In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-14-00189-CV
JACKSON FULGHAM DBA COMMERCE STREET PARTNERS, Appellant
V.
ALLIED PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11-08353
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang-Miers, Whitehill, and Schenck Opinion by Justice Schenck
Jackson Fulgham (Fulgham) appeals a jury’s award of damages to his insurer Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company (Allied). In two issues, Fulgham challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, on the finding of fraud and on the finding of unjust enrichment. We affirm the judgment. Because all issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
In July 2009, Fulgham made a claim under a property-insurance policy he purchased from Allied for damage to his roof he alleged was caused by a recent hailstorm. Allied’s claims specialist inspected the exterior of Fulgham’s building and estimated the cost of removing and replacing Fulgham’s roof. After Allied issued a payment for the estimated cost, Fulgham contacted the claims specialist and claimed the repairs to the roof would cost more than the estimate. Allied’s claims specialist obtained a comparison estimate to repair the roof “as Mr.
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Fulgham had wanted it done,” and in October 2009, Allied paid an additional amount to Fulgham for costs to repair his roof.
In December 2009, Fulgham called Allied’s claims specialist to add the claim that he had suffered interior damage to his building. In January 2010, the claims specialist inspected the interior of Fulgham’s building and became concerned that Fulgham had misrepresented the building’s purpose on the declarations form as a commercial real estate office when the building had no internal cooling or heating system. In February 2010, Allied required Fulgham to complete and return a Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss. Allied then paid Fulgham for his claimed damages to the interior of his building. In April 2010, following Fulgham’s representations that repairs were complete, and after receiving letters, contracts, and invoices submitted by Fulgham, Allied paid additional amounts for recoverable depreciation related to Fulgham’s roof.
In July 2010, Fulgham submitted an invoice for costs for organizing, cleaning, and storing the contents of the building, despite the fact that Fulgham previously had denied on several occasions that he would make a claim for damaged contents. Allied’s claims specialist inspected the contents of the building and determined little if any work had been done to organize or clean the contents since his last inspection. Fulgham now stated the claimed invoice was an estimate, rather than an invoice. In August 2010, the claims specialist returned with a claims manager and another representative from Allied to inspect the contents of the building. Fulgham submitted additional invoices to support his contents claim. Allied then issued payments to Fulgham for the contents as well.
At this point, Allied’s payments to Fulgham totaled $899,160.00. The jury would later hear substantial evidence that Fulgham was fabricating his claimed losses and enlisting his employees to manufacture evidence in support of his fraud.
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Fulgham then asserted additional damages related to his original claim, including debris removal, asbestos, business interruption, increased costs of construction, and destruction of papers and records. In July 2011, Fulgham sued Allied, asserting contractual, statutory, and common-law claims related to the insurance policy, arguing that Allied improperly refused to participate in an appraisal process provided under the insurance policy in order to determine additional amounts under Fulgham’s original claim. Allied counter-sued Fulgham for fraud and unjust enrichment. The trial court dismissed Fulgham’s claims prior to trial. The jury awarded Allied damages in the amount of $899,160.00, and the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence on a matter for which he or she did not have the burden of proof, the appellant must demonstrate on appeal that there is no evidence to support the adverse findings. McCullough v. Scarbrough, Medlin & Assocs., Inc., 435 S.W.3d 871, 892 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied). Under a no-evidence point, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, indulging every reasonable inference in support of it. Id. We are mindful in our review that jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. A legal-sufficiency challenge fails if there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the judgment. Id. “The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” Id. Evidence that does no more than create a surmise or suspicion is insufficient to rise to the level of a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence. Id.
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DISCUSSION
Fulgham’s first issue challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of fraud.
In general, actionable fraud consists of a material false representation that (1) the speaker either knew to be false or was asserted without knowledge of its truth, (2) he intended to be relied upon, (4) was reasonably relied on, and (5) caused injury. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323, 337 (Tex. 2011). Fulgham argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence of Allied’s reliance on Fulgham’s misrepresentations in the application process. Fulgham further urges that Allied is legally precluded from claiming it relied on Fulgham’s misrepresentations in the claims process because it conducted its own investigation. Finally, Fulgham raises issues with Allied’s failure to comply with provisions of the Texas Insurance Code.
Fulgham urges that there is no evidence that Allied relied on any of the various false statements he made in the application process and that the jury’s finding of Allied’s reliance on Fulgham’s statements in the claims process is contrary to the great weight of the evidence. The question posed to the jury on fraud did not distinguish between fraud in the application process or fraud in the claims process. Fulgham waived error, if any, in comingling these two bases for liability in a single fraud question by failing to raise a timely and specific objection at the trial court below. Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Tex. 2014). Accordingly, evidence of reliance in the claims process is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of fraud. Indeed, the jury heard ample evidence of Allied’s reliance in the claims process. Allied’s claims specialist testified he relied on Fulgham’s representations that (1) his roof was damaged by a hailstorm during the policy period when it was not, (2) extra work was necessary in paying Fulgham more than the initial estimated cost to repair his roof when it was not, (3) the hailstorm led to damages
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to the interior of the building when it did not, and (4) statements, invoices, and a contract to repair the roof were all issued by contractors when they were fabricated by Fulgham.
Independent of his factual challenges, Fulgham fashions a non-reliance argument to the effect that, as a matter of law, Allied could not rely on his misrepresentations in the claims process because it conducted its own investigation of his claim. This notion does not account for the prospect of fraud directed at the investigation itself. In that context, the Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument more than a century ago, leaving the fraud subject to a remedy despite the plaintiff’s investigation where the defendant takes affirmative steps to frustrate it. Ranger & Co. v. Hearne, 41 Tex. 258, 260–61 (1874) (holding that a contract’s recital that the purchaser of an engine satisfactorily examined the engine will not preclude the purchaser from showing the engine had defects the sellers of the engine hid with new paint and polish). Indeed, this rule has been in effect and in continuous operation since the founding of the Republic. TEX. CONST. OF 1836, art. IV, § 13 (directing Congress to adopt the common law of England as rule of decision); see also Schneider v. Heath (1813) 170 Eng. Rep. 1462 (Ct. Com. Pls.) 1462–63, 3 Camp. 506, 506–08 (cited with approval in Hearne, 41 Tex. at 261).
To be sure, it would initially appear that this Court rejected this ancient common-law norm in a 1950 opinion when we said “[w]here a party who claims to have been defrauded had the means to have discovered the fraud, if any existed, and undertakes to investigate for himself, . . . it must be held as a matter of law that he has knowledge of everything that a proper investigation would disclose, and hence would not be justified in acting on fraudulent representations . . . .” Mann v. Rugel, 228 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1950, no writ). However, on closer reading, the Court actually confirmed and embraced the rule laid down in Hearne. In particular, reliance can be defeated by a party’s investigation only when he is “not hindered or prevented from doing so by any act of the other party.” Id.; see also M. L.
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Mayfield Petroleum Corp. v. Kelly, 450 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1970, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (if the investigation is “free and unhampered and conditions are such that he must obtain the information he desires, he is presumed to rely upon his own investigation rather than on representations made to him”).
Fulgham relies on decisions from our sister courts of appeal to support his interpretation that when one performs his or her own investigation of the facts, one cannot, as a matter of law, be said to have relied upon the misrepresentation of others. See Chitsey v. Nat’l Lloyd’s Ins. Co., 698 S.W.2d 766, 769 (Tex. App.—Austin 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 738 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1987); Kolb v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n, 585 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.). However, neither decision discusses the effect of a defendant’s systematic campaign to hinder or hamper the investigation of a plaintiff. The Chitsey court relied on Kolb to hold that when one makes his own investigation of the facts, he cannot, as a matter of law, be said to have relied upon the misrepresentations of others. Chitsey, 698 S.W.2d at 769. The Kolb court did agree with the general rule that where a person makes his own investigation of the facts, he cannot sustain a cause of action based on misrepresentations made by others, but the court reversed summary judgment granted in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the record was unclear as to whether the plaintiff relied solely on his own investigation. The Texarkana Court of Appeals later made clear that the assertion “that one cannot recover for misrepresentations when he has made his own investigation of the facts . . . is too broad a statement of the rule.” Lutheran Bhd. v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc., 829 S.W.2d 300, 308 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, writ granted w.r.m.). Instead, the rule is that “one cannot recover for fraudulent misrepresentations when he knows the representation is false, or when he has relied solely on his own investigation rather than on the representations of the other party.” Id. We do not read these opinions to be out of harmony with that of the Texas Supreme Court or those from
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this Court. A party who claims to have been defrauded and conducted his own investigation will not be prevented from relying on representations made to him by the alleged fraudster so long as the party was hindered or hampered in his investigation by the alleged fraudster or did not rely solely on his investigation.
The jury heard plenty of evidence that Fulgham’s employees, at his instruction, took numerous affirmative actions to hinder or hamper Allied’s investigation and to misrepresent both the existence and the extent of his claimed loss. One employee testified that the building, including its roof, was previously damaged prior to the hail storm and that Fulgham had filed a claim with a different insurance company for fire damage to the building. The employee also related that Fulgham used those other insurance proceeds to remodel the building instead of replacing the roof. In his remodeling attempts, Fulgham removed pipes and installed beams that blocked the building’s drainage system, forcing the rainwater to penetrate the ceiling.
Fulgham then installed a PVC pipe that caught the water coming through the roof and carried the water outside the building. The employee also testified Fulgham hired additional laborers to paint and repair the building in order to make it appear as if Fulgham had maintained the building before the hail storm and to disguise the fact that the damage, including the leak in the roof, existed prior to the hailstorm. According to the employee, Fulgham instructed him on how to answer Allied’s claims specialist’s questions regarding the damage to the building and its roof. Fulgham also directed the employee to represent to Allied’s claims specialist and claims manager that steel beams stored in the building were damaged by leaks and required cleaning so that Fulgham could make custom furniture with them, when in fact that steel beams were leftover from a previous project and as such did not require cleaning. That same employee also testified that his contracting company, which was listed on the invoices sent to Allied’s claims specialist, did not perform the work listed on the invoices and that although his signature was on the
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invoices, he did not prepare or sign the invoices. A second employee testified that Fulgham instructed him to wear business clothes to a meeting with one of Allied’s representatives and to present himself as an owner of a demolition company at a meeting between Fulgham and Allied’s representative. The second employee also testified that Fulgham directed his employees to place documents in certain areas of the building in order to cause them to sustain water damage.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the record contains more than a scintilla of evidence that Allied relied on Fulgham’s representations and that there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found fraud as charged. See McCullough, 435 S.W.3d at 892. There was also evidence Fulgham hindered or hampered Allied’s investigation by covering up the physical evidence that the roof was not damaged when or as Fulgham claimed, by directing employees to lie to Allied’s claims specialist, and by creating fraudulent invoices to support his claimed costs of repair, all of which a reasonable jury could find prevented Allied from discovering the fraudulent nature of his claims. See Mann, 228 S.W.2d at 587. The record contains evidence that Allied did not rely solely on its investigations, but instead also relied on Fulgham’s representations. See Lutheran Bhd., 829 S.W.2d at 308. Accordingly, we overrule Fulgham’s first issue.
