Congratulations to Jim Williams and Jeff Lacy for being named to Fort Worth Magazine’s Top Attorney List for 2014. They will be attending a Reception honoring the selected attorneys at the Fort Worth Club on November 20th.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
The Texas Supreme Court in a June 20, 2014 decision called State Office of Risk Management v. Carty, 2014 WL 2790810 (Tex. 2014), addressed how a workers’ compensation carrier’s future credit is calculated when more than one death beneficiary is involved in the case.
As background, in Texas, an insurance company that has paid workers’ compensation benefits to a legal beneficiary of an employee has subrogation rights that attach to a beneficiary’s claims against a 3rd party. Tex. Lab. Code § 417.001-.002 (2006). The Texas Workers’ Compensation Act defines the term “legal beneficiary” as meaning a person who is entitled to receive a death benefit under the Act. Tex. Lab. Code § 401.011(29). The workers’ compensation carrier has a right of reimbursement from the first monies paid by the 3rd party tortfeasor, whether by settlement or pursuant to judgment. Texas Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ledbetter, 251 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. 2008).
“That portion of an award or settlement which represents a workers’ compensation beneficiary’s interest”, is what a carrier’s rights are limited to. If there is a settlement that involves beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, monies must first be allocated to each before the extent of the carrier’s rights under § 417.002 can be determined. It is important to note that a carrier has no right to any part of the distribution of a 3rd party recovery that represents a non-beneficiary’s interest. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Hernandez, 918 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi, 1996, writ denied).
With this legal back drop, in the Carty case, the 5th Circuit had posed this question to the Supreme Court: How should a workers’ compensation carrier’s right under § 417.002 to treat a recovery as an advance of future benefits be calculated in a case involving multiple beneficiaries? Should the carrier’s right be determined on a beneficiary-by-beneficiary basis or on a collective-recovery basis?
The Court stated that in such a scenario the carrier recovers its past lien off the top any time there are multiple beneficiaries involved. The net amount recovered by a claimant should be used to reimburse the carrier for past benefits paid. With respect to future benefits, the insurance carrier’s right to claim credit is premised on the concept that a carrier is entitled to recover first money and the advance of any future benefits in a case involving several beneficiaries must be determined on a collective-recovery basis. Consequently, the future benefits credit is not determined on a beneficiary by beneficiary basis, but must be looked at as a whole.
When the apportionment of a settlement has an effect on an insurance carrier’s reimbursement rights, a court should apportion the monies based upon the relative value and merit of the various claims involved. The court cannot do so in a way that circumvents the carrier’s subrogation rights. Texas Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v. Travis, 912 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. – Fort Worth, 1995, no writ).
Language from the Ledbetter case reflects the strength of a carrier’s position in a workers’ compensation subrogation matter in Texas courts generally:
When an injured worker settles a case without reimbursing a compensation carrier, everyone involved is liable to the carrier for conversion – the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs’ attorney, and the defendants. As between those parties, we have held that generally those who received the funds unlawfully (the plaintiffs and their attorney) should disgorge them rather than making the tortfeasors pay twice. Ledbetter, supra.
It is expected that the new Supreme Court decision in Carty will be interpreted as a more clear definition of a workers’ compensation carrier’s rights under § 417.002 of The Texas Labor Code. Combined with the “club” that the “conversion” cause of action provides as reflected in Ledbetter, the Carty decision now arms insurance carriers with more clarity to go with the “club”.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
It’s very common for employers, when terminating an employee, to pay a sum of money (usually termed “severance”) in exchange for the former employee’s release of any legal claim related to the employment relationship. Often times the terminated employee is satisfied with the “severance” payment and everyone goes on with their lives.
However, there are other times when the terminated employee is not satisfied with the way things ended with its former employer. Maybe the “severance” was not enough, or maybe the employee felt that he was terminated for an unlawful reason. This is when the employer really needs that release it paid for to be enforceable.
The problem is, many of them are not. Employment law can be very technical and as a result innocent mistakes are frequently made. Does the release provide the employee with an opportunity to review the terms with independent counsel? Does it use clear and specific language to address the type of claims being waived? Does it require the employee to acknowledge that he is receiving fair compensation in return for his signature on the release?
If the answer is no to any of these questions there is a possibility that the employee will be permitted to pursue legal action despite that fact that he signed a release. The good news is that with the help of an experienced employment lawyer problems in release documents can be easily corrected.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
You have likely heard that Texas is an employment at-will state. This means that an employer may terminate an employee’s employment at any time, without notice. Furthermore, there is no requirement that the employer state a cause for the termination. This general rule makes it real easy for the employer who wishes to make a personnel change, right? Wrong!
