording.

Appeal to the Commission

If you disagree with the results of the Appeal Tribunal, you may appeal to the Texas Workforce Commission. The Commission will rule on your case after reviewing the Appeal Tribunal decision and listening to the recorded hearing. E-mail questions to commission.appeals@twc.state.tx.us.

You must appeal in writing within 14 calendar days from the date TWC mailed you the Appeal Tribunal decision. The mailing date is printed on the coversheet of your appeal decision.

You can submit your written appeal online, in person at your Workforce Solutions office, or by mailing or faxing your appeal letter to Commission Appeals at the address or fax number in the instructions included with your Appeal Tribunal decision. You cannot file an appeal by e-mail or over the telephone. If you choose to fax the information, keep the paperwork that indicates successful transmission of your appeal.

Commission Appeal Process

A reviewing attorney in Commission Appeals will review the audio-recording of your hearing. The attorney will also review all other evidence accepted at your first appeal hearing. The reviewing attorney will make a recommendation to the Commission regarding the decision in the case.

The Commissioners will review the recommendation separately and will decide whether or not to follow it. Then the Commission will vote on the case and issue a written decision. They may order an additional hearing to gather more evidence, but they usually do not.

We will mail you the decision from the Commission.

If you disagree with the Commission decision, you have two options: a Motion for Rehearing, or an appeal to a civil court.

Motion for Rehearing

If you disagree with the Commission decision, you may request a Motion for Rehearing by the Commission within 14 calendar days after the date TWC mailed you the Commission decision. TWC will grant the Motion for Rehearing only if you show these three things

  • Important new information about your case
  • A compelling reason why you did not present the new information earlier
  • Why you think the new information could change the Commission decision

You can submit your written Motion for Rehearing online, in person at your nearest Workforce Solutions office, or by mailing or faxing your letter to Commission Appeals at the address or fax number in the instructions included with your Commission decision. You cannot file a Motion for Rehearing by e-mail or telephone. If you choose to fax the information, keep the paperwork that indicates successful transmission of your Motion for Rehearing.

If you ask for a rehearing and the Commission denies it, you can still appeal that decision to a civil court.

Appeal to a Civil Court

You may appeal to a civil court within 30 calendar days after the date TWC mailed you the Commission decision. You must have completed all the appeal steps available through TWC, except the optional Motion for Rehearing, before appealing to a civil court. The instructions for submitting an appeal to a civil court are included with the Commission decision.

 

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

Necessity and Nature of Venue in Texas Civil Litigation–Texas Civil Litigation Attorneys