In his second issue, Fulgham urges that unjust enrichment is not an available cause of action because Allied, as an insurer, was limited to contractual claims and challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding of unjust enrichment. Because the jury’s fraud finding is sufficient to support the judgment, we need not address Fulgham’s second issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
Finally, we briefly address Fulgham’s arguments that Allied failed to comply with certain provisions of the Texas Insurance Code. Fulgham argues that under section 705.005, Allied was
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required to provide notice to Fulgham that it refused to be bound by the policy. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 705.005 (West 2009). Fulgham also urges Allied was required to show his misrepresentations caused Allied to waive or lose a valid defense to the policy in order to rely on a policy provision concerning misrepresentation in a proof of loss. Id. § 705.003. These provisions govern an insurer’s use of a policyholder’s misrepresentations as grounds for defense against a policyholder’s claims or to void or rescind a policy based on a provision in the policy prohibiting insured’s misrepresentations. See id. § 705.005 (“A defendant may use as a defense a misrepresentation made in the application for or in obtaining an insurance policy”); § 705.003 (imposing requirements on insurer in order to allow insurer to rescind or void policy based on provision prohibiting insured’s misrepresentations). In the instant case, the insurance policy provided that any material misrepresentations made by Fulgham in the application or claims process would void the insurance policy, but Allied did not seek to rescind or void the policy on that provision and did not obtain relief on those grounds. Instead, Allied sought and obtained relief on the grounds of its own affirmative claims of common-law fraud and unjust enrichment.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment.
140189F.P05
/David J. Schenck/
DAVID J. SCHENCK JUSTICE
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S
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JACKSON FULGHAM D/B/A COMMERCE STREET PARTNERS, Appellant
No. 05-14-00189-CV V.
ALLIED PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 11-08353.
Opinion delivered by Justice Schenck. Justices Lang-Miers and Whitehill participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee ALLIED PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY recover its costs of this appeal from appellant JACKSON FULGHAM D/B/A COMMERCE STREET PARTNERS.
Judgment entered this 28th day of May, 2015.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
Congress enacted the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) in 1935 to protect the rights of employees and employers, to encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private sector labor and management practices, which can harm the general welfare of workers, businesses and the U.S. economy.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Also cited NLRA or the Act; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
[Title 29, Chapter 7, Subchapter II, United States Code]
FINDINGS AND POLICIES
Section 1.[§151.] The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees.
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair the interest of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self- organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 2. [§152.] When used in this Act [subchapter]–
(1) The term “person” includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in cases under title 11 of the United States Code [under title 11], or receivers.
(2) The term “employer” includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such labor organization.
[Pub. L. 93-360, § 1(a), July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 395, deleted the phrase “or any corporation or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual” from the definition of “employer.”]
(3) The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act [this subchapter] explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
(4) The term “representatives” includes any individual or labor organization.
(5) The term “labor organization” means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
(6) The term “commerce” means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia or any foreign country.
(7) The term “affecting commerce” means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
(8) The term “unfair labor practice” means any unfair labor practice listed in section 8 .
(9) The term “labor dispute” includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
(10) The term “National Labor Relations Board” means the National Labor Relations Board provided for in section 3 of this Act .
(11) The term “supervisor” means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
(12) The term “professional employee” means–
(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or
(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).
(13) In determining whether any person is acting as an “agent” of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
(14) The term “health care institution” shall include any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm, or aged person.
[Pub. L. 93-360, § 1(b), July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 395, added par. (14).]
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Sec. 3. [§ 153.] (a) [Creation, composition, appointment, and tenure; Chairman; removal of members] The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the “Board”) created by this Act [subchapter] prior to its amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq.], is continued as an agency of the United States, except that the Board shall consist of five instead of three members, appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Of the two additional members so provided for, one shall be appointed for a term of five years and the other for a term of two years. Their successors, and the successors of the other members, shall be appointed for terms of five years each, excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.
(b) [Delegation of powers to members and regional directors; review and stay of actions of regional directors; quorum; seal] The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. The Board is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 9 to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a secret ballot under subsection (c) or (e) of section 9 and certify the results thereof, except that upon the filling of a request therefore with the Board by any interested person, the Board may review any action of a regional director delegated to him under this paragraph, but such a review shall not, unless specifically ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of any action taken by the regional director. A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof. The Board shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
(c) [Annual reports to Congress and the President] The Board shall at the close of each fiscal year make a report in writing to Congress and to the President summarizing significant case activities and operations for that fiscal year.
(d) [General Counsel; appointment and tenure; powers and duties; vacancy] There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel of the Board shall exercise general supervision over all attorneys employed by the Board (other than administrative law judges and legal assistants to Board members) and over the officers and employees in the regional offices. He shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 10 , and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may be provided by law. In case of vacancy in the office of the General Counsel the President is authorized to designate the officer or employee who shall act as General Counsel during such vacancy, but no person or persons so designated shall so act (1) for more than forty days when the Congress is in session unless a nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been submitted to the Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in which such nomination was submitted.
[The title “administrative law judge” was adopted in 5 U.S.C. § 3105.]
Sec. 4. [§ 154. Eligibility for reappointment; officers and employees; payment of expenses] (a) Each member of the Board and the General Counsel of the Board shall be eligible for reappointment, and shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. The Board shall appoint an executive secretary, and such attorneys, examiners, and regional directors, and such other employees as it may from time to time find necessary for the proper performance of its duties. The Board may not employ any attorneys for the purpose of reviewing transcripts of hearings or preparing drafts of opinions except that any attorney employed for assignment as a legal assistant to any Board member may for such Board member review such transcripts and prepare such drafts. No administrative law judge’s report shall be reviewed, either before or after its publication, by any person other than a member of the Board or his legal assistant, and no administrative law judge shall advise or consult with the Board with respect to exceptions taken to his findings, rulings, or recommendations. The Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other agencies, and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from time to time be needed. Attorneys appointed under this section may, at the direction of the Board, appear for and represent the Board in any case in court. Nothing in this Act [subchapter] shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation, or for economic analysis.
[The title “administrative law judge” was adopted in 5 U.S.C. § 3105.]
(b) All of the expenses of the Board, including all necessary traveling and subsistence expenses outside the District of Columbia incurred by the members or employees of the Board under its orders, shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers therefore approved by the Board or by any individual it designates for that purpose.
Sec. 5. [§ 155. Principal office, conducting inquiries throughout country; participation in decisions or inquiries conducted by member] The principal office of the Board shall be in the District of Columbia, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers at any other place. The Board may, by one or more of its members or by such agents or agencies as it may designate, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions in any part of the United States. A member who participates in such an inquiry shall not be disqualified from subsequently participating in a decision of the Board in the same case.
Sec. 6. [§ 156. Rules and regulations] The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act [by subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5], such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act [subchapter].
RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES
Sec. 7. [§ 157.] Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) .
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Sec. 8. [§ 158.] (a) [Unfair labor practices by employer] It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer–
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ;
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to section 6 , an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act [subchapter], or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act [in this subsection] as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a) , in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 9(e) within one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this Act [subchapter];
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a) .
(b) [Unfair labor practices by labor organization] It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents–
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 : Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) [of subsection (a)(3) of this section] or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;
(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a) ;
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is- –
(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by section 8(e) [subsection (e) of this section];
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9 : Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9 ;
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for employees performing such work:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection (b) [this subsection] shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required to recognize under this Act [subchapter]: Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution;
(5) to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized under subsection (a)(3) [of this section] the payment, as a condition precedent to becoming a member of such organization, of a fee in an amount which the Board finds excessive or discriminatory under all the circumstances. In making such a finding, the Board shall consider, among other relevant factors, the practices and customs of labor organizations in the particular industry, and the wages currently paid to the employees affected;
(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed; and
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their collective- bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such employees:
(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this Act [subchapter] any other labor organization and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 9(c) of this Act ,
(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 9(c) of this Act has been conducted, or
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice under this section 8(b) [this subsection].
(c) [Expression of views without threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit] The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act [subchapter], if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
(d) [Obligation to bargain collectively] For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there is in effect a collective- bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification–
(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;
(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing the proposed modifications;
(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that time; and
(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever occurs later:
The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) [paragraphs (2) to (4) of this subsection] shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which the labor
organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the provisions of section 9(a) , and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in this subsection, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsection (g) of this section, shall lose his status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 8, 9, and 10 of this Act [sections 158, 159, and 160 of this title], but such loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is re-employed by such employer. Whenever the collective bargaining involves employees of a health care institution, the provisions of this section 8(d) [this subsection] shall be modified as follows:
(A) The notice of section 8(d)(1) [paragraph (1) of this subsection] shall be ninety days; the notice of section 8(d)(3) [paragraph (3) of this subsection] shall be sixty days; and the contract period of section 8(d)(4) [paragraph (4) of this subsection] shall be ninety days.
(B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification or recognition, at least thirty days’ notice of the existence of a dispute shall be given by the labor organization to the agencies set forth in section 8(d)(3) [in paragraph (3) of this subsection].
(C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under either clause (A) or (B) of this sentence, the Service shall promptly communicate with the parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to bring them to agreement. The parties shall participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be undertaken by the Service for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute.
[Pub. L. 93-360, July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 395, amended the last sentence of Sec. 8(d) by striking the words “the sixty-day” and inserting the words “any notice” and by inserting before the words “shall lose” the phrase “, or who engages in any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsection (g) of this section.” It also amended the end of paragraph Sec. 8(d) by adding a new sentence “Whenever the collective bargaining . . . aiding in a settlement of the dispute.”]