For every rule there is an exception, and in the case of at-will employment, the exceptions have nearly swallowed the rule, making the decision to terminate an employee one of the more complex decisions that a business will consider.
Personnel decisions that are based (or appear to be based) on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, or age are often called into scrutiny by the disgruntled employee or job applicant. Similarly, the decision to terminate someone who has recently filed for workers’ compensation benefits or benefits under the Family Medical Leave Act can lead to claims of retaliation.
So, although Texas does technically allow termination without cause every employer needs to understand the various exceptions to the rule. Using policies and procedures that establish the employer’s expectations and the procedure for disciplining employees when those expectations are not met will go a long way in the effort to minimize employment disputes.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
We frequently handle Contested Case Hearings on behalf of our insurance company clients in Texas workers’ compensation cases. When we win at the CCH level, and the Claimant appeals, we work hard to convince the Appeals Panel to affirm the decision of the Hearing Officer. We often point out the following points of law in support of our position:
It is settled law that the Hearing Officer is the trier of fact and the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. (Tex. Lab. Code Sec. 410.165(a); AP No. 990132). It is also well settled that the Hearing Officer can believe part or all of the testimony of a witness. (AP No. 972447). The Hearing Officer is the trier of fact and judges the credibility of each and every witness, the weight to assign to each witness= testimony and resolves conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony. (Taylor v. Lewis 553 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Civ. App. – Amarillo 1977, writ ref=d n.r.e.); AP No. 93426).
Equally true is the application by the Hearing Officer of the assignment of credibility and weight in the resolution of conflicts and inconsistencies as regards medical evidence. (Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dis.] 1984, no writ.)). The trier of fact is not required to accept a Claimant=s testimony at face value, even if not specifically contradicted by other evidence. (Bullard v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Company, 609 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. Civ. App. – Amarillo 1980, no writ.)). The Hearing Officer may believe all, part or none of the testimony of any witnesses. (Aetna Insurance Company v. English, 204 S.W. 2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1947, no writ.)).
An appeals level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence could support a different result. (National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1991, writ denied)). The Appeals Panel has stated : “… we do not substitute our judgment for that of the Hearing Officer if there is some appropriate evidence supporting his factual determination, and it is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” (AP No. 92155; In Re Kings Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986)).
When the evidence in a case clearly supports the Hearing Officer’s Decision and Order, the Appeals Panel is supposed to affirm on any grounds available. See Daylin, Inc. v. Juarez, 766 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App. – El Paso 1989, writ denied); Hernandez v. Hernandez, 611 S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Civ. App. – San Antonio 1981, no writ.).
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
Texas has a substantial factor requirement in workers’ compensation cases which the Claimant’s evidence frequently fails to meet in our hearing offices and court rooms. Also, if the medical evidence of causation is conclusory, it is insufficient.
1) SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR REQUIRED
The causation standard on whether an injury is work related is based on a recent Texas Supreme Court case called Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crump . It says that “producing cause in workers’ compensation cases is defined as a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred.”
The Crump court said: “In other words, for an act or event to rise to the level of cause in the legal sense, the act or event must be such that reasonable jurors would identify it as being actually responsible for the ultimate harm. The cause must be more than one of the countless ubiquitous and insignificant causes that in some remote sense may have contributed to a given effect as, for example, simply getting up in the morning. That the term substantial factor is given to this commonsense aspect of legal causation simply makes plain to jurors that more than causation in this indirect, “philosophic sense” is required.”
2) EVIDENCE CANNOT JUST BE CONCLUSORY
And in Texas Workers Compensation Appeals Panel Decision 110054, the Appeals Panel stated that “[a]lthough the claimed conditions are listed in the record, there is not any explanation of causation for the claimed conditions in the record. We hold that in this case the mere recitation of the claimed conditions in the medical records without attendant explanation how those conditions may be related to the compensable injury does not establish those conditions are related to the compensable injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability.”