Court of Appeals of Texas,Dallas.
Rutilio Ignacio VELASCO, Individually and a/n/f
Josue Velasco, A Minor, Erick Velasco, A Minor,
and Steven Velasco, A Minor, and as Representative
of The Estate of Gloria Oviedo Velasco, Appellant
v.
TEXAS KENWORTH COMPANY, Texas Kenworth
Company d/b/a MHC Kenworth-Dallas,
Texas Kenworth Company d/b/a MHC Kenworth-
Fort Worth, Texas Kenworth Company d/b/a Texas
Kenworth Co. Dallas, Texas Kenworth Company d/
b/a Texas Kenworth Co. Fort Worth, Texas Kenworth
Corporation and Mark Sims, Appellees.
No. 05-03-01160-CV.
Aug. 17, 2004.
Rehearing Overruled Sept. 30, 2004.
Background: Husband of driver killed in accident,
individually, as representative of driver’s estate, and
on behalf of minor children, brought wrongfuldeath
action against manufacturer of tractor involved
in accident, and against individual. After
transfer of venue from county where accident occurred,
the 192nd Judicial District Court, Dallas
County, Merrill Hartman, J., granted summary
judgment for defendants. Husband appealed.
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Joseph B. Morris,
J., held that venue lay in county where accident occurred.
Vacated and remanded.
West Headnotes
[1] Venue 401 8.2
401 Venue
401I Nature or Subject of Action
401k8 Actions for Torts
401k8.2 k. Particular Torts. Most Cited
Cases
Pursuant to venue statute, venue for wrongful-death
case brought by husband of driver killed in multivehicle
accident lay in county where accident occurred,
where driver died, where bid for tractor involved
in accident was submitted and opened by
county authorities, and where individual defendant
talked to county authorities. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice
& Remedies Code § 15.002(a)(1).
[2] Venue 401 1.5
401 Venue
401I Nature or Subject of Action
401k1.5 k. Nature and Necessity of Venue in
Action. Most Cited Cases
A plaintiff has the first choice to fix venue in a
proper county. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies
Code § 15.002(a)(1).
[3] Appeal and Error 30 1043(8)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(J) Harmless Error
30XVI(J)6 Interlocutory and Preliminary
Proceedings
30k1043 Interlocutory Proceedings
30k1043(8) k. Objections to Venue
and Motions for Change of Venue. Most Cited
Cases
It is reversible error to transfer venue from a proper
venue, even if the county of transfer would have
been proper if originally chosen by the plaintiff.
V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code §
15.002(a)(1).
[4] Appeal and Error 30 840(1)
30 Appeal and Error
30XVI Review
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in
General
30k838 Questions Considered
30k840 Review of Specific Questions
144 S.W.3d 632 Page 1
144 S.W.3d 632
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
and Particular Decisions
30k840(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
To determine whether a trial court improperly
transferred venue in a case, an appellate court must
consider the entire record, including any trial on the
merits. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code
§ 15.002(a)(1).
[5] Venue 401 33
401 Venue
401III Change of Venue or Place of Trial
401k33 k. Power and Duty of Court in General.
Most Cited Cases
If there is any probative evidence that supports venue
in the county of suit, the trial court must deny a
transfer; this is true even if the evidence preponderates
to the contrary. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice &
Remedies Code § 15.002(a)(1).
[6] Venue 401 2
401 Venue
401I Nature or Subject of Action
401k2 k. Place in Which Action May Be
Brought or Tried in General. Most Cited Cases
Venue statute limits the number of counties where
venue can be maintained to those with a substantial
connection with the lawsuit. V.T.C.A., Civil Practice
& Remedies Code § 15.002(a)(1).
*632 M. Kevin Queenan, Queenan Law Firm, P.C.,
DeSoto, for Appellant.
*633 James L. Williams, Williams, Peters &
Parmelee, P.C., and Carolyn Mitchell, Law Office
of Carolyn Mitchel, Fort Worth, for Appellee.
Before Justices MORRIS and
WHITTINGTON.FN1
FN1. The Honorable Tom James, Retired,
Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at
Dallas, was a member of the panel at the
time this case was argued and submitted
for decision. Due to his retirement from
the Court, Justice James did not participate
in the issuance of this opinion.
SeeTEX.R.APP. P. 41.1(a) & (b).
OPINION
Opinion by Justice MORRIS.
In this wrongful death case, appellant Rutilio Ignacio
Velasco, individually and as next friend to
Josue Velasco, a minor, Erick Velasco, a minor,
and Steven Velasco, a minor, and as Representative
of the Estate of Gloria Oviedo Velasco, appeals the
trial court’s final judgment dismissing his claims
with prejudice. On appeal, appellant makes three
general arguments: first, he asserts his case was improperly
transferred from Johnson County to Dallas
County; second, he claims the Johnson County trial
court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee
Mark Sims; and third, he contends the Dallas
County trial court erred in denying his motion for a
continuance and granting summary judgment to appellees
Texas Kenworth Company, Texas Kenworth
Company d/b/a MHC Kenworth-Dallas, Texas Kenworth
Company d/b/a MHC Kenworth-Fort Worth,
Texas Kenworth Company d/b/a Texas Kenworth
Co. Dallas, Texas Kenworth Company d/b/a Texas
Kenworth Co. Fort Worth and Texas Kenworth
Corporation. Because we conclude appellant’s case
was transferred to Dallas County in error, we vacate
the Dallas County trial court’s final summary judgment
and remand the case to that court for transfer
back to the trial court in Johnson County.
Appellant filed this lawsuit after his wife died in a
multi-vehicle collision in Johnson County, Texas.
In his petition, appellant alleged that a used Kenworth
semi-tractor purchased by Johnson County
from the Kenworth appellees shortly before the accident
had faulty brakes and was a proximate cause
of the collision. Appellant asserted claims for negligence,
strict liability, breach of warranty, and misrepresentation.
FN2 Kenworth filed an answer
denying each allegation in appellant’s petition and
filed a motion to transfer the case from Johnson
County to Dallas County. Appellant amended his
144 S.W.3d 632 Page 2
144 S.W.3d 632
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
petition to include Mark Sims as defendant. Appellant
asserted venue was proper in Johnson County
because it is the location where a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to his claims occurred
and because appellee Mark Sims resided in
Johnson County. Sims moved for and was granted
summary judgment. The trial court then granted
Kenworth’s motion to transfer appellant’s lawsuit to
Dallas County. In Dallas, Kenworth filed a traditional
and a no-evidence motion for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment in
Kenworth’s favor and rendered a final judgment incorporating
all of the previous interlocutory orders.
It is from this judgment that appellant appeals.
FN2. Appellant also asserted claims
against the previous owners of the vehicle,
Unimin Corporation and Unimin Texas
Company, L.P. The Unimin defendants
were granted summary judgment by the
Johnson County trial court.
[1][2][3][4][5] In his first point of error, appellant
complains about the trial court’s order transferring
his lawsuit from Johnson *634 County to Dallas
County.FN3 Texas venue law is well-established.
The plaintiff has the first choice to fix venue in a
proper county. See Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife
Dept., 886 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex.1994). It is reversible
error to transfer venue from a proper venue
even if the county of transfer would have been