(e) [Enforceability of contract or agreement to boycott any other employer; exception] It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection (e) [this subsection] shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection (e) and section 8(b)(4)(B) [this subsection and subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section] the terms “any employer,” “any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce,” and “any person” when used in relation to the terms “any other producer, processor, or manufacturer,” “any other employer,” or “any other person” shall not include persons in the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided further, That nothing in this Act [subchapter] shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing exception.
(f) [Agreements covering employees in the building and construction industry] It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building and construction employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of this Act [subsection (a) of this section] as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established under the provisions of section 9 of this Act prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or experience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall set aside the final proviso to section 8(a)(3) of this Act [subsection (a)(3) of this section]: Provided further, That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e) .
(g) [Notification of intention to strike or picket at any health care institution] A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not less than ten days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of that intention, except that in the case of bargaining for an initial agreement following certification or recognition the notice required by this subsection shall not be given until the expiration of the period specified in clause (B) of the last sentence of section 8(d) of this Act [subsection (d) of this section]. The notice shall state the date and time that such action will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended by the written agreement of both parties.
[Pub. L. 93-360, July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 396, added subsec. (g).]
REPRESENTATIVES AND ELECTIONS
Sec. 9 [§ 159.] (a) [Exclusive representatives; employees’ adjustment of grievances directly with employer] Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective- bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
(b) [Determination of bargaining unit by Board] The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act [subchapter], the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit votes against separate representation or (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer’s premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.
(c) [Hearings on questions affecting commerce; rules and regulations] (1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board–
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to recognize their representative as the representative defined in section 9(a) [subsection (a) of this section], or (ii) assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in section 9(a) [subsection (a) of this section]; or
(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be recognized as the representative defined in section 9(a) [subsection (a) of this section]; the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof.
(2) In determining whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and in no case shall the Board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with section 10(c) .
(3) No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held. Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall find are consistent with the purposes and provisions of this Act [subchapter] in any election conducted within twelve months after the commencement of the strike. In any election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a run-off shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a selection between the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast in the election.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a consent election in conformity with regulations and rules of decision of the Board.
(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) [of this section] the extent to which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.
(d) [Petition for enforcement or review; transcript] Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section 10(c) is based in whole or in part upon facts certified following an investigation pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and there is a petition for the enforcement or review of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under section 10(e) or 10(f) [subsection (e) or (f) of section 160 of this title], and thereupon the decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript.
(e) [Secret ballot; limitation of elections] (1) Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of the employees in a bargaining unit covered by an agreement between their employer and labor organization made pursuant to section 8(a)(3) , of a petition alleging they desire that such authorization be rescinded, the Board shall take a secret ballot of the employees in such unit and certify the results thereof to such labor organization and to the employer.
(2) No election shall be conducted pursuant to this subsection in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve- month period, a valid election shall have been held.
PREVENTION OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Sec. 10. [§ 160.] (a) [Powers of Board generally] The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8 ) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominately local in character) even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this Act [subchapter] or has received a construction inconsistent therewith.
(b) [Complaint and notice of hearing; six-month limitation; answer; court rules of evidence inapplicable] Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service in the armed forces, in which event the six- month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge. Any such complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to section 2072 of title 28, United States Code .
(c) [Reduction of testimony to writing; findings and orders of Board] The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency, or the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act [subchapter]: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, backpay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him: And provided further, That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of section 8(a)(1) or section 8(a)(2) [subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of section 158 of this title], and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in scope. Such order may further require such person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has complied with the order. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any backpay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. In case the evidence is presented before a member of the Board, or before an administrative law judge or judges thereof, such member, or such judge or judges, as the case may be, shall issue and cause to be served on the parties to the proceeding a proposed report, together with a recommended order, which shall be filed with the Board, and if no exceptions are filed within twenty days after service thereof upon such parties, or within such further period as the Board may authorize, such recommended order shall become the order of the Board and become affective as therein prescribed.
[The title “administrative law judge” was adopted in 5 U.S.C. § 3105.]
(d) [Modification of findings or orders prior to filing record in court] Until the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or order made or issued by it.
(e) [Petition to court for enforcement of order; proceedings; review of judgment] The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States, within any circuit or district, respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, and shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code . Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made a part of the record. The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, by reason of additional evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which findings with respect to question of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order. Upon the filing of the record with it the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review by the appropriate United States court of appeals if application was made to the district court as hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28.
(f) [Review of final order of Board on petition to court] Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such court a written petition praying that the order of the Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Board, and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, certified by the Board, as provided in section 2112 of title 28, United States Code . Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under subsection (e) of this section, and shall have the same jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board; the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive.
(g) [Institution of court proceedings as stay of Board’s order] The commencement of proceedings under subsection (e) or (f) of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate as a stay of the Board’s order.
(h) [Jurisdiction of courts unaffected by limitations prescribed in chapter 6 of this title] When granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order, or making and entering a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part an order of the Board, as provided in this section, the jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by sections 101 to 115 of title 29, United States Code [chapter 6 of this title] [known as the “Norris-LaGuardia Act”].
(i) Repealed.
(j) [Injunctions] The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) [of this section] charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, within any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
(k) [Hearings on jurisdictional strikes] Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section 8(b) , the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.
(l) [Boycotts and strikes to force recognition of uncertified labor organizations; injunctions; notice; service of process] Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A), (B), or (C) of section 8(b) , or section 8(e) or section 8(b)(7) , the preliminary investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within any district where the unfair labor practice in question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate injunctive relief pending the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision of law: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order shall be issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at the expiration of such period: Provided further, That such officer or regional attorney shall not apply for any restraining order under section 8(b)(7) if a charge against the employer under section 8(a)(2) has been filed and after the preliminary investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and that a complaint should issue. Upon filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person involved in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present any relevant testimony: Provided further, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests of employee members. The service of legal process upon such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor organization and make such organization a party to the suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 8(b)(4)(D) .
(m) [Priority of cases] Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of subsection (a)(3) or (b)(2) of section 8 , such charge shall be given priority over all other cases except cases of like character in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred and cases given priority under subsection (1) [of this section].
INVESTIGATORY POWERS
Sec. 11. [§ 161.] For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by section 9 and section 10 [sections 159 and 160 of this title]–
(1) [Documentary evidence; summoning witnesses and taking testimony] The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. The Board, or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party to such proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such proceeding or investigation requested in such application. Within five days after the service of a subpoena on any person requiring the production of any evidence in his possession or under his control, such person may petition the Board to revoke, and the Board shall revoke, such subpoena if in its opinion the evidence whose production is required does not relate to any matter under investigation, or any matter in question in such proceedings, or if in its opinion such subpoena does not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence whose production is required. Any member of the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place in the United States or any Territory or possession thereof, at any designated place of hearing.
(2) [Court aid in compelling production of evidence and attendance of witnesses] In case on contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, any United States district court or the United States courts of any Territory or possession, within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.
(3) Repealed.
[Immunity of witnesses. See 18 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq.]
(4) [Process, service and return; fees of witnesses] Complaints, orders and other process and papers of the Board, its member, agent, or agency, may be served either personally or by registered or certified mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the principal office or place of business of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt or telegraph receipt therefore when registered or certified and mailed or when telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same. Witnesses summoned before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the United States.
(5) [Process, where served] All process of any court to which application may be made under this Act [subchapter] may be served in the judicial district wherein the defendant or other person required to be served resides or may be found.
(6) [Information and assistance from departments] The several departments and agencies of the Government, when directed by the President, shall furnish the Board, upon its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before the Board.
Sec. 12. [§ 162. Offenses and penalties] Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with any member of the Board or any of its agents or agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this Act [subchapter] shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
LIMITATIONS
Sec. 13. [§ 163. Right to strike preserved] Nothing in this Act [subchapter], except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
Sec. 14. [§ 164. Construction of provisions] (a) [Supervisors as union members] Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this Act [subchapter] shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
(b) [Agreements requiring union membership in violation of State law] Nothing in this Act [subchapter] shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
(c) [Power of Board to decline jurisdiction of labor disputes; assertion of jurisdiction by State and Territorial courts] (1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act [to subchapter II of chapter 5 of title 5], decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
(2) Nothing in this Act [subchapter] shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.
Sec. 15. [§ 165.] Omitted.
[Reference to repealed provisions of bankruptcy statute.]
Sec. 16. [§ 166. Separability of provisions] If any provision of this Act [subchapter], or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances, shall be held invalid, the remainder of this Act [subchapter], or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
Sec. 17. [§ 167. Short title] This Act [subchapter] may be cited as the “National Labor Relations Act.”
Sec. 18. [§ 168.] Omitted.
[Reference to former sec. 9(f), (g), and (h).]
INDIVIDUALS WITH RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS
Sec. 19. [§ 169.] Any employee who is a member of and adheres to established and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion, body, or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations shall not be required to join or financially support any labor organization as a condition of employment; except that such employee may be required in a contract between such employee’s employer and a labor organization in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious, nonlabor organization charitable fund exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of title 26 of the Internal Revenue Code , chosen by such employee from a list of at least three such funds, designated in such contract or if the contract fails to designate such funds, then to any such fund chosen by the employee. If such employee who holds conscientious objections pursuant to this section requests the labor organization to use the grievance-arbitration procedure on the employee’s behalf, the labor organization is authorized to charge the employee for the reasonable cost of using such procedure.
[Sec. added, Pub. L. 93-360, July 26, 1974, 88 Stat. 397, and amended, Pub. L. 96-593, Dec. 24, 1980, 94 Stat. 3452.]
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
Also cited LMRA; 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197
[Title 29, Chapter 7, United States Code]
SHORT TITLE AND DECLARATION OF POLICY
Section 1. [§ 141.] (a) This Act [chapter] may be cited as the “Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.” [Also known as the “Taft-Hartley Act.”]
(b) Industrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with the full production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize under law one another’s legitimate rights in their relations with each other, and above all recognize under law that neither party has any right in its relations with any other to engage in acts or practices which jeopardize the public health, safety, or interest.
It is the purpose and policy of this Act [chapter], in order to promote the full flow of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general welfare, and to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affecting commerce.