Reversing the Hearing Officer, The Appeals Panel stated:
“There are no medical records in evidence, neither those of the treating doctor or the designated doctor, that explain how the work injury of [date of injury], caused the claimed right lower extremity myelopathy, arthrosis at L4-5, disc bulge at L5-S1, and aggravation of degenerative disc disease. The peer review doctor, testified at the CCH as to what each of these claimed conditions were, and why, in his medical opinion, the medical records of the claimant did not establish the claimed conditions resulted from the work injury, within reasonable medical probability. In contrast, the Designated Doctor’s letter of causation is a mere recitation of the claimed extent-of-injury diagnoses and is conclusory. Accordingly, that portion of the hearing officer’s finding that the claimant’s right lower extremity myelopathy, arthrosis at L4-5, disc bulge at L5-S1, and aggravation of degenerative disc disease arose out of and naturally flowed from the compensable injury of [date of injury], is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust.”
We as Insurance Carrier Attorneys frequently make these and similar arguments with success in Contested Case Hearings at the Division of Workers’ Compensation. Gone are the days of minimal proof of causation with little or no supporting expert opinion evidence. This trend has been favorable for our insurance company clients.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
The Texas statutes prevent a hospital lien from attaching to the following:
Claims under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act, the Federal Employees Liability Act; the Federal Longshoremens’ of Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, and claims against railroad companies who own the hospital in which the injured person is treated, § 55.003(b);
Claims against the injured worker’s own insurance policy proceeds, such as uninsured/underinsured motorists’ coverage and PIP. §55.003; Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hermann Hospital, 664 S.W.2d 325, 28 (Tex. 1984) (uninsured/underinsured motorists benefits are not subject to statutory hospital lien);
Hospital liens do not attach to proceeds from wrongful death actions, but they do attach to survival actions. They attach only in cases where recovery for personal injury is sought; they do not attach to judgments or awards for wrongful death;
Hospital liens do not attach to the expenses of treatment of medical problems that are unrelated to the accident at issue but which are attributed to the negligence of another person;
A hospital may not recover pre-judgment interest on the amount of its hospital lien, and, where it intervenes in a suit in order to recover its lien, it may not recover attorneys’ fees, either. Hermann Hospital v. Vardeman, 775 S.W.2d 866, 867-868 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ).
The text of the relevant statutory language is below:
Texas Property Code CHAPTER 55. HOSPITAL AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES LIENS
PROPERTY CODE
CHAPTER 55. HOSPITAL AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL SERVICES LIENS
§ 55.001. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter:
(1) “Emergency medical services” has the meaning
assigned by Section 773.003, Health and Safety Code.
(2) “Emergency medical services provider” has the
meaning assigned by Section 773.003, Health and Safety Code.
(3) “Hospital” means a person or institution
maintaining a facility that provides hospital services in this
state.
(4) “Person” does not include a county, common, or
independent school district.
§ 55.002. LIEN. (a) A hospital has a lien on a cause of
action or claim of an individual who receives hospital services for
injuries caused by an accident that is attributed to the negligence
of another person. For the lien to attach, the individual must be
admitted to a hospital not later than 72 hours after the accident.
(b) The lien extends to both the admitting hospital and a
hospital to which the individual is transferred for treatment of
the same injury.
(c) An emergency medical services provider has a lien on a
cause of action or claim of an individual who receives emergency
medical services in a county with a population of 575,000 or less
for injuries caused by an accident that is attributed to the
negligence of another person. For the lien to attach, the
individual must receive the emergency medical services not later
than 72 hours after the accident.
§ 55.003. PROPERTY TO WHICH LIEN ATTACHES. (a) A lien
under this chapter attaches to:
(1) a cause of action for damages arising from an
injury for which the injured individual is admitted to the hospital
or receives emergency medical services;
(2) a judgment of a court in this state or the decision
of a public agency in a proceeding brought by the injured individual
or by another person entitled to bring the suit in case of the death
of the individual to recover damages arising from an injury for
which the injured individual is admitted to the hospital or
receives emergency medical services; and
(3) the proceeds of a settlement of a cause of action
or a claim by the injured individual or another person entitled to
make the claim, arising from an injury for which the injured
individual is admitted to the hospital or receives emergency
medical services.
(b) The lien does not attach to:
(1) a claim under the workers’ compensation law of this
state, the Federal Employees Liability Act, or the Federal
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act; or
(2) the proceeds of an insurance policy in favor of the
injured individual or the injured individual’s beneficiary or legal
representative, except public liability insurance carried by the
insured that protects the insured against loss caused by an
accident or collision.
(c) A hospital lien described by Section 55.002(a) does not
attach to a claim against the owner or operator of a railroad
company that maintains or whose employees maintain a hospital in
which the injured individual is receiving hospital services.