proper if originally chosen by the plaintiff. See id.
at 262. To determine whether a trial court improperly
transferred the case, we must consider the entire
record, including any trial on the merits. Ruiz
v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 758 (Tex.1993).
If there is any probative evidence that supports venue
in the county of suit, the trial court must deny
the transfer. Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907
S.W.2d 465, 471 (Tex.1995). This is true even if
the evidence preponderates to the contrary. Id.
FN3. In addition to opposing the trial
court’s transfer order on the merits, appellant
also claims that Kenworth waived the
venue issue by “waiting almost a year to
seek a hearing on its motion.” Because appellant
has provided no argument or authority
to support this contention, appellant
does not present the issue for review.
SeeTEX.R.APP. P. 38.1(h).
[6] In the case before us, appellant relies on section
15.002(a)(1) of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies
Code to establish venue in Johnson County.
This section provides that venue is proper in the
county where “all or a substantial part of the events
or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §
15.002(a)(1) (Vernon 2002). This provision limits
the number of counties where venue can be maintained
to those with a substantial connection with
the lawsuit. Chiriboga v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 96 S.W.3d 673, 681 (Tex.App.-Austin 2003,
no pet.). Appellant’s factual basis for maintaining
venue in Johnson County is that Johnson County is
where the accident occurred, where appellant’s wife
died, where the bid for the semi-tractor was submitted
and opened by Johnson County representatives,
and where Sims talked to Johnson County representatives
about the semi-tractor. Thus, appellant
contends, Johnson County became the site for a
substantial part of the facts giving rise to his
claims. We agree.
Appellant’s wrongful death claim arose when his
wife died in the accident in Johnson County. See
Ray v. Farris, 887 S.W.2d 164, 166
(Tex.App.-Texarkana 1994,rev’d on other
grounds, 895 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.1995)). Additionally,
appellant’s petition complains about the failure
of Kenworth to inform or warn Johnson County
about the dangerous condition of the semi-tractor,
the breach of various warranties contained in the
bid proposal, and misrepresentations made to Johnson
County with respect to the character or quality
of the semi-tractor. Appellant complains that these
omissions or acts occurred at the time the bid was
delivered to Johnson County representatives in
Johnson County. Because a substantial number of
the essential facts upon which appellant’s claims are
144 S.W.3d 632 Page 3
144 S.W.3d 632
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
based occurred in Johnson County, we conclude
venue was proper in Johnson County.
Conceding that there is no dispute that appellant’s
claim arose when the accident occurred in Johnson
County, Kenworth argues that for purposes of a
venue analysis under subsection (a)(1), we must focus
solely on the defendant’s action or inaction giving
rise to appellant’s claims. Specifically, Kenworth
asserts that because appellant’s petition alleges
that it failed to properly repair, service, or inspect
the brakes on the semi-tractor, Tarrant County
is the proper venue under subsection (a)(1) because
that is where these alleged acts or omissions occurred.
FN4 Initially, we *635 note that there is no
indication that the present venue statute contemplates
only one county can satisfy the requirements
of subsection (a)(1). Indeed at least one appellate
court has concluded more than one county may
qualify as proper venue under subsection (a)(1)
provided a “substantial part of the event or omissions”
giving rise to the claim occurred there. See
Southern County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ochoa, 19
S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000).
Therefore, to succeed on its motion to transfer,
Kenworth had to establish that no substantial part
of the events giving rise to appellant’s claims occurred
in Johnson County, not merely that a substantial
part of the events or omissions occurred in
another county. Kenworth has failed to do so. Even
assuming that Tarrant County qualified as a county
where a substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to appellant’s cause of action occurred,
there was probative evidence that Johnson County
also satisfied subsection (a)(1)’s requirements. Accordingly,
the trial court erred in transferring the
case from Johnson County.
FN4. Although Kenworth argued in the trial
court that the appropriate venue under
subsection (a)(1) was Tarrant County,
Kenworth requested the trial court to transfer
the case to Dallas County under subsection
(a)(3) because that is where its principal
place of business is located.
Although our research has revealed no Texas case
directly on point, we find support for our conclusion
in several federal cases. Because subsection
(a)(1) appears to have been patterned after a federal
venue statute, we may presume the legislature intended
to adopt the construction placed on that
wording by the federal courts and look to federal
cases to guide our interpretation of the state
statute.FN5 See id at 457. The ninth circuit has
reasoned that because the harm a plaintiff experienced
occurred in Nevada, venue was proper there
as the location where a substantial part of the
events and omission giving rise to the claim occurred.
See Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238
F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir.2001). In product liability
cases against manufacturers, other courts have
stated the accident or crash constituted a substantial
part of the events giving rise to the claim such that
venue is appropriate where the crash or accident occurred.
Cali v. E. Coast Aviation Serv., Ltd., 178
F.Supp.2d 276, 282 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (venue proper
where airplane crashed); Roll v. Tracor, Inc., 26
F.Supp.2d 482, 485 (W.D.N.Y.1998) (venue proper
where accident occurred); and Dwyer v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 853 F.Supp. 690, 692 (S.D.N.Y.1994).
Contrary to Kenworth’s position, federal courts
have interpreted the subsection (a)(1)’s federal
counterpart to allow venue in a district where acts
or omissions closely related to the legal action occurred,
even if none of those acts or omissions were
the act or omission that allegedly caused the injury.
See e.g., Ciena Corp. v. Jarrard, 203 F.3d 312,
315-16 (4th Cir.2000).
FN5. The federal statute provides venue in
a diversity action may be placed in “a judicial
district in which a substantial part of
the events or omission giving rise to the
claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(2).
Because the accident, appellant’s wife’s death, and
other events of which appellant complains occurred
in Johnson County, we conclude that Johnson
County has a close connection to this lawsuit and
that the requirements of subsection (a)(1) have been
144 S.W.3d 632 Page 4
144 S.W.3d 632
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
satisfied. We therefore sustain appellant’s first point
of error. Because our determination on the venue
question is dispositive, we do not address appellant’s
remaining points of error. SeeTEX.R.APP. P.
47.1.
We vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand
this case to the trial *636 court for transfer to
the Johnson County trial court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Tex.App.-Dallas,2004.
Velasco v. Texas Kentworth Co.
144 S.W.3d 632
END OF DOCUMENT
144 S.W.3d 632 Page 5
144 S.W.3d 632
© 2008 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