TITLE I, Amendments to
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (printed above)
TITLE II
[Title 29, Chapter 7, Subchapter III, United States Code]
CONCILIATION OF LABOR DISPUTES IN INDUSTRIES AFFECTING COMMERCE; NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
Sec. 201. [§ 171. Declaration of purpose and policy] It is the policy of the United States that–
(a) sound and stable industrial peace and the advancement of the general welfare, health, and safety of the Nation and of the best interest of employers and employees can most satisfactorily be secured by the settlement of issues between employers and employees through the processes of conference and collective bargaining between employers and the representatives of their employees;
(b) the settlement of issues between employers and employees through collective bargaining may by advanced by making available full and adequate governmental facilities for conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage employers and the representatives of their employees to reach and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working conditions, and to make all reasonable efforts to settle their differences by mutual agreement reached through conferences and collective bargaining or by such methods as may be provided for in any applicable agreement for the settlement of disputes; and
(c) certain controversies which arise between parties to collective bargaining agreements may be avoided or minimized by making available full and adequate governmental facilities for furnishing assistance to employers and the representatives of their employees in formulating for inclusion within such agreements provision for adequate notice of any proposed changes in the terms of such agreements, for the final adjustment of grievances or questions regarding the application or interpretation of such agreements, and other provisions designed to prevent the subsequent arising of such controversies.
Sec. 202. [§ 172. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service]
(a) [Creation; appointment of Director] There is created an independent agency to be known as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (herein referred to as the “Service,” except that for sixty days after June 23, 1947, such term shall refer to the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor). The Service shall be under the direction of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Director (hereinafter referred to as the “Director”), who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Director shall not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment
.(b) [Appointment of officers and employees; expenditures for supplies, facilities, and services] The Director is authorized, subject to the civil service laws, to appoint such clerical and other personnel as may be necessary for the execution of the functions of the Service, and shall fix their compensation in accordance with sections 5101 to 5115 and sections 5331 to 5338 of title 5, United States Code [chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of title 5], and may, without regard to the provisions of the civil service laws, appoint such conciliators and mediators as may be necessary to carry out the functions of the Service. The Director is authorized to make such expenditures for supplies, facilities, and services as he deems necessary. Such expenditures shall be allowed and paid upon presentation of itemized vouchers therefore approved by the Director or by any employee designated by him for that purpose.
(c) [Principal and regional offices; delegation of authority by Director; annual report to Congress] The principal office of the Service shall be in the District of Columbia, but the Director may establish regional offices convenient to localities in which labor controversies are likely to arise. The Director may by order, subject to revocation at any time, delegate any authority and discretion conferred upon him by this Act [chapter] to any regional director, or other officer or employee of the Service. The Director may establish suitable procedures for cooperation with State and local mediation agencies. The Director shall make an annual report in writing to Congress at the end of the fiscal year.
(d) [Transfer of all mediation and conciliation services to Service; effective date; pending proceedings unaffected] All mediation and conciliation functions of the Secretary of Labor or the United States Conciliation Service under section 51 [repealed] of title 29, United States Code [this title], and all functions of the United States Conciliation Service under any other law are transferred to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, together with the personnel and records of the United States Conciliation Service. Such transfer shall take effect upon the sixtieth day after June 23, 1947. Such transfer shall not affect any proceedings pending before the United States Conciliation Service or any certification, order, rule, or regulation theretofore made by it or by the Secretary of Labor. The Director and the Service shall not be subject in any way to the jurisdiction or authority of the Secretary of Labor or any official or division of the Department of Labor.
FUNCTIONS OF THE SERVICE
Sec. 203. [§ 173. Functions of Service] (a) [Settlement of disputes through conciliation and mediation] It shall be the duty of the Service, in order to prevent or minimize interruptions of the free flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes, to assist parties to labor disputes in industries affecting commerce to settle such disputes through conciliation and mediation.
(b) [Intervention on motion of Service or request of parties; avoidance of mediation of minor disputes] The Service may proffer its services in any labor dispute in any industry affecting commerce, either upon its own motion or upon the request of one or more of the parties to the dispute, whenever in its judgment such dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption of commerce. The Director and the Service are directed to avoid attempting to mediate disputes which would have only a minor effect on interstate commerce if State or other conciliation services are available to the parties. Whenever the Service does proffer its services in any dispute, it shall be the duty of the Service promptly to put itself in communication with the parties and to use its best efforts, by mediation and conciliation, to bring them to agreement.
(c) [Settlement of disputes by other means upon failure of conciliation] If the Director is not able to bring the parties to agreement by conciliation within a reasonable time, he shall seek to induce the parties voluntarily to seek other means of settling the dispute without resort to strike, lockout, or other coercion, including submission to the employees in the bargaining unit of the employer’s last offer of settlement for approval or rejection in a secret ballot. The failure or refusal of either party to agree to any procedure suggested by the Director shall not be deemed a violation of any duty or obligation imposed by this Act [chapter].
(d) [Use of conciliation and mediation services as last resort] Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The Service is directed to make its conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
(e) [Encouragement and support of establishment and operation of joint labor management activities conducted by committees] The Service is authorized and directed to encourage and support the establishment and operation of joint labor management activities conducted by plant, area, and industry wide committees designed to improve labor management relationships, job security and organizational effectiveness, in accordance with the provisions of section 205A .
Sec. 204. [§ 174. Co-equal obligations of employees, their representatives, and management to minimize labor disputes] (a) In order to prevent or minimize interruptions of the free flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes, employers and employees and their representatives, in any industry affecting commerce, shall–
(1) exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working conditions, including provision for adequate notice of any proposed change in the terms of such agreements;
(2) whenever a dispute arises over the terms or application of a collective- bargaining agreement and a conference is requested by a party or prospective party thereto, arrange promptly for such a conference to be held and endeavor in such conference to settle such dispute expeditiously; and
(3) in case such dispute is not settled by conference, participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be undertaken by the Service under this Act [chapter] for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute.
Sec. 205. [§175. National Labor-Management Panel; creation and composition; appointment, tenure, and compensation; duties] (a) There is created a National Labor-Management Panel which shall be composed of twelve members appointed by the President, six of whom shall be elected from among persons outstanding in the field of management and six of whom shall be selected from among persons outstanding in the field of labor. Each member shall hold office for a term of three years, except that any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring prior to the expiration of the term for which his predecessor was appointed shall be appointed for the remainder of such term, and the terms of office of the members first taking office shall expire, as designated by the President at the time of appointment, four at the end of the first year, four at the end of the second year, and four at the end of the third year after the date of appointment. Members of the panel, when serving on business of the panel, shall be paid compensation at the rate of $25 per day, and shall also be entitled to receive an allowance for actual and necessary travel and subsistence expenses while so serving away from their places of residence.
(b) It shall be the duty of the panel, at the request of the Director, to advise in the avoidance of industrial controversies and the manner in which mediation and voluntary adjustment shall be administered, particularly with reference to controversies affecting the general welfare of the country.
Sec. 205A. [§ 175a. Assistance to plant, area, and industry wide labor management committees]
(a) [Establishment and operation of plant, area, and industry wide committees] (1) The Service is authorized and directed to provide assistance in the establishment and operation of plant, area and industry wide labor management committees which–
(A) have been organized jointly by employers and labor organizations representing employees in that plant, area, or industry; and
(B) are established for the purpose of improving labor management relationships, job security, organizational effectiveness, enhancing economic development or involving workers in decisions affecting their jobs including improving communication with respect to subjects of mutual interest and concern.
(2) The Service is authorized and directed to enter into contracts and to make grants, where necessary or appropriate, to fulfill its responsibilities under this section.
(b) [Restrictions on grants, contracts, or other assistance] (1) No grant may be made, no contract may be entered into and no other assistance may be provided under the provisions of this section to a plant labor management committee unless the employees in that plant are represented by a labor organization and there is in effect at that plant a collective bargaining agreement.
(2) No grant may be made, no contract may be entered into and no other assistance may be provided under the provisions of this section to an area or industry wide labor management committee unless its participants include any labor organizations certified or recognized as the representative of the employees of an employer participating in such committee. Nothing in this clause shall prohibit participation in an area or industry wide committee by an employer whose employees are not represented by a labor organization.
(3) No grant may be made under the provisions of this section to any labor management committee which the Service finds to have as one of its purposes the discouragement of the exercise of rights contained in section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 157) , or the interference with collective bargaining in any plant, or industry.
(c) [Establishment of office] The Service shall carry out the provisions of this section through an office established for that purpose.
(d) [Authorization of appropriations] There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this section $10,000,000 for the fiscal year 1979, and such sums as may be necessary thereafter.
[Pub. L. 95-524, § 6(c)(2), Oct. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 2020, added Sec. 205A.]
NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
Sec. 206. [§ 176. Appointment of board of inquiry by President; report; contents; filing with Service] Whenever in the opinion of the President of the United States, a threatened or actual strike or lockout affecting an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or with foreign nations, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce, will, if permitted to occur or to continue, imperil the national health or safety, he may appoint a board of inquiry to inquire into the issues involved in the dispute and to make a written report to him within such time as he shall prescribe. Such report shall include a statement of the facts with respect to the dispute, including each party’s statement of its position but shall not contain any recommendations. The President shall file a copy of such report with the Service and shall make its contents available to the public.
Sec. 207. [§ 177. Board of inquiry]
(a) [Composition] A board of inquiry shall be composed of a chairman and such other members as the President shall determine, and shall have power to sit and act in any place within the United States and to conduct such hearings either in public or in private, as it may deem necessary or proper, to ascertain the facts with respect to the causes and circumstances of the dispute.
(b) [Compensation] Members of a board of inquiry shall receive compensation at the rate of $50 for each day actually spent by them in the work of the board, together with necessary travel and subsistence expenses.
(c) [Powers of discovery] For the purpose of any hearing or inquiry conducted by any board appointed under this title, the provisions of sections 49 and 50 of title 15, United States Code [sections 49 and 50 of title 15] (relating to the attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents) are made applicable to the powers and duties of such board.
Sec. 208. [§ 178. Injunctions during national emergency]
(a) [Petition to district court by Attorney General on direction of President] Upon receiving a report from a board of inquiry the President may direct the Attorney General to petition any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties to enjoin such strike or lockout or the continuing thereof, and if the court finds that such threatened or actual strike or lockout–
(i) affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof engaged in trade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or with foreign nations, or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and
(ii) if permitted to occur or to continue, will imperil the national health or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjoin any such strike or lockout, or the continuing thereof, and to make such other orders as may be appropriate.