§ 55.004. AMOUNT OF LIEN. (a) In this section,
“emergency hospital care” means health care services provided in a
hospital to evaluate, stabilize, and treat a serious medical
problem of recent onset or severity, including severe pain that
would lead a prudent layperson possessing an average knowledge of
medicine and health to believe that the condition, illness, or
injury is of such a nature that failure to obtain immediate medical
care would in all reasonable probability:
(1) seriously jeopardize the patient’s health;
(2) seriously impair one or more bodily functions;
(3) seriously harm an organ or other part of the body;
(4) cause serious disfigurement; or
(5) in the case of a pregnant woman, seriously
jeopardize the health of the fetus.
(b) A hospital lien described by Section 55.002(a) is for
the amount of the hospital’s charges for services provided to the
injured individual during the first 100 days of the injured
individual’s hospitalization.
(c) A hospital lien described by Section 55.002(a) may also
include the amount of a physician’s reasonable and necessary
charges for emergency hospital care services provided to the
injured individual during the first seven days of the injured
individual’s hospitalization. At the request of the physician, the
hospital may act on the physician’s behalf in securing and
discharging the lien.
(d) A hospital lien described by Section 55.002(a) does not
cover:
(1) charges for other services that exceed a
reasonable and regular rate for the services;
(2) charges by the physician related to any services
provided under Subsection (c) for which the physician has accepted
insurance benefits or payment under a private medical indemnity
plan or program, regardless of whether the benefits or payment
equals the full amount of the physician’s charges for those
services;
(3) charges by the physician for services provided
under Subsection (c) if the injured individual has coverage under a
private medical indemnity plan or program from which the physician
is entitled to recover payment for the physician’s services under
an assignment of benefits or similar rights; or
(4) charges by the physician related to any services
provided under Subsection (c) if the physician is a member of the
legislature.
(e) A hospital lien described by Section 55.002(a) is not
affected by a hospital’s use of a method of classifying patients
according to their ability to pay that is solely intended to obtain
a lien for services provided to an indigent injured individual.
(f) An emergency medical services lien described by Section
55.002(c) is for the amount charged by the emergency medical
services provider, not to exceed $1,000, for emergency medical
services provided to the injured individual during the 72 hours
following the accident that caused the individual’s injuries.
(g) An emergency medical services lien described by Section
55.002(c) does not cover:
(1) charges for services that exceed a reasonable and
regular rate for the services;
(2) charges by the emergency medical services provider
related to any services for which the emergency medical services
provider has accepted insurance benefits or payment under a private
medical indemnity plan or program, regardless of whether the
benefits or payments equal the full amount of the charges for those
services; or
(3) charges by the emergency medical services provider
for services provided if the injured individual has coverage under
a private medical indemnity plan or program from which the provider
is entitled to recover payment for the provider’s services under an
assignment of benefits or similar right.
(h) If the physician is employed in that capacity by an
institution of higher education, as defined by Section 61.003,
Education Code, and the lien does not include the amount of the
physician’s reasonable and necessary charges described by
Subsection (c), the physician has a lien on the cause of action in
the same manner as a hospital under this chapter. The lien is
subject to provisions of this chapter applicable to a hospital
lien, and the physician or the physician’s employing institution
may secure and enforce the lien in the manner provided by this
chapter.
§ 55.005. SECURING LIEN. (a) To secure the lien, a
hospital or emergency medical services provider must file written
notice of the lien with the county clerk of the county in which the
services were provided. The notice must be filed before money is
paid to an entitled person because of the injury.
(b) The notice must contain:
(1) the injured individual’s name and address;
(2) the date of the accident;
(3) the name and location of the hospital or emergency
medical services provider claiming the lien; and
(4) the name of the person alleged to be liable for
damages arising from the injury, if known.
(c) The county clerk shall record the name of the injured
individual, the date of the accident, and the name and address of
the hospital or emergency medical services provider and shall index
the record in the name of the injured individual.
§ 55.006. DISCHARGE OF LIEN. (a) To discharge a lien
under this chapter, the authorities of the hospital or emergency
medical services provider claiming the lien or the person in charge
of the finances of the hospital or emergency medical services
provider must execute and file with the county clerk of the county
in which the lien notice was filed a certificate stating that the
debt covered by the lien has been paid or released and authorizing
the clerk to discharge the lien.
(b) The county clerk shall record a memorandum of the
certificate and the date it was filed.