 

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]

Final Pay for Commissions and Bonuses Under the Texas Pay Day Law–Fort Worth, Texas Employment Defense Attorneys

According to the Texas Workforce’s interpretation and analysis, a common problem is that of what happens with an employer’s duty to pay commissions and bonuses once an employee has left the company. The answer depends upon the terms of the commission or bonus agreement. Commission pay agreements are enforceable whether they are oral or in writing, and agreements can be established with a showing of a pattern or practice of paying commissions in a certain way. Thus, the advice to have a clear, signed written wage agreement applies with particular force to commissions. Changes to written agreements must be in writing. A good agreement will avoid the risks of ambiguity by clearly setting out how commissions are earned, when and under what circumstances they are paid, whether “chargebacks” are made and under what circumstances, and what happens to commissions from sales in progress at the time of work separation. Similarly, a bonus agreement should specify exactly how a bonus is earned, how it is calculated, when it is paid, whether it is discretionary in any way (as to the amount, timing, or ability of the company to cancel the bonus altogether under certain conditions), and what happens to a bonus that is not determined or paid out until after an employee has left the company. If the commission or bonus agreement provides for payment of commissions and bonuses in any way after an employee has separated from employment, the deadline for such a payment would be based upon the wording of the agreement. Prior draws against commissions may be offset against the final pay; under 40 T.A.C. § 821.26(d), “[d]raws against commissions or bonuses may be recovered from the current or any subsequent pay period until fully reconciled.” The key to protecting the company’s interests is to spell out in a clear, written agreement exactly how, when, and under what circumstances commissions and bonuses will be paid, and then follow the written agreement to the letter, because that is how TWC will enforce the agreement in the event of a wage claim concerning such payments.

 

The Texas Family Code provides that garnishment for support obligations apply to certain post-termination lump-sum payments such as a bonus, commission, or payout of accrued leave (see Texas Family Code § 158.215): if such a lump-sum payment is $500 or more, the employer must notify the Attorney General’s office (do it in writing or electronically – see https://portal.cs.oag.state.tx.us/wps/portal/WageWithholdingResponsibilities#lumpsum) before making the payment so that that agency can determine whether a support deduction should be made. The agency then has ten days after that date to notify the employer about its duty to make the support deduction; if no such notification occurs, the employer may make the payment without the deduction. If, however, the agency informs the employer that the support order would apply to the lump-sum payment, the employer would need to make the deduction. Since such a garnishment would be pursuant to a court order, it would not have to be authorized in writing by the employee.

 

Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.

Martindale AVtexas[2]