(b) [Inapplicability of chapter 6] In any case, the provisions of sections 101 to 115 of title 29, United States Code [chapter 6 of this title] [known as the “Norris-LaGuardia Act”] shall not be applicable.
(c) [Review of orders] The order or orders of the court shall be subject to review by the appropriate United States court of appeals and by the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in section 1254 of title 28, United States Code .
Sec. 209. [§ 179. Injunctions during national emergency; adjustment efforts by parties during injunction period]
(a) [Assistance of Service; acceptance of Service’s proposed settlement] Whenever a district court has issued an order under section 208 enjoining acts or practices which imperil or threaten to imperil the national health or safety, it shall be the duty of the parties to the labor dispute giving rise to such order to make every effort to adjust and settle their differences, with the assistance of the Service created by this Act [chapter]. Neither party shall be under any duty to accept, in whole or in part, any proposal of settlement made by the Service.
(b) [Reconvening of board of inquiry; report by board; contents; secret ballot of employees by National Labor Relations Board; certification of results to Attorney General] Upon the issuance of such order, the President shall reconvene the board of inquiry which has previously reported with respect to the dispute. At the end of a sixty-day period (unless the dispute has been settled by that time), the board of inquiry shall report to the President the current position of the parties and the efforts which have been made for settlement, and shall include a statement by each party of its position and a statement of the employer’s last offer of settlement. The President shall make such report available to the public. The National Labor Relations Board, within the succeeding fifteen days, shall take a secret ballot of the employees of each employer involved in the dispute on the question of whether they wish to accept the final offer of settlement made by their employer, as stated by him and shall certify the results thereof to the Attorney General within five days thereafter.
Sec. 210. [§ 180. Discharge of injunction upon certification of results of election or settlement; report to Congress] Upon the certification of the results of such ballot or upon a settlement being reached, whichever happens sooner, the Attorney General shall move the court to discharge the injunction, which motion shall then be granted and the injunction discharged. When such motion is granted, the President shall submit to the Congress a full and comprehensive report of the proceedings, including the findings of the board of inquiry and the ballot taken by the National Labor Relations Board, together with such recommendations as he may see fit to make for consideration and appropriate action.
COMPILATION OF COLLECTIVE-BARGAINING AGREEMENTS, ETC.
Sec. 211. [§ 181.] (a) For the guidance and information of interested representatives of employers, employees, and the general public, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor shall maintain a file of copies of all available collective bargaining agreements and other available agreements and actions thereunder settling or adjusting labor disputes. Such file shall be open to inspection under appropriate conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, except that no specific information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed.
(b) The Bureau of Labor Statistics in the Department of Labor is authorized to furnish upon request of the Service, or employers, employees, or their representatives, all available data and factual information which may aid in the settlement of any labor dispute, except that no specific information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed.
EXEMPTION OF RAILWAY LABOR ACT
Sec. 212. [§ 182.] The provisions of this title [subchapter] shall not be applicable with respect to any matter which is subject to the provisions of the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time.
CONCILIATION OF LABOR DISPUTES IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
Sec. 213. [§ 183.] (a) [Establishment of Boards of Inquiry; member- ship] If, in the opinion of the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, a threatened or actual strike or lockout affecting a health care institution will, if permitted to occur or to continue, substantially interrupt the delivery of health care in the locality concerned, the Director may further assist in the resolution of the impasse by establishing within 30 days after the notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under clause (A) of the last sentence of section 8(d) (which is required by clause (3) of such section 8(d) ), or within 10 days after the notice under clause (B), an impartial Board of Inquiry to investigate the issues involved in the dispute and to make a written report thereon to the parties within fifteen (15) days after the establishment of such a Board. The written report shall contain the findings of fact together with the Board’s recommendations for settling the dispute, with the objective of achieving a prompt, peaceful and just settlement of the dispute. Each such Board shall be composed of such number of individuals as the Director may deem desirable. No member appointed under this section shall have any interest or involvement in the health care institutions or the employee organizations involved in the dispute.
(b) [Compensation of members of Boards of Inquiry] (1) Members of any board established under this section who are otherwise employed by the Federal Government shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in carrying out its duties under this section.
(2) Members of any board established under this section who are not subject to paragraph (1) shall receive compensation at a rate prescribed by the Director but not to exceed the daily rate prescribed for GS-18 of the General Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code , including travel for each day they are engaged in the performance of their duties under this section and shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in carrying out their duties under this section.
(c) [Maintenance of status quo] After the establishment of a board under subsection (a) of this section and for 15 days after any such board has issued its report, no change in the status quo in effect prior to the expiration of the contract in the case of negotiations for a contract renewal, or in effect prior to the time of the impasse in the case of an initial bargaining negotiation, except by agreement, shall be made by the parties to the controversy.
(d) [Authorization of appropriations] There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section.
TITLE III
[Title 29, Chapter 7, Subchapter IV, United States Code]
SUITS BY AND AGAINST LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Sec. 301. [§ 185.] (a) [Venue, amount, and citizenship] Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act [chapter], or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
(b) [Responsibility for acts of agent; entity for purposes of suit; enforcement of money judgments] Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act [chapter] and any employer whose activities affect commerce as defined in this Act [chapter] shall be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment against a labor organization in a district court of the United States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any individual member or his assets.
(c) [Jurisdiction] For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal offices, or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members.
(d) [Service of process] The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of any court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor organization, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor organization.
(e) [Determination of question of agency] For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is acting as an “agent” of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
RESTRICTIONS ON PAYMENTS TO EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATIVES
Sec. 302. [§ 186.] (a) [Payment or lending, etc., of money by employer or agent to employees, representatives, or labor organizations] It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or any person who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or consultant to an employer or who acts in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value–
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry affecting commerce; or
(2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, any of the employees of such employer who are employed in an industry affecting commerce;
(3) to any employee or group or committee of employees of such employer employed in an industry affecting commerce in excess of their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee or group or committee directly or indirectly to influence any other employees in the exercise of the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing; or
(4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect to any of his actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of employees or as such officer or employee of such labor organization.
(b) [Request, demand, etc., for money or other thing of value]
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to request, demand, receive, or accept, or agree to receive or accept, any payment, loan, or delivery of any money or other thing of value prohibited by subsection (a) [of this section].
(2) It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or for any person acting as an officer, agent, representative, or employee of such labor organization, to demand or accept from the operator of any motor vehicle (as defined in part II of the Interstate Commerce Act [49 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.]) employed in the transportation of property in commerce, or the employer of any such operator, any money or other thing of value payable to such organization or to an officer, agent, representative or employee thereof as a fee or charge for the unloading, or in connection with the unloading, of the cargo of such vehicle: Provided, That nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to make unlawful any payment by an employer to any of his employees as compensation for their services as employees.
(c) [Exceptions] The provisions of this section shall not be applicable (1) in respect to any money or other thing of value payable by an employer to any of his employees whose established duties include acting openly for such employer in matters of labor relations or personnel administration or to any representative of his employees, or to any officer or employee of a labor organization, who is also an employee or former employee of such employer, as compensation for, or by reason of, his service as an employee of such employer; (2) with respect to the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value in satisfaction of a judgment of any court or a decision or award of an arbitrator or impartial chairman or in compromise, adjustment, settlement, or release of any claim, complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of fraud or duress; (3) with respect to the sale or purchase of an article or commodity at the prevailing market price in the regular course of business; (4) with respect to money deducted from the wages of employees in payment of membership dues in a labor organization: Provided, That the employer has received from each employee, on whose account such deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the termination date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner; (5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and their families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the representatives of the employers and the representatives of employees may agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or annuities; (6) with respect to money or other thing of value paid by any employer to a trust fund established by such representative for the purpose of pooled vacation, holiday, severance or similar benefits, or defraying costs of apprenticeship or other training programs: Provided, That the requirements of clause (B) of the proviso to clause (5) of this subsection shall apply to such trust funds; (7) with respect to money or other thing of value paid by any employer to a pooled or individual trust fund established by such representative for the purpose of (A) scholarships for the benefit of employees, their families, and dependents for study at educational institutions, (B) child care centers for preschool and school age dependents of employees, or (C) financial assistance for employee housing: Provided, That no labor organization or employer shall be required to bargain on the establishment of any such trust fund, and refusal to do so shall not constitute an unfair labor practice: Provided further, That the requirements of clause (B) of the proviso to clause (5) of this subsection shall apply to such trust funds; (8) with respect to money or any other thing of value paid by any employer to a trust fund established by such representative for the purpose of defraying the costs of legal services for employees, their families, and dependents for counsel or plan of their choice: Provided, That the requirements of clause (B) of the proviso to clause (5) of this subsection shall apply to such trust funds: Provided further, That no such legal services shall be furnished: (A) to initiate any proceeding directed (i) against any such employer or its officers or agents except in workman’s compensation cases, or (ii) against such labor organization, or its parent or subordinate bodies, or their officers or agents, or (iii) against any other employer or labor organization, or their officers or agents, in any matter arising under the National Labor Relations Act, or this Act [under subchapter II of this chapter or this chapter]; and (B) in any proceeding where a labor organization would be prohibited from defraying the costs of legal services by the provisions of the Labor- Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 [29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.]; or (9) with respect to money or other things of value paid by an employer to a plant, area or industry wide labor management committee established for one or more of the purposes set forth in section 5(b) of the Labor Management Cooperation Act of 1978.
[Sec. 302(c)(7) was added by Pub. L. 91-86, Oct. 14, 1969, 83 Stat. 133; Sec. 302(c)(8) by Pub. L. 93-95, Aug. 15, 1973, 87 Stat. 314; Sec. 302(c)(9) by Pub. L. 95-524, Oct. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 2021; and Sec. 302(c)(7) was amended by Pub. L. 101-273, Apr. 18, 1990, 104 Stat. 138.]
(d) [Penalty for violations] Any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of this section shall, upon conviction thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
(e) [Jurisdiction of courts] The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of the Territories and possessions shall have jurisdiction, for cause shown, and subject to the provisions of rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (relating to notice to opposite party) to restrain violations of this section, without regard to the provisions of section 7 of title 15 and section 52 of title 29, United States Code [of this title] [known as the “Clayton Act”], and the provisions of sections 101 to 115 of title 29, United States Code [chapter 6 of this title] [known as the “Norris-LaGuardia Act”].