(c) The filing of the certificate and recording of the
memorandum discharge the lien.
§ 55.007. VALIDITY OF RELEASE. (a) A release of a cause
of action or judgment to which a lien under this chapter may attach
is not valid unless:
(1) the charges of the hospital or emergency medical
services provider claiming the lien were paid in full before the
execution and delivery of the release;
(2) the charges of the hospital or emergency medical
services provider claiming the lien were paid before the execution
and delivery of the release to the extent of any full and true
consideration paid to the injured individual by or on behalf of the
other parties to the release; or
(3) the hospital or emergency medical services
provider claiming the lien is a party to the release.
(b) A judgment to which a lien under this chapter has
attached remains in effect until the charges of the hospital or
emergency medical services provider claiming the lien are paid in
full or to the extent set out in the judgment.
§ 55.008. RECORDS. (a) On request by an attorney for a
party by, for, or against whom a claim is asserted for damages
arising from an injury, a hospital or emergency medical services
provider shall as promptly as possible make available for the
attorney’s examination its records concerning the services
provided to the injured individual.
(b) The hospital or emergency medical services provider may
issue reasonable rules for granting access to its records under
this section, but it may not deny access because a record is
incomplete.
(c) The records are admissible, subject to applicable rules
of evidence, in a civil suit arising from the injury.
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
Back in the day, truck drivers use to drive all over the country with daily stops in the morning to find a payphone so they could call dispatch to let them know of their location and how much farther they had to go to delivery or next pick up.
Then the pager got introduced to the trucking industry as a great new way of communicating with the driver. Wow, beep, beep, and then a number would come across the screen and the driver would find a payphone to call the 1-800 number. When Qualcomms got introduced many drivers didn’t like it because, they felt they were being spied on. What do drivers’ think now that cameras are being put into the truck cab? Not only to look out the windshield, but also looking at the driver as he drives.
Several reasons the trucking companies are giving for this new technology, for safety and data collecting information on drivers reactions as they drive. Whether it be a hard break, accident or bad weather. In some cases it has help some drivers to be better drivers’ because safety was able to see what occurred at the time in question. At times it just a bad habit, other times the driver is doing things against company policy. The company can help the driver by pointing out the bad habit or decide it is time to part ways…
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
In 2013, an enforcement initiative was launched by OSHA focusing on the improvement of safety measures for temporary workers.
OSHA defines “temporary workers” as workers that are supplied to a host employer and paid by a staffing agency. This applies whether the worker’s job is temporary or not. OSHA’s enforcement initiative focuses on identifying temporary workers, evaluating whether they are exposed to any safety hazards, and determining if they have received proper training and protection.
In recent months, OSHA has received a number of reports of temporary workers suffering fatal injuries during their first few days on a job. For example, in December of 2013, an Illinois temporary worker was killed by the forklift he was operating when it fell between the dock and truck. Also in December of 2013, a temporary worker died from a fall after he was caught in a sorter. Lastly OSHA cited Bacardi Bottling Corporation after a 21-year old temporary worker was fatally injured his first day on the job.
Ultimately, OSHA views the protecting of temporary workers as a joint responsibility between host employers and their staffing agency. However, OSHA has shown concern that as a means to avoid meeting all their compliance obligations under the OSH Act and other worker protection laws, some employers are using more and more temporary workers. Temporary workers are often not given adequate safety and health training or explanations of their duties by either the temporary staffing agency or the host employer and are likely more vulnerable to workplace safety and health hazards than workers in traditional employment relationships.
To see article:
https://www.linkedin.com/today/post/article/20140722232211-5310498–reducing-hazards-to-temporary-workers?trk=object-title
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
On Tuesday the Business & Industry Committee of the Texas House held a hearing on the voluntary nature of workers’ compensation in Texas. Some effort to make workers’ comp mandatory is made in every session of the legislature . Some effort to make workers’ comp mandatory is made in every session of the legislature and usually goes nowhere. That may be the case in the upcoming session, but it seems the concept will get a harder look this time. The hearing was due to the interim charge from Speaker Joe Strauss to study the “voluntary” nature of workers’ comp. in Texas….
Williams, McClure & Parmelee is dedicated to high quality legal representation of businesses and insurance companies in a variety of matters. We are experienced Texas civil litigation attorneys based in Fort Worth who know Texas courts and Texas law. For more information, please contact the law firm at 817-335-8800. The firm’s office location is 5601 Bridge Street, Suite 300, Fort Worth, Texas 76112.
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