(f) [Effective date of provisions] This section shall not apply to any contract in force on June 23, 1947, until the expiration of such contract, or until July 1, 1948, whichever first occurs.
(g) [Contributions to trust funds] Compliance with the restrictions contained in subsection (c)(5)(B) [of this section] upon contributions to trust funds, otherwise lawful, shall not be applicable to contributions to such trust funds established by collective agreement prior to January 1, 1946, nor shall subsection (c)(5)(A) [of this section] be construed as prohibiting contributions to such trust funds if prior to January 1, 1947, such funds contained provisions for pooled vacation benefits.
BOYCOTTS AND OTHER UNLAWFUL COMBINATIONS
Sec. 303. [§ 187.] (a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act .
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of subsection (a) [of this section] may sue therefore in any district court of the United States subject to the limitation and provisions of section 301 hereof without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.
RESTRICTION ON POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
Sec. 304. Repealed.
[See sec. 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1972, 2 U.S.C. § 441b.]
Sec. 305.[ § 188.] Strikes by Government employees. Repealed.
[See 5 U.S.C. § 7311 and 18 U.S.C. § 1918.]
TITLE IV
[Title 29, Chapter 7, Subchapter V, United States Code]
CREATION OF JOINT COMMITTEE TO STUDY AND REPORT ON BASIC PROBLEMS AFFECTING FRIENDLY LABOR RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY
Secs. 401-407. [§§ 191-197.] Omitted.
TITLE V
[Title 29, Chapter 7, Subchapter I, United States Code]
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 501. [§ 142.] When used in this Act [chapter]–
(1) The term “industry affecting commerce” means any industry or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct commerce or tend to burden or obstruct commerce or the free flow of commerce.
(2) The term “strike” includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.
(3) The terms “commerce,” “labor disputes,” “employer,” “employee,” “labor organization,” “representative,” “person,” and “supervisor” shall have the same meaning as when used in the National Labor Relations Act as amended by this Act [in subchapter II of this chapter].
SAVING PROVISION
Sec. 502. [§ 143.] [Abnormally dangerous conditions] Nothing in this Act [chapter] shall be construed to require an individual employee to render labor or service without his consent, nor shall anything in this Act [chapter] be construed to make the quitting of his labor by an individual employee an illegal act; nor shall any court issue any process to compel the performance by an individual employee of such labor or service, without his consent; nor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such employee or employees be deemed a strike under this Act [chapter].
SEPARABILITY
Sec. 503. [§ 144.] If any provision of this Act [chapter], or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, shall be held invalid, the remainder of this Act [chapter], or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
Harassment is a form of employment discrimination that violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, (ADEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, (ADA).
Harassment is unwelcome conduct that is based on race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy), national origin, age (40 or older), disability or genetic information. Harassment becomes unlawful where 1) enduring the offensive conduct becomes a condition of continued employment, or 2) the conduct is severe or pervasive enough to create a work environment that a reasonable person would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive. Anti-discrimination laws also prohibit harassment against individuals in retaliation for filing a discrimination charge, testifying, or participating in any way in an investigation, proceeding, or lawsuit under these laws; or opposing employment practices that they reasonably believe discriminate against individuals, in violation of these laws.
Petty slights, annoyances, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not rise to the level of illegality. To be unlawful, the conduct must create a work environment that would be intimidating, hostile, or offensive to reasonable people.
Offensive conduct may include, but is not limited to, offensive jokes, slurs, epithets or name calling, physical assaults or threats, intimidation, ridicule or mockery, insults or put-downs, offensive objects or pictures, and interference with work performance. Harassment can occur in a variety of circumstances, including, but not limited to, the following:
The harasser can be the victim’s supervisor, a supervisor in another area, an agent of the employer, a co-worker, or a non-employee.
The victim does not have to be the person harassed, but can be anyone affected by the offensive conduct.
Unlawful harassment may occur without economic injury to, or discharge of, the victim.
Prevention is the best tool to eliminate harassment in the workplace. Employers are encouraged to take appropriate steps to prevent and correct unlawful harassment. They should clearly communicate to employees that unwelcome harassing conduct will not be tolerated. They can do this by establishing an effective complaint or grievance process, providing anti-harassment training to their managers and employees, and taking immediate and appropriate action when an employee complains. Employers should strive to create an environment in which employees feel free to raise concerns and are confident that those concerns will be addressed.
Employees are encouraged to inform the harasser directly that the conduct is unwelcome and must stop. Employees should also report harassment to management at an early stage to prevent its escalation.
Employer Liability for Harassment
The employer is automatically liable for harassment by a supervisor that results in a negative employment action such as termination, failure to promote or hire, and loss of wages. If the supervisor’s harassment results in a hostile work environment, the employer can avoid liability only if it can prove that: 1) it reasonably tried to prevent and promptly correct the harassing behavior; and 2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.
The employer will be liable for harassment by non-supervisory employees or non-employees over whom it has control (e.g., independent contractors or customers on the premises), if it knew, or should have known about the harassment and failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action.
When investigating allegations of harassment, the EEOC looks at the entire record: including the nature of the conduct, and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred. A determination of whether harassment is severe or pervasive enough to be illegal is made on a case-by-case basis.
If you believe that the harassment you are experiencing or witnessing is of a specifically sexual nature, you may want to see EEOC’s information on sexual harassment.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
The law requires an employer to post a notice describing the Federal laws prohibiting job discrimination based on race, color, sex, national origin, religion, age, equal pay, disability or genetic information.
The “EEO is the Law” poster, prepared by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), summarizes these laws and explains how an employee or applicant can file a complaint if s/he believes that s/he has been the victim of discrimination. EEOC’s poster is available in English, Arabic, Chinese and Spanish.
These posters should be placed in a conspicuous location in the workplace where notices to applicants and employees are customarily posted. In addition to posting the enclosed poster, employers are encouraged to post the electronic notice on their internal web sites in a conspicuous location. In most cases, electronic posting supplements physical posting but does not itself fulfill the employer’s basic obligation to physically post the required information in its workplaces. In some situations (e.g., for employees who telework and do not visit the employer’s workplace on a regular basis), it may be required in addition to physical posting.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requires that notices of Federal laws prohibiting job discrimination be made available in a location that is accessible to applicants and employees with disabilities that limit mobility.
Printed notices should also be made available in an accessible format, as needed, to persons with disabilities that limit the ability to see or read. Notices can be recorded on an audio file, provided in an electronic format that can be utilized by screen-reading technology or read to applicants or employees with disabilities that limit seeing or reading ability. A screen-readable electronic format is available below.
If you have an older copy of the Poster, you can print the supplement below and post it alongside EEOC’s September 2002 “EEO is the Law” poster or OFCCP’s August 2008 “EEO is the Law” poster.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
with population figures from the 2010 U.S. census, estimates for 2013, as well as a complete list of the more than 17,000 towns, including those that no longer exist.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
This reprint generally retains the section numbers originally created by Congress in the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat 1590. This document includes some editorial changes, such as changing the format to make it easier to read, correcting typographical errors, and updating some of the margin notes. Because Congress enacted amendments to the Act since 1970, this version differs from the original version of the OSH Act. It also differs slightly from the version published in the United States Code at 29 U.S.C. 661 et seq . For example, this reprint refers to the statute as the “Act” rather than the “chapter.”
This reprint reflects the provisions of the OSH Act that are in effect as of January 1, 2004. Citations to Public Laws which made important amendments to the OSH Act since 1970 are set forth in the margins and explanatory notes are included below.
NOTE: Some provisions of the OSH Act may be affected by the enactment of, or amendments to, other statutes. Section 17(h)(1), 29 U.S.C. 666, is an example. The original provision amended section 1114 of title 18 of the United States Code to include employees of “the Department of Labor assigned to perform investigative, inspection, or law enforcement functions” within the list of persons protected by the provisions to allow prosecution of persons who have killed or attempted to kill an officer or employee of the U.S. government while performing official duties. This reprint sets forth the text of section 17(h) as enacted in 1970. However, since 1970, Congress has enacted multiple amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1114. The current version does not specifically include the Department of Labor in a list; rather it states that “Whoever kills or attempts to kill any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government (including any member of the uniformed services) while such officer or employee is engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties, or any person assisting such an officer or employee in the performance of such duties or on account of that assistance shall be punished . . .” as provided by the statute. Readers are reminded that the official version of statutes can be found in the current volumes of the United States Code, and more extensive historical notes can be found in the current volumes of the United States Code Annotated.
Amendments
On January 2, 1974, section 2(c) of Pub. L. 93-237 replaced the phrase “7(b)(6)” in section 28(d) of the OSH Act with “7(b)(5)”. 87 Stat. 1023. Note: The text of Section 28 (Economic Assistance to Small Business) amended Sections 7(b) and Section 4(c)(1) of the Small Business Act. Because these amendments are no longer current, the text of section 28 is omitted in this reprint. For the current version, see 15 U.S.C. 636.
In 1977, the U.S. entered into the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977, Sept. 7, 1977, U.S.-Panama, T.I.A.S. 10030, 33 U.S.T. 39. In 1979, Congress enacted implementing legislation. Panama Canal Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-70, 93 Stat. 452 (1979). Although no corresponding amendment to the OSH Act was enacted, the Canal Zone ceased to exist in 1979. The U.S. continued to manage, operate and facilitate the transit of ships through the Canal under the authority of the Panama Canal Treaty until December 31, 1999, at which time authority over the Canal was transferred to the Republic of Panama.
On March 27, 1978, Pub. L. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183, replaced the term “hearing examiner(s)” with “administrative law judge(s)” in all federal laws, including sections 12(e), 12(j), and 12(k) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 661.
On October 13, 1978, Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111, 1221, which redesignated section numbers concerning personnel matters and compensation, resulted in the substitution of section 5372 of Title 5 for section 5362 in section 12(e) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 661.
On October 17, 1979, Pub. L. 96-88, Title V, section 509(b), 93 Stat. 668, 695, redesignated references to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to the Department of Health and Human Services and redesignated references to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
On September 13, 1982, Pub. L. 97-258, §4(b), 96 Stat. 877, 1067, effectively substituted “Section 3324(a) and (b) of Title 31” for “Section 3648 of the Revised Statutes, as amended (31 U.S.C. 529)” in section 22 (e)(8), 29 U.S.C. 671, relating to NIOSH procurement authority.
On December 21, 1982, Pub. L. 97-375, 96 Stat. 1819, deleted the sentence in section 19(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 668, that directed the President of the United States to transmit annual reports of the activities of federal agencies to the House of Representatives and the Senate.
On October 12, 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, Chapter II, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987, (commonly referred to as the “Sentencing Reform Act of 1984”) instituted a classification system for criminal offenses punishable under the United States Code. Under this system, an offense with imprisonment terms of “six months or less but more than thirty days,” such as that found in 29 U.S.C. 666(e) for a willful violation of the OSH Act, is classified as a criminal “Class B misdemeanor.” 18 U.S.C. 3559(a)(7).
The criminal code increases the monetary penalties for criminal misdemeanors beyond what is provided for in the OSH Act: a fine for a Class B misdemeanor resulting in death, for example, is not more than $250,000 for an individual, and is not more than $500,000 for an organization. 18 U.S.C. 3571(b)(4), (c)(4). The criminal code also provides for authorized terms of probation for both individuals and organizations. 18 U.S.C. 3551, 3561. The term of imprisonment for individuals is the same as that authorized by the OSH Act. 18 U.S.C. 3581(b)(7).
On November 8, 1984, Pub. L. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335, deleted the last sentence in section 11(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 660, that required petitions filed under the subsection to be heard expeditiously.
On November 5, 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, amended section 17 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 666, by increasing the penalties in section 17(a) from $10,000 for each violation to “$70,000 for each violation, but not less than $5,000 for each willful violation,” and increased the limitation on penalties in sections (b), (c), (d), and (i) from $1,000 to $7,000.
On October 26, 1992, Pub. L. 102-522, 106 Stat. 3410, 3420, added to Title 29, section 671a “Workers’ Family Protection” to grant authority to the Director of NIOSH to evaluate, investigate and if necessary, for the Secretary of Labor to regulate employee transported releases of hazardous material that result from contamination on the employee’s clothing or person and may adversely affect the health and safety of workers and their families. Note: section 671a was enacted as section 209 of the Fire Administration Authorization Act of 1992, but it is reprinted here because it is codified within the chapter that comprises the OSH Act.
On October 28, 1992, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3672, 3924, amended section 22 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 671, by adding subsection (g), which requires NIOSH to institute a training grant program for lead-based paint activities.
On July 5, 1994, section 7(b) of Pub. L. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745, repealed section 31 of the OSH Act, “Emergency Locator Beacons.” Section 1(e) of the same Public Law, however, enacted a modified version of section 31 of the OSH Act. This provision, titled “Emergency Locator Transmitters,” is codified at 49 U.S.C. 44712.
On December 21, 1995, Section 3003 of Pub. L. 104-66, 109 Stat. 707, as amended, effective May 15, 2000, terminated the provisions relating to the transmittal to Congress of reports under section 26 of the OSH Act. 29 U.S.C. 675.
On July 16, 1998, Pub. L. 105-197, 112 Stat. 638, amended section 21 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 670, by adding subsection (d), which required the Secretary to establish a compliance assistance program by which employers can consult with state personnel regarding the application of and compliance with OSHA standards.
On July 16, 1998, Pub. L. 105-198, 112 Stat. 640, amended section 8 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 657, by adding subsection (h), which forbids the Secretary to use the results of enforcement activities to evaluate the employees involved in such enforcement or to impose quotas or goals.
On September 29, 1998, Pub. L. 105-241, 112 Stat. 1572, amended sections 3(5) and 19(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 652 and 668, to include the United States Postal Service as an “employer” subject to OSHA enforcement.
On June 12, 2002, Pub. L. 107-188, Title I, Section 153, 116 Stat. 631, Congress enacted 29 U.S.C. 669a, to expand research on the “health and safety of workers who are at risk for bioterrorist threats or attacks in the workplace.”
Jurisdictional Note
Although no corresponding amendments to the OSH Act have been made, OSHA no longer exercises jurisdiction over the entity formerly known as the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The Trust Territory, which consisted of the Former
Japanese Mandated Islands, was established in 1947 by the Security Council of the United Nations, and administered by the United States. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, Apr. 2-July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301, T.I.A.S. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S. 189.
From 1947 to 1994, the people of these islands exercised the right of self-determination conveyed by the Trusteeship four times, resulting in the division of the Trust Territory into four separate entities. Three entities: the Republic of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall Islands, became “Freely Associated States,” to which U.S. Federal Law does not apply. Since the OSH Act is a generally applicable law that applies to Guam, it applies to the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, which elected to become a “Flag Territory” of the United States. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, Article V, section 502(a) as contained in Pub. L. 94-24, 90 Stat. 263 (Mar. 24, 1976)[citations to amendments omitted]; 48 U.S.C. 1801 and note (1976); s ee also Saipan Stevedore Co., Inc. v. Director, Office of Workers’Compensation Programs, 133 F.3d 717, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)(Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act applies to the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to section 502(a) of the Covenant because the Act has general application to the states and to Guam). For up-to-date information on the legal status of these freely associated states and territories, contact the Office of Insular Affairs of the Department of the Interior. (Web address: http://www.doi.gov/oia/)
Omitted Text. Reasons for textual deletions vary. Some deletions may result from amendments to the OSH Act; others to subsequent amendments to other statutes which the original provisions of the OSH Act may have amended in 1970. In some instances, the original provision of the OSH Act was date-limited and is no longer operative.
The text of section 12(c), 29 U.S.C. 661, is omitted. Subsection (c) amended sections 5314 and 5315 of Title 5, United States Code, to add the positions of Chairman and members of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
The text of section 27, 29 U.S.C. 676, is omitted. Section 27 listed Congressional findings on workers’ compensation and established the National Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws, which ceased to exist ninety days after the submission of its final report, which was due no later than July 31, 1972.
The text of section 28 (Economic Assistance to Small Business) amended sections 7(b) and section 4(c)(1) of the Small Business Act to allow for small business loans in order to comply with applicable standards. Because these amendments are no longer current, the text is omitted here. For the current version see 15 U.S.C. 636.
The text of section 29, (Additional Assistant Secretary of Labor), created an Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health, and section 30 (Additional Positions) created additional positions within the Department of Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission in order to carry out the provisions of the OSH Act. The text of these sections is omitted here because it no longer reflects the current statutory provisions for staffing and pay. For current
provisions, see 29 U.S.C. 553 and 5 U.S.C. 5108 (c).
Section 31 of the original OSH Act amended 49 U.S.C. 1421 by inserting a section entitled “Emergency Locator Beacons.” The text of that section is omitted in this reprint because Pub. L. 103-272, 108 Stat.745, (July 5, 1994), repealed the text of section 31 and enacted a modified version of the provision, entitled “Emergency Locator Transmitters,” which is codified at 49 U.S.C. 44712.
Notes on other legislation affecting the administration of the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Sometimes legislation does not directly amend the OSH Act, but does place requirements on the Secretary of Labor either to act or to refrain from acting under the authority of the OSH Act. Included below are some examples of such legislation. Please note that this is not intended to be a comprehensive list.
STANDARDS PROMULGATION.
For example, legislation may require the Secretary to promulgate specific standards pursuant to authority under section 6 of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. 655. Some examples include the following:
Hazardous Waste Operations. Pub. L. 99-499, Title I, section 126(a)-(f), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), as amended by Pub. L. 100-202, section 101(f), Title II, section 201, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987), required the Secretary of Labor to promulgate standards concerning hazardous waste operations.
Chemical Process Safety Management. Pub. L. 101-549, Title III, section 304, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), required the Secretary of Labor, in coordination with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, to promulgate a chemical process safety standard.
Hazardous Materials. Pub. L. 101-615, section 29, 104 Stat. 3244 (1990), required the Secretary of Labor, in consultation with the Secretaries of Transportation and Treasury, to issue specific standards concerning the handling of hazardous materials.
Bloodborne Pathogens Standard. Pub. L. 102-170, Title I, section 100, 105 Stat. 1107 (1991), required the Secretary of Labor to promulgate a final Bloodborne Pathogens standard.
Lead Standard. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-550, Title X, sections 1031 and 1032, 106 Stat. 3672 (1992), required the Secretary of Labor to issue an interim final lead standard.
EXTENSION OF COVERAGE.
Sometimes a statute may make some OSH Act provisions applicable to certain entities that are not subject to those provisions by the terms of the OSH Act. For example, the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3, (1995), extended certain OSH Act coverage, such as the duty to comply with Section 5 of the OSH Act, to the Legislative Branch. Among other provisions, this legislation authorizes the General Counsel of the Office of Compliance within the Legislative Branch to exercise the authority granted to the Secretary of Labor in the OSH Act to inspect places of employment and issue a citation or notice to correct the violation found. This statute does not make all the provisions of the OSH Act applicable to the Legislative Branch. Another example is the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Title IX, Section 947, Pub. L. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003), which requires public hospitals not otherwise subject to the OSH Act to comply with OSHA’s Bloodborne Pathogens standard, 29 CFR 1910.1030. This statute provides for the imposition and collection of civil money penalties by the Department of Health and Human Services in the event that a hospital fails to comply with OSHA’s Bloodborne Pathogens standard.
PROGRAM CHANGES ENACTED THROUGH APPROPRIATIONS LEGISLATION.
Sometimes an appropriations statute may allow or restrict certain substantive actions by OSHA or the Secretary of Labor. For example, sometimes an appropriations statute may restrict the use of money appropriated to run the Occupational Safety and Health Administration or the Department of Labor. One example of such a restriction, that has been included in OSHA’s appropriation for many years, limits the applicability of OSHA requirements with respect to farming operations that employ ten or fewer workers and do not maintain a temporary labor camp. Another example is a restriction that limits OSHA’s authority to conduct certain enforcement activity with respect to employers of ten or fewer employees in low hazard industries. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. 108-199, Div. E – Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 2004, Title I – Department of Labor, 118 Stat. 3 (2004). Sometimes an appropriations statute may allow OSHA to retain some money collected to use for occupational safety and health training or grants. For example, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Div. E, Title I, cited above, allows OSHA to retain up to $750,000 of training institute course tuition fees per fiscal year for such uses. For the statutory text of currently applicable appropriations provisions, consult the OSHA appropriations statute for the fiscal year in question.
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Information on NFPA Codes and Standards Development
I. Applicable Regulations. The primary rules governing the processing of NFPA documents (codes, standards, recommended practices, and guides) are the NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects (Regs). Other applicable rules include NFPA Bylaws, NFPA Technical Meeting Convention Rules, NFPA Guide for the Conduct of Participants in the NFPA Standards Development Process, and the NFPA Regulations Governing Petitions to the Board of Directors from Decisions of the Standards Council. Most of these rules and regulations are contained in the NFPA Directory. For copies of the Directory, contact Codes and Standards Administration at NFPA Headquarters; all these documents are also available on the NFPA website at “www.nfpa.org.” The following is general information on the NFPA process. All participants, however, should refer to the actual rules and regulations for a full understanding of this process and for the criteria that govern participation.
II. Technical Committee Report. The Technical Committee Report is defined as “the Report of the Technical Committee and Technical Correlating Committee (if any) on a document. A Technical Committee Report consists of the Report on Proposals (ROP), as modified by the Report on Comments (ROC), published by the Association.”
III. Step 1: Report on Proposals (ROP). The ROP is defined as “a report to the Association on the actions taken by Technical Committees and/or Technical Correlating Committees, accompanied by a ballot statement and one or more proposals on text for a new document or to amend an existing document.” Any objection to an action in the ROP must be raised through the filing of an appropriate Comment for consideration in the ROC or the objection will be considered resolved.
IV. Step 2: Report on Comments (ROC). The ROC is defined as “a report to the Association on the actions taken by Technical Committees and/or Technical Correlating Committees accompanied by a ballot statement and one or more comments resulting from public review of the Report on Proposals (ROP).” The ROP and the ROC together constitute the Technical Committee Report. Any outstanding objection following the ROC must be raised through an appropriate Amending Motion at the Association Technical Meeting or the objection will be considered resolved.
V. Step 3a: Action at Association Technical Meeting. Following the publication of the ROC, there is a period during which those wishing to make proper Amending Motions on the Technical Committee Reports must signal their intention by submitting a Notice of Intent to Make a Motion. Documents that receive notice of proper Amending Motions (Certified Amending Motions) will be presented for action at the annual June Association Technical Meeting. At the meeting, the NFPA membership can consider and act on these Certified Amending Motions as well as Follow-up Amending Motions, that is, motions that become necessary as a result of a previous successful Amending Motion. (See 4.6.2 through 4.6.9 of Regs for a summary of the available Amending Motions and who may make them.) Any outstanding objection following action at an Association Technical Meeting (and any further Technical Committee consideration following successful Amending Motions, see Regs at 4.7) must be raised through an appeal to the Standards Council or it will be considered to be resolved.
VI. Step 3b: Documents Forwarded Directly to the Council. Where no Notice of Intent to Make a Motion (NITMAM) is received and certified in accordance with the Technical Meeting Convention Rules, the document is forwarded directly to the Standards Council for action on issuance. Objections are deemed to be resolved for these documents.
VII. Step 4a: Council Appeals. Anyone can appeal to the Standards Council concerning procedural or substantive matters related to the development, content, or issuance of any document of the Association or on matters within the purview of the authority of the Council, as established by the Bylaws and as determined by the Board of Directors. Such appeals must be in written form and filed with the Secretary of the Standards Council (see 1.6 of Regs). Time constraints for filing an appeal must be in accordance with 1.6.2 of the Regs. Objections are deemed to be resolved if not pursued at this level.
VIII. Step 4b: Document Issuance. The Standards Council is the issuer of all documents (see Article 8 of Bylaws). The Council acts on the issuance of a document presented for action at an Association Technical Meeting within 75 days from the date of the recommendation from the Association Technical Meeting, unless this period is extended by the Council (see 4.8 of Regs). For documents forwarded directly to the Standards Council, the Council acts on the issuance of the document at its next scheduled meeting, or at such other meeting as the Council may determine (see 4.5.6 and 4.8 of Regs).
IX. Petitions to the Board of Directors. The Standards Council has been delegated the responsibility for the administration of the codes and standards development process and the issuance of documents. However, where extraordinary circumstances requiring the intervention of the Board of Directors exist, the Board of Directors may take any action necessary to fulfill its obligations to preserve the integrity of the codes and standards development process and to protect the interests of the Association. The rules for petitioning the Board of Directors can be found in the Regulations Governing Petitions to the Board of Directors from Decisions of the Standards Council and in 1.7 of the Regs. X. For More Information. The program for the Association Technical Meeting (as well as the NFPA website as information becomes available) should be consulted for the date on which each report scheduled for consideration at the meeting will be presented. For copies of the ROP and ROC as well as more information on NFPA rules and for up-to-date information on schedules and deadlines for processing NFPA documents, check the NFPA website (www.nfpa.org) or contact NFPA Codes & Standards Administration at (617) 984-7246.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
Following a series of TSDF losses, starting in 2005 at Environmental Quality (EQ) in Romulus, Michigan to a more recent fatality and serious burn injury at Heritage WTI in East Liverpool, Ohio in December 2011, the CSB has recommended the NFPA “develop a fire protection standard for TSDFs addressing fire prevention, detection, control, and suppression requirements.” The applicability of NFPA codes and standards to hazardous wastes and TSDFs was not clear.In 2013, the NFPA Hazardous Chemicals Technical Committee created a task group to further investigate the TSDF fire problem in the context of the NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code. The task group identified the need for additional research regarding TSDF incidents in the form of a gap analysis. This code fund project, through the Fire Protection Research Foundation (FPRF), was created to gather information on TSDF losses including causes and contributing factors; to identify trends and challenges unique to TSDFs; to review the fire codes in the context of TSDFs; to identify gaps, both real and perceived, by Chemical Safety Board (CSB) and others; and propose a strategy for implementing code language with the existing MAQ per control area approach to fundamental requirements, fire prevention and fire protection for TSDFs containing a cross section of hazardous materials.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
Federal Agency Alleges Company Failed to Hire Bi-Racial Applicant Because of His Race
MINNEAPOLIS – A manufacturing company based in New Ulm, Minn., violated civil rights law by failing to hire an applicant who is bi-racial (African-American and white) because of his race, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in a lawsuit filed here today.
According to Julianne Bowman, the EEOC’s district director in Chicago, the EEOC’s pre-suit administrative investigation revealed that Windings, Inc., refused to hire Tommie Kimball for a vacant assembler position, and instead hired a white applicant.
Kimball applied for a vacant assembler job and interviewed with the company on Jan. 9, 2014, the EEOC said. Kimball was qualified for the job as he passed the job-related assessment tests, and had previous work experience as an assembler. Windings did not hire Kimball for the job, and instead hired a white applicant. The EEOC alleges that Kimball was not hired because of his race.
This alleged conduct violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which protects employees from discrimination based on race. The EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Windings, Inc.; Civil Action No. 15-cv-02901) after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process. The EEOC seeks back pay and compensatory damages and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.
“Federal law is crystal-clear: Employers may not refuse to hire individuals because of their race,” said John Hendrickson, regional attorney for the EEOC’s Chicago District. “The EEOC will vigorously fight to eliminate this sort of injustice.”
The EEOC’s litigation will be led by Senior Trial Attorney Tina Burnside in its Minneapolis Area Office and supervised by Associate Regional Attorney Jean Kamp in the agency’s Chicago District Office. That office is responsible for processing charges of discrimination, administrative enforcement and litigation in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Illinois and Iowa, with Area Offices in Milwaukee and Minneapolis.
The EEOC enforces federal laws prohibiting employment discrimination. Further information about the EEOC is available on its website at www.eeoc.gov.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
NHC Healthcare/Clinton, LLC Failed to Provide Pregnant Employee with a Reasonable Accommodation and Subsequently Fired Her, Federal Agency Charged
GREENVILLE, S.C. – NHC Healthcare/Clinton, LLC, a licensed nursing center that provides a wide array of skilled nursing, therapeutic and rehabilitative services, violated federal law when it failed to accommodate a pregnant employee and subsequently fired her because of her pregnancy and her disability, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charged in a lawsuit filed last week.
According to the EEOC’s complaint, around Feb. 21, 2002, NHC Healthcare hired Tonya Aria as a full-time licensed practical nurse (LPN) at its nursing center facility in Clinton, S.C. Aria suffers from paroxysmal supraventricular tachycardia (PSVT), which, without medication, can cause rapid heart rate, numbness in the extremities, tunnel vision, and occasional blackouts. Aria’s PSVT is controlled by medication. NHC was aware of Aria’s medical condition.
In mid-December 2012, Aria learned she was pregnant and stopped taking her PSVT medicine due to possible side effects to her unborn child. As a result, Aria’s PSVT symptoms became uncontrolled. Additionally, Aria’s normal pregnancy symptoms, such as fatigue and nausea, were exacerbated by her PSVT. Due to her medical condition and pregnancy, Aria was placed on bed rest and written out of three days’ work in early January 2013. On Jan. 15, Aria was fired by the director of nursing because of absences related to her pregnancy and PSVT. The EEOC contends that NHC Healthcare refused to accommodate Aria by allowing her medical leave, and subsequently fired her because of her disability and pregnancy.
Such alleged conduct violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which protects employees from discrimination based on their disabilities and requires employers to provide disabled employees with reasonable accommodations unless doing so would be an undue hardship for the employer. Additionally, the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibits employers from discriminating against employees due to their pregnancies. The EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Greenville Division (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. NHC Healthcare/Clinton, LLC, Civil Action No.6:15-CV-02584-MGL-KFM) after first attempting to reach a pre-litigation settlement through its conciliation process. The EEOC seeks back pay as well as compensatory damages and punitive damages for Aria. The EEOC also seeks injunctive relief.
“Federal laws protect employees who are pregnant as well as those who have a disability,” said Lynette A. Barnes, regional attorney for the EEOC’s Charlotte District Office. “In this case, Ms. Aria had a pre-existing disability and was pregnant when the events alleged in EEOC’s complaint occurred. However, employees who do not have a pre-existing disability, but who develop medical conditions that meet the ADA’s definition of ‘disability’ as a result of becoming pregnant, are also protected from disability discrimination. Employers must be aware of this intersection between Title VII’s pregnancy discrimination prohibition and the ADA.”
One of the six national priorities identified by the Commission’s Strategic Enforcement Plan (SEP) is for the Commission to address emerging and developing issues in equal employment law, including issues involving the intersection between the ADA and pregnancy-related limitations.
The EEOC is responsible for enforcing federal laws against employment discrimination. Further information is available at www.eeoc.gov.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s new office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